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Red sky at night,
Sailor’s delight;
Red sky at morning,
1
Sailor’s warning.
The research for this article originated in essays prepared for two CLE
presentations in 2009 and 2010. Roland Trope and Claudia Ray, The Real Realities
of Cloud Computing: Ethical Issues for Lawyers, Law Firms and Judges, Essay for CLE
Program, ABA Annual Meeting, San Francisco, August 2010; Roland Trope and
Claudia Ray, Head in the Cloud – Feet on the Ground: Understanding the Ethical
Challenges of Web 2.0 for Lawyers, Law Firms and Judges, ABA Annual Meeting,
Chicago, August 2009. Copies of both essays are on file with the authors. The
research for this article was current as of August 4, 2011.
The authors would like to thank Claudia Ray for her earlier work and
Vince O. Polley, a former Chair of the Cyberspace Law Committee and Chair of
the ABA’s Standing Committee on Technology, Col. Barry L. Schoop, Col.
Nathaniel Causey, Geoffrey Schwartz, and Dr. Monique Witt for comments related
to specific cyber risks and duties that are discussed in this article.
In addition, the authors want to acknowledge the gracious invitation from
the editors of the William Mitchell Law Review to publish this article, and to extend
special thanks to Professor Christina Kunz, who is a faculty member at William
Mitchell College of Law and until recently a vice chair of the American Bar
Association’s Cyberspace Law Committeethe committee which sponsored one of
the two CLE programsfor her suggestion to the editors to invite us to contribute
to this issue.
Three exceptional research assistants contributed to this article in

114

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

Lady Gaga has made herself a paragon of pop ambition and a spokeswoman
for equal rights, but on Monday she became an unwitting symbol for
2
something else: the pitfalls of cloud computing.

significant ways, Christina Clark, E. Sebastian Arduengo, and Peyman Yousefy,
Maurer School of Law, Classes of 2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively. Finally, the
authors thank Marion Conaty and Max Exter of the Maurer School of Law whose
timely assistance was instrumental when this manuscript (with exquisite irony)
became corrupt. Without the contributions of these five individuals, this article
would never have been finished. Regardless of their talents, any remaining errors
are the authors’ responsibilities.
The views expressed in this article are solely those of the authors and have
not been approved by, and should not be attributable to, the U. S. Military
Academy at West Point, the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Government,
the Maurer School of Law, or the Trustees of Indiana University.
1. NURSERY RHYMESLYRICS, ORIGINS & HISTORY!, http://www.rhymes.org.uk
/red_sky_at_night.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).
The website
http://www.rhymes.org.uk/red_sky_at_night.htm attributes the rhyme’s origins to
the Bible:
He answered and said unto them, When it is evening, ye say, It will be fair
weather; for the sky is red. And in the morning, It will be foul weather today [sic]; for the sky is red and lowering. O ye hypocrites, ye can discern
the face of the sky, but can ye not discern the signs of the times?
Id. (quoting Matt. 16:2–3). Shakespeare also paraphrased this old adage in Venus
and Adonis (1593). WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE ARDEN SHAKESPEARE COMPLETE
WORKS 55 (Richard Proudfoot et al. eds., 1998) (“Like a red morn, that ever yet
betoken’d, Wreck to the seaman, tempest to the field, Sorrow to shepherds, woe
unto the birds, Gusts and foul flaws to herdmen and to herds.”); see also EVERYDAY
MYSTERIES: FUN SCI. FACTS FROM THE LIBR. OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/rr
/scitech/mysteries/weather-sailor.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2011) (explaining the
history behind the saying).
2. Ben Sisario, Lady Gaga Sale Stalls Amazon Servers, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2011,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/business/media/24gaga.
html?ref=technology. In May 2011, on the release of Lady Gaga’s new album,
“Born This Way,” Amazon.com offered “a one-day sale of the MP3 version of the
album for ninety-nine cents, a full $11 less than its price at iTunes, the Web’s
dominant music retailer.” Id. The discount reportedly provides Amazon a means
of promoting its new “Cloud Drive” service that “allows users to store music files
on remote servers and stream them over the Internet to their computer or
smartphone.” Id. However, the promotion proved so popular that the requests
for the “99 cent” download overwhelmed Amazon’s cloud computing servers,
which “stalled” and prevented many users from completing the download or from
listening to the full album. Id. In addition, in late May 2011, a staff developer at
the Tenafly, New Jersey school district employed a Lady Gaga impersonator to
deliver a presentation about bullying over the Internet. Karen Sudol, Tenafly
School Officials Reviewing ‘Lady Gaga’ Incident, NORTH JERSEY.COM (May 31, 2011),
http://www.northjersey.com/news/Tenafly_school_officials_reviewing_Lady_Gag
a_incident.html. After a student queried administrators as to the true identity of
the speaker, the school district called the developer’s actions “a clear lapse in
judgment.” Id. Though the employee has not been formally disciplined, her case
also highlights the pitfalls that may be encountered when utilizing new
technologies in the workplace. Id.
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INTRODUCTION

For three decades, the practice of law has adjusted to the
incoming tide of the Digital Era. The tide has not raised all boats.
What has required so much adjustment is the arrival of a succession
of new communications technologies. These new technologies
promise far-reaching benefits including decreased processing time,
enhanced reach of communications (with e-mail eclipsing faxes),
global transmission of text messages and “tweets,” compression of
reams of documents into portable storage devices and thumb
drives, and finally, global access to entire libraries via website data
banks. However, these extraordinary advances have not been
without cost.
Counsel have had to adjust to these new technologies and with
each new advance learn how to take the best advantage of their
greater efficiencies, and most importantly (although often
underestimated), how to evaluate the hidden impact of each
technology on counsel’s professional responsibilities and ethical
duties. But the ethical and professional obligations that arise when
lawyers and law firms become “early adopters” of a new
communications technology are not always immediately apparent.
Nor is it clear that the profession’s ethics have kept pace with
the incipient risks of these new technologies. The need to keep
pace with technologies, the risks they may present to counsel and
the client confidential information entrusted to them, and the
relationship of those tasks to the professional ethics rules is the
focus of this article. These needs will shape the policies that
counsel establish for their legal practices and for their acquisitions
of new technologies and will give them an increasingly influential
role in the legal profession’s operations. We would therefore
suggest that the professional ethics rules be accompanied by fresh
inquiries in light of recently emerging communications
technologies, particularly cloud-based Web 2.0 applications and
cloud computing services—and the vulnerabilities that they bring
unnoticed into the enterprises that adopt and deploy them. This
article will attempt to define broad areas of risk created by the new
technologies and offer guidance to counsel on identifying such
risks, assessing whether they can be mitigated by reasonable
precautions, and if not, what counsel may need to do to fulfill their
professional ethical obligations. In it, we examine obligations that
include (1) understanding the features and operations of Web 2.0
communications, storage, and processing technologies; (2)
increasing familiarity with emerging practices and customs of users
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of such technologies; and (3) assessing risks that these technologies
may pose for lawyers and law firms with obligations to comply with
applicable rules of professional conduct.
This inquiry is timely given the vulnerabilities to cyber attacks
that all enterprises, including law firms, face if they have adopted
and deployed the communications technologies of the Digital Era.
In Part II of this article, we discuss the damage done to the targeted
enterprises and the latent but very real risks to which an enterprise
exposes itself when it adopts a new communications technology.
These technologies perforce contain innumerable security
vulnerabilities whose existence, nature, location, and significance
are largely unknown to the enterprise.
Upon deployment,
moreover, they create additional, unquantifiable vulnerabilities in
an enterprise’s cyber-based systems and provide covert access to an
enterprise’s privileged, proprietary, or other sensitive digital assets
and records.
Thus, the enterprise becomes “porous” and is at high risk of
having its digital assets targeted for misappropriation or
destruction and the operations of its computer networks (and any
machinery and equipment) brought under an adversary’s
command and control that can direct the enterprise to sabotage
itself or to launch attacks on other enterprises. Cyber attacks occur
by stealth, do their harm unopposed, and cease (often without
detection or even awareness of the harm suffered). Company data
often survives the attack; supervisory control and data acquisition
(“SCADA”) systems appear to function properly and it is only later
(sometimes months later) that damage to targeted data or
equipment becomes apparent. Often enterprises or information
networks succumb to exploits that utilized data stolen from another
enterprise. Trade secrets believed to be tightly protected are taken
advantage of elsewhere, with no trail of misappropriation or clear
evidence of the identity of the adversary. Finally, the enterprise’s
most sensitive data—the design of its cyber security safeguards and
procedures—have been compromised, subverted to become part of
the exploit that enables the attack to succeed.
The enterprise in essence engineers its own damage. Any new
communications technology should therefore be examined for the
presence of cyber vulnerabilities, lest a time-saver become a
technology Trojan horse. Such a latent threat circumvents the
enterprise’s own physical safeguards and its cyber defenses.
An enterprise whose capabilities have been enhanced by
innovations in communications technologies may belatedly realize

2011]

RED SKIES IN THE MORNING

117

that such technology has compromised its cybersecurity, its digital
assets, its ability to operate, its corporate integrity, in short, its
existence. Technology vendors do not inform customers of the
risks a new technology introduces into an enterprise—perhaps
because they are aware or anticipate that they have not discovered
all such vulnerabilities or made cybersecurity their highest priority.
Some firms have recognized the need to change their priorities—
and other firms have not.
The marketing literature for technologies seldom alerts
potential buyers to the latent vulnerabilities created in deploying it,
particularly if developers (or vendors) failed in design reviews and
testing to discover these. Unlike a faulty wire in hardware, or short
on a motherboard, or “bug” that impairs the operation of software,
cyber vulnerabilities do not announce their presence by system
malfunctions. A cyber attack reveals such vulnerabilities belatedly,
and misplaced trust can allow the vulnerabilities to persist,
amplifying the damage, as Cynthia E. Irvine (of the Naval
Postgraduate School) and J.R. Rao (of IBM Thomas J. Watson
Research Center) explained:
[S]ecurity is a behind-the-scenes service that we don’t
concern ourselves with until something goes wrong. Most
of us probably don’t expect our systems to allow criminals
to obtain or manipulate our valuable information, nor do
we expect catastrophic failures of large-scale systems due
to manipulation by adversaries.
A typical developer might think that a system is
acceptable if it provides the customer’s requested
functionality; a wise developer might also ensure that the
system isn’t a danger to the user’s health or safety. The
result can be a carefully constructed system that also
provides the intended services. But wait! What if the
system does its job, but still leaves an entryway so that
cyber miscreants can slip in and steal or modify valuable
information? What if these miscreants wreak havoc by
causing systems to go off kilter? Even if our wise
developer could construct the system carefully, many such
systems are used in ways that were neither intended nor
anticipated—for example, systems designed for the enterprise
but used in multitenant settings such as the cloud. This
scenario highlights the problem of misplaced trust: the
system we trust isn’t as trustworthy as we had imagined and now
exhibits some mixture of both expected and unexpected
functionality.
A disconnect exists between user
assumptions regarding what the system was supposed to
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do and what it ended up doing. How did this happen?
The answer is that the system does something
unexpectedly because it contains unspecified or misused
functionality in the form of flaws or, worse, clandestine
artifices.
Unspecified functionality is rampant in many of
3
today’s systems.
In this article, we take a cold, hard look at the frequency of
successful cyber attacks and the consequent transfers of valuable
information (often an unlicensed export of export controlled
technology and with this a transfer of an enterprise’s hard-earned
competitive edge). The transfers include source code, intellectual
property, and cybersecurity information. These unauthorized
transfers are not limited to data stored within an enterprise’s
computers and servers. Enterprises store such data increasingly in
servers of cloud computing service vendors where it can be
similarly breached and misappropriated.
And, enterprises
frequently entrust some of their most sensitive data to their outside
counsel who may store it on computers and servers that are no less
vulnerable to attack than those of their clients and the clients’
cloud storage vendors. For counsel, such unauthorized access to
client confidential information may result in damage to clients’
interests as well as to the counsel’s relationship with affected
clients. The rising incidence of cyber attacks and the damage they
cause radically redefine the risk evaluations in which counsel
routinely engage. And, the misplaced trust in technology and the
high costs it imposes should be seen, we believe, as “handwriting on
the wall,” intimating that our Digital Era’s technologies are
compromising the enterprise.
Nearly ubiquitous connectivity disperses nearly ubiquitous
vulnerability. Users demand connectivity, enterprises attempt to
enhance their competitive edge by purchasing the technology
without weighing the latent cost of the technological benefits—
cyber defenses may become eroded and porous. The Digital Era’s
technology has allowed for unprecedented concentration of
valuable information assets in digital media. Once stored there,
however, the data becomes easily transferrable worldwide in
seconds: it can be saved to light-weight portable computing devices
and easily concealed memory sticks that can be taken outside the
enterprise; information can be uploaded to cloud computing
3. Cynthia E. Irvine & J.R. Rao, Engineering Secure Systems, IEEE SECURITY &
PRIVACY, Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 18.
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servers where the vendor may elect to make multiple copies, stored
in multiple jurisdictions or where the data may be under the
control of other outsource contractors with unverifiable cyber
defenses. Multiplicity of copies and their dispersal creates an
infinite number of data treasure troves. An adversary need only
attack one to infiltrate an enterprise’s valuable information. If
copies of the enterprise’s source code have been secreted on
numerous media, the attacker needs only to exploit one of the
media in order to misappropriate the complete code.
Enterprises that rely on the benefits of technology must create
protocols to reassess the costs of such technology. They must factor
the calculable damage to digital assets, and they may well conclude
that the costs in misappropriated intellectual property,
compromised cyber security, and reputational or enterprise
damage dim the luster of the benefits. Given this cost/benefit
analysis, future investments in new technology may well prove
unjustifiable unless cyber security can be appropriately reinforced
and maintained. This is the analysis in which we believe law firm
management and their clients’ Boards of Directors must engage
when asked to approve a technology acquisition strategy.
As destructive cyber attacks increase in frequency and severity
(a pattern already in evidence), we believe they will force a seachange in regulations governing critical infrastructure enterprises,
in the creation of new or enhanced legal duties of care, in legal
liability, and in the actions required to be taken by responsible personnel to
fulfill professional ethical duties. The interpretations of such ethical
duties are bound to change to reflect the increased risks presented
by the technology and by users’ failure or inability to mitigate or
neutralize those risks. We believe that vulnerabilities to cyber
attacks and the profusion and continuous onslaught of such attacks
will prompt officers and directors and their counsel to give serious
consideration to treating cyber security as material to the financial
condition of the enterprise. Cyber attacks could well become
material events for disclosure purposes.
Underlying each enterprise’s decision to adopt a new
communications technology are decisions that have in common
three questions:
• First, can we trust the new technology? (i.e., what are the worst-case
scenarios?);
• Second, can we trust ourselves to use the new technology
advantageously? (i.e., can our personnel evaluate the benefits,
identify the vulnerabilities, and guard against the risks?); and
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Third, if we deploy the new technology throughout the enterprise, can
we trust the enterprise’s cyber defenses? (i.e., will the cyber defenses
protect against misappropriation of the enterprise’s cyber
security designs, plans, and procedures? Will the cyber
defenses detect and repel an adversary intent on manipulating
our SCADA systems or damaging the enterprise’s machinery,
networks, and information systems?).
Counsel have an additional question. This is a question that
really confronts any licensed professional (e.g., lawyer, physician,
accountant, or engineer) whose practice is subject to ethical
standards:
• Fourth, if we adopt the new technology, can we fulfill our ethical duties
and protect our client’s interests?
In our haste to gain the benefits of a new technology, there is a
strong institutional temptation to implement prior to vetting fully
the risk factors. In most cases, to forgo is to forget.
When military operations are planned there is often a carefully
prepared advantage/risk ratio adjusted to reflect updates provided
by intelligence assessments. Enterprises, including law firms, may
find it in their best interests to require carefully prepared
advantage/risk ratios when they undertake to decide whether,
when, and to what extent to adopt and deploy a new
communications technology. Counsel will need to be more
proactive in these decisions as cybersecurity becomes part of their
professional ethical duties.
We are not advocating raising the ethical standards applicable
to counsel. But, bar associations may review ethical standards with
the advent of round-the-clock cyber attacks on corporate
enterprises.
The effort we undertake in this article is designed to help
counsel by improving their understanding of the nature of the risks
and by recommending ways that those risks can be mitigated such
that counsel can avoid inadvertent mistakes. We offer some
guidelines for “best practices” of cybersecurity such that counsel
may make these an integral part of the practice of law.
Impregnable cyber defenses may exceed current skills.
Restoration of the secure enterprise may not be possible, or only
intermittently achievable. Attack skills have advanced so far, but we
ought to be able to reverse the trend of decisions that increase an
enterprise’s vulnerabilities. Stemming that tide should not be
mistaken for the folly of trying to oppose the Digital Era’s incoming
tide. And, what is interesting is that a heightened understanding of
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professional ethical duties amidst the waves of cyber attacks may
prove to be a valuable skill in that pursuit. As expressed in the old
saw, “measure twice, cut once,” a concern for professional ethical
duties can remind counsel to ensure that the second “measuring”
of a technology acquisition decision involves an accurate
assessment of what it will do to the enterprise’s cybersecurity.
The organization of this article is as follows: Part II discusses
the ethical challenges presented by ever-evolving communications
4
technology. Part III reviews what some lawyers believe has come to
be an implicit duty under the applicable rules to stay abreast of new
communications technologies and considers the basis for such an
implicit duty under the ethical rules that require counsel to provide
competent representation and to protect client confidential
5
information. Part IV provides an extensive analysis of cloud
computing and its security risks, discusses some of the ethical risks
they may create for lawyers and law firms, and suggests some
measures that may help put counsel in a good position to minimize
6
those risks.
We have concentrated on cloud computing for three reasons.
First, most if not all of the ethical risks that arise under other Web
2.0 technologies, and particularly social networking technologies,
are present in cloud computing.
Second, most Web 2.0
technologies rely heavily on cloud computing platforms for their
operation. Third, although most Web 2.0 technologies can be
understood through “hands-on” use, and such use will also reveal
many of the most serious security risks to an observant lawyer, that
is decidedly not the case for cloud computing. Cloud computing
vendors tend to disclose little of the workings of their platforms,
their security precautions, their policies in the event of outages and
data breaches, and their procedures for the location, storage,
copying, movement, and purging of customer data. Moreover,
when security incidents or outages occur that impair or disrupt a
vendor’s cloud computing services for prolonged periods, the
vendor’s explanations have tended to arrive after recovery, not
during the outages when customers urgently need to know what is
happening so that they can implement contingency plans. Also,
the explanations have tended to be expressed in impenetrable
jargon (notwithstanding considerable detail provided to unpack
the jargon), as illustrated in Amazon’s explanation of the four-day
4.
5.
6.

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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7

outage of its cloud services in April 2011 in terms of a “remirroring storm”:
Now that we have fully restored functionality to all
affected services, we would like to share more details with
our customers about the events that occurred with the
Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (“EC2”) last week . . . .
....
Primary Outage. At 12:47 AM PDT on April 21st, a
network change was performed as part of our normal
AWS scaling activities in a single Availability Zone in the
US East Region. The configuration change was to
upgrade the capacity of the primary network. During the
change, one of the standard steps is to shift traffic off of
one of the redundant routers in the primary EBS network
to allow the upgrade to happen. The traffic shift was
executed incorrectly and rather than routing the traffic to
the other router on the primary network, the traffic was
routed onto the lower capacity redundant EBS network.
For a portion of the EBS cluster in the affected Availability
Zone, this meant that they did not have a functioning
primary or secondary network because traffic was
purposely shifted away from the primary network and the
secondary network couldn’t handle the traffic level it was
receiving. As a result, many EBS nodes in the affected
Availability Zone were completely isolated from other EBS
nodes in its cluster.
Unlike a normal network
interruption, this change disconnected both the primary
and secondary network simultaneously, leaving the
affected nodes completely isolated from one another.
When this network connectivity issue occurred, a
large number of EBS nodes in a single EBS cluster lost
connection to their replicas. When the incorrect traffic
shift was rolled back and network connectivity was
restored, these nodes rapidly began searching the EBS
cluster for available server space where they could remirror data. Once again, in a normally functioning
cluster, this occurs in milliseconds. In this case, because
the issue affected such a large number of volumes
concurrently, the free capacity of the EBS cluster was
quickly exhausted, leaving many of the nodes “stuck” in a
loop, continuously searching the cluster for free space.
7. Maija Palmer, Security: Internet is Industry Achilles Heel, FIN. TIMES, June 28,
2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/19f14406-a118-11e0-9a07
-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1bAGTdn5D.
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This quickly led to a “re-mirroring storm,” where a large
number of volumes were effectively “stuck” while the
nodes searched the cluster for the storage space it needed
for its new replica. At this point, about 13% of the
volumes in the affected Availability Zone were in this
8
“stuck” state.
Probably very few, if any, lawyers knew that the Amazon cloud
computing service had such constituent elements as described in
that account or were aware of the disarray that could occur among
them during routine maintenance. Hands-on use of the cloud
would not reveal such facts. Moreover, explanations like Amazon’s,
albeit well intended, and the withholding of such critical
information until after the vendor restores cloud computing
services, puts clients and counsel in a poor position to assess risks.
The more sensitive and valuable the data to be entrusted to the
cloud (and the more that counsel may have ethical obligations
concerning the proper care of such data), the greater the
probability that a premature decision to move such data to the
cloud could result in unintended consequences and inadvertent
ethical lapses. These challenges may become more complicated as
vendors, seeking to appear to be offering cloud computing, engage
in marketing strategies that make unclear the extent to which the
customer is, or is not, embarking on a cloud computing exercise if
it purchases the vendors’ services. Such marketing practices,
referred to as “cloud washing,” tend to involve placing “cloud”
9
labels on data storage advertisements and in vendor pitches. For
these reasons, of all the Web 2.0 technologies, we believe the one
that is probably going to have the most far-reaching effects on
counsel’s presentation of clients, and the one most poorly
understood by clients and counsel, is cloud computing, and it,
therefore, deserves the greatest attention. Moreover, as noted
previously in this introduction, recent developments, and
particularly high-profile data security breaches involving the

8. Amazon Web Servs. Team, Summary of the Amazon EC2 and Amazon RDS
Service Disruption in the US East Region, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, http://aws.amazon
.com/message/65648 (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).
9. Rachel Kossmann, Cloud Washing Defined: How to Avoid This Marketing
Trend, SEARCHCLOUDSTORAGE.COM, http://searchcloudstorage.techtarget.com
/podcast/Cloud-washing-defined-How-to-avoid-this-marketing-trend (last visited
Oct. 18, 2011). For examples of “cloud washing,” see Larry Dignan, Oracle’s
Exalogic Box: Cloud Washing at Its Best?, ZDNET (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.zdnet
.com/blog/btl/oracles-exalogic-box-cloud-washing-at-its-best/39343.
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10

cloud, suggest that the risks described in this article are not
11
speculative, trivial, or financially insignificant.
Part V briefly describes new cybersecurity attacks that have
12
changed the landscape of information security. Part VI reviews
the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST)
revised standards and recommendations that appear in its “DRAFT
Cloud Computing Synopsis and Recommendations,” Special
13
Publication 800-146, that was published in May 2011. Because
NIST highlights certain problematic views of cloud computing, we
discuss those and assess the ethical challenges they may pose for
14
lawyers and law firms. Part VII concludes the discussion with a
brief review of representative examples of ethical risks that other
15
Web 2.0 technologies may pose for lawyers and law firms.
II. ETHICAL CHALLENGES FROM NEW COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGIES
New technologies often create new and unsuspected technical
problems as well as new and unanticipated ethical challenges.
Although data leaks undoubtedly occurred at major corporations
and financial institutions long before they became the subject of
frequent headlines and recurrent boardroom agenda items, few
16
such leaks were publicly reported. This approach, which probably
resulted from the fear of adverse publicity, has tended to result in a
state of denial among senior management and an erroneous belief
that tweaking, but not significantly changing, an enterprise’s
information security could be adequate.
As often happens, the external threats have evolved much
10. See Ben Kuchera, PlayStation Network Hacked, Data Stolen: How Badly Is Sony
Hurt?, ARSTECHNICA (Apr. 26, 2011, 6:37 PM), http://arstechnica.com/gaming
/news/2011/04/sonys-black-eye-is-a-pr-problem-not-a-legal-one.ars.
11. For discussion of some of the ethical risks that may arise in the use of
other Web 2.0 technologies, see, for example, H. Christopher Boehning & Daniel
J. Toal, The Ethics on Evidence from Social Networking Sites, 246 N.Y. L.J. 5, 7 (2011)
and Margaret M. DiBianca, Ethical Risks Arising from Lawyers’ Use of (and Refusal to
Use) Social Media, 12 DEL. L. REV. 179 (2011).
12. See infra Part V.
13. See BADGER ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., DRAFT CLOUD
COMPUTING SYNOPSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (MAY 2011) [hereinafter NIST CLOUD
SYNOPSIS], available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-146/DraftNIST-SP800-146.pdf.
14. See infra Part VI.
15. See infra Part VII.
16. See M. Eric Johnson et al., Security Through Information Risk Management,
IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, May–June 2009, at 45, 49.
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faster than the safeguards against them, due to the rapid evolution
of communications technology. Spurred by these changes, the law
has changed as well in an effort to enforce ethical behavior in
connection with new technologies. The advent of state data breach
17
forced U.S.
reporting statutes, beginning in California,
enterprises subject to those statutes to disclose the frequency of
leakages and the magnitude of data released, lost, or compromised.
They also motivated company management to pursue radical
strategies for the protection of the most sensitive and valuable data.
Nevertheless, data leaks and data breaches continue to occur with
significant damage to financial and reputational interests, with the
attendant legal and ethical consequences. For perspective on these
incidents, consider the findings of a study published in 2011 and
conducted by the Verizon RISK Team in cooperation with the U.S.
Secret Service and the Dutch High Tech Crime Unit:
361 million >> 144 million >> 4 million. Thus goes the
tally of total records compromised across the combined
caseload of Verizon and the United States Secret Service
(USSS) over the last three years . . . .
....
It is fascinating from a research standpoint that the
all-time lowest amount of data loss occurred in the same
year as the all-time highest amount of incidents
investigated . . . . We witnessed highly automated and
prolific external attacks, low and slow attacks, intricate
internal fraud rings, country-wide device tampering
schemes, cunning social engineering plots, and much
more . . . .
....
18
Cloud, Aurora, Mobility, Zeus, APT, Wikileaks,
19
Stuxnet, Anonymous. If a word cloud were created using
17. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2009).
18. The acronym APT stands for “advanced persistent threats,” which are
campaigns to steal intellectual property using cyber-attacks including malware by a
human or an organization. Greg Hoglund, Info. Sys. Sec. Assoc., Conference
Presentation, Advanced Persistent Threat: What APT Means to Your Enterprise
(Feb. 19, 2010), available at http://www.issa-sac.org/info_resources
/ISSA_20100219_HBGary_Advanced_Persistent_Threat.pdf. For an anatomy of
advanced persistent threat campaigns, see id.
19. For an account of the Stuxnet worm, the effect it had on Iranian nuclear
processing facilities, and the threats that similar malware—using “man-in-themiddle” attacks—pose to the increasingly widespread supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) systems, see Roland L. Trope & Geoffrey Schwartz, Cyber
Security for U.S.-Based Nuclear Power Plants, Continuing Legal Education Program at
the ABA Cyberspace Law Committee’s Winter Working Meeting (Jan. 2011) (on
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infosec headlines from 2010, these would certainly be
rendered big and bold . . . . While the Cloud and mobile
devices increasingly allow us to do anything from
anywhere with anyone at any time, Aurora, Zeus,
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), Wikileaks, and
Stuxnet remind us of the difficulty of protecting our
information assets in a usability-driven world . . . .
....
. . . [W]e constantly see breaches involving hosted systems,
20
outsourced management, rogue vendors, and even VMs
(though the attack vectors have nothing to do with it
being a VM or not). In other words, it’s more about
giving up control of our assets and data (and not
controlling the associated risk) than any technology
21
specific to the Cloud.
The severity of the advanced persistent threats, particularly
those reported based in and launched from China, and the
ubiquity of risks created, in part, by the nearly ubiquitous access to
treasure troves of companies’ digital data assets is attested to in the
release in August 2011 of the McAfee report, authored by Dmitri
Alperovitch, that observed:
Having investigated intrusions such as Operation Aurora
file with the authors).
20. The acronym VM stands for “virtual machine.”
21. VERIZON, 2011 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 2, 4 (2011), available
at http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach
-investigations-report-2011_en_xg.pdf. As for the sharp decline in the number of
records compromised in 2010, the report offers this explanation:
The Secret Service has focused attention on numerous “bullet proof
hosters,” who provide web hosting services that allow their customer’s
[sic] considerable leniency in the types of materials they may upload and
distribute. Seizures in excess of 200TB [terabytes] of data, [sic]
belonging to bullet proof hosters, [sic] have made the proliferation of
malware more challenging for cybercriminals and provided a substantial
number of investigative leads.
With all these factors taken into account, it is not surprising that the
number of compromised records significantly decreased during 2010.
After any major investigation and arrest, the cybercriminal underground
evaluates what happened and evolves from the lessons learned during the
prosecution of their peers.
It appears that cybercriminals are currently satisfied with
compromising Point of Sale (POS) systems and performing account
takeovers and Automated Clearing House (ACH) transaction fraud.
There has been an increase in these areas in 2010. In relation to prior
years, it appeared that there were more data breaches in 2010, but the compromised
data decreased due to the size of the compromised company’s databases.
Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
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and NightDragon (systemic long-term compromise of
Western oil and gas industry), as well as numerous others
that have not been disclosed publicly, I am convinced that
every company in every conceivable industry with
significant size and valuable intellectual property and
trade secrets has been compromised (or will be shortly),
with the great majority of the victims rarely discovering
the intrusion or its impact. In fact, I divide the entire set
of Fortune Global 2,000 firms into two categories: those
that know they’ve been compromised and those that don’t yet
know.
Lately, with the rash of revelations about attacks on
organizations such as RSA, Lockheed Martin, Sony, PBS,
and others, I have been asked . . . whether the rate of
intrusions is increasing and if it is a new phenomenon. I
find the question ironic because these types of
exploitations have occurred relentlessly for at least a half
decade, and the majority of the recent disclosures in the
last six months have, in fact, been a result of relatively
unsophisticated and opportunistic exploitations for the
sake of notoriety by loosely organized political hacktivist
groups such as Anonymous and Lulzsec. On the other
hand, the targeted compromises we are focused on—
known as advanced persistent threats (APTs)—are much
more insidious and occur largely without public
disclosures.
They present a far greater threat to
companies and governments, as the adversary is
tenaciously persistent in achieving their objectives. The
key to these intrusions is that the adversary is motivated by
a massive hunger for secrets and intellectual property; this
is different from the immediate financial gratification that
drives much of cybercrime, another serious but more
manageable threat.
What we have witnessed over the past five to six years
has been nothing short of a historically unprecedented
transfer of wealth—closely guarded national secrets
(including those from classified government networks),
source code, bug databases, email archives, negotiation
plans and exploration details for new oil and gas field
auctions, document stores, legal contracts, supervisory
control and data acquisition (SCADA) configurations,
design schematics, and much more has ‘fallen off the
truck’ of numerous, mostly Western companies and
disappeared in the ever-growing electronic archives of
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22

dogged adversaries.
From such reports, it is reasonable to infer that the widespread
occurrence of data breaches is due in large part to the
opportunities created by proliferation of at least four kinds of
digital-based technologies:
(1) portable, high density, data devices (e.g., multiple gigabyte
memory sticks and portable terabyte storage units);
(2) wireless communications devices providing ubiquitous
website access (e.g., smartphones that can surf the web and
store reams of downloaded data, e-mails, and attached
documents);
(3) wireless data warehouses (e.g., “cloud computing services”—
the outsourced storage of data in server farms accessed
wirelessly); and
(4) online social media (e.g., Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter)
that build upon, expand the use of, and enhance the markets
for wireless web-access.
Unfortunately, increased connectivity has also been
accompanied by increased concentrations of sensitive and valuable
data and increased vulnerabilities, making leakages and losses of
such data inevitable. As an H&R Block executive explained: “‘I had
somebody ask me, ‘Can you protect this piece of information?’ I
23
said, ‘Yes, as long as you promise never to use it.”’ Moreover, the
changes in the market for stolen data have led data thieves to focus
their attacks on larger concentrations of personal identification
24
information. As noted in the earlier 2009 study by the Verizon
Business RISK Team:
The value associated with selling stolen credit card data
[has] dropped from between $10 and $16 per record in
mid-2007 to less than $0.50 per record today.
As supply has increased and prices fallen, criminals
have had to overhaul their processes and differentiate
22. DMITRI ALPEROVITCH, REVEALED: OPERATION SHADY RAT, 2 (McAfee 2011),
available at http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-operationshady-rat.pdf. “Operation Aurora” is the term given to the infiltration of Google’s
networks and those of at least twenty other major companies in 2009, by what
apparently was a China-based espionage network that specifically targeted certain
companies. See Robin Wauters, McAfee Calls Operation Aurora a “Watershed Moment
in Cybersecurity,” Offers Guidance, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 17, 2010), http://techcrunch
.com/2010/01/17/mcafee-operation-aurora-2.
23. Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 49.
24. WADE H. BAKER ET AL., 2009 DATA BREACH INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 5
(2009), available at http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/security
/reports/2009_databreach_rp.pdf.
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their products in order to maintain profitability. In 2008,
this was accomplished by targeting points of data
concentration or aggregation and acquiring more
valuable sets of consumer information. The big money is
now in stealing personal identification number (PIN)
information together with associated credit and debit
accounts . . . . Furthermore, PIN fraud typically places a
larger share of the burden upon the consumer to prove
that transactions are fraudulent. This makes the recovery
of lost assets more difficult than with standard credit-fraud
25
charges.
The magnitude of the vulnerability of digital data held by
businesses became publicly evident back in a September 2008
Department of Justice report concerning information security
26
incidents experienced by businesses in 2005. The report discloses
that “[c]ritical infrastructure businesses detected 13 million
27
[computer security] incidents (nearly two-thirds of the total).
High risk industries detected more than 4 million incidents (a fifth
28
of the total).” Moreover, “[n]inety-one percent of the businesses
that detected incidents and answered questions on loss sustained,”
either monetary loss or system downtime, and forty-one percent
29
sustained both kinds of loss. It is reasonable to infer that data
losses were of a comparable magnitude to those involving monetary
30
loss, since theft of data is often required for theft of funds. The
annual loss of intellectual property and investment opportunities
across all industries has reportedly reached “$6 billion to $20
31
The
billion, with a big part owing to oil industry losses.”
magnitude of the costs to a single company is evident in the
consequences to RSA, the security service vendor that provides
tokens that companies and governments use to log on remotely to
workplace systems: EMC Corp (one of whose divisions is RSA) has
disclosed that “it had taken a $66 million charge to cover
remediation costs associated with a March [2011] intrusion of its
25. Id.
26. RAMONA R. RANTALA, CYBERCRIME AGAINST BUSINESSES, 2005, at 1–9 (2008),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cb05.pdf.
27. Id. at 6.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 4.
30. See id. at 2.
31. Ellen Nakashima, Report on ‘Operation Shady RAT’ Identifies Widespread Cyberspying, WASH. POST (Aug. 2, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/national/national-security/report-identifies-widespread-cyber-spying
/2011/07/29/gIQAoTUmqI_story.html?wpisrc=nl_tech.
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32

RSA division.”
Some companies have concluded that some of their security
processes and structures were inadequate and obsolete, and have
sought to improve their policies and procedures for information
security and their guidelines for employees’ use of online social
media. For some, this has meant adopting a presumption that yetto-be-classified data is sensitive and must be given strong
33
As one company executive explained, “[w]e also
protection.
block our data, and we have established that if date is not labeled,
34
However, the corporate
then it is confidential by default.”
response appears to be failing to keep pace with the cyber-threats
to corporate digital assets. As noted in Ernst & Young’s thirteenth
annual Global Information Security Survey, “60% of respondents
perceived an increase in the level of risk they face due to the use of
social networking, cloud computing and personal devices in the
35
enterprise.” However, despite that awareness, the report noted a
paradoxical lack of enterprise interest in the emerging risks:
The fact that only 10% of respondents indicated the
examination of new and emerging IT trends as a critically
important function is further evidence that few
organizations have assessed the impact of social
networking . . . . As the use of social networking and Web
2.0 sites continues to increase and become a part of the
standard work environment, the behaviors related to
sharing personal information are often being transferred
to sensitive business information, where they are not
appropriate. If no action is taken, this will likely lead to
an increase in the disclosure of business information or
protected privacy-related data, either intentionally or
36
accidentally through the use of social media.
The reported data leaks and other technological incidents at
32.
33.

Id.
Gregg Keizer, Hacker Break-in of Twitter E-mail Yields Secret Docs,
COMPUTERWORLD (July 16, 2009, 1:16 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s
/article/9135591/Hacker_break_in_of_Twitter_e_mail_yields_secret_docs. Note
that in one account, the vulnerable password reset was in the Yahoo! web mail,
and in another, the vulnerable password reset was in Google Apps. Id. It may be
that the hacker breached the password reset at both Yahoo!’s and Google’s webbased applications.
34. Johnson et al., supra note 16, at 49.
35. ERNST & YOUNG, BORDERLESS SECURITY: ERNST & YOUNG’S 2010 GLOBAL
INFORMATION SECURITY SURVEY 2 (2010), available at http://www.ey.com
/Publication/vwLUAssets/Global_information_security_survey_2010_advisory/$L
LE/GISS%20report_final.pdf.
36. Id. at 12–13.
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major corporate, governmental, and financial enterprises contrast
37
sharply with the paucity of reports of such problems at law firms.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to infer that similar problems may
well have occurred but not been reported in the media, and that
law firms face the same or similar threats as their clients. When
such technical problems do occur, as seems likely to happen with
the advent of the new communications technologies, the risks of
reputational damage may be compounded by the risks of ethical
violations under the jurisdiction’s applicable rules of professional
38
responsibility.
Web 2.0 communications technologies have increased the
opportunities for attackers who seek unauthorized access to data,
both personal and corporate. As noted in a 2008 study by the
European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA):
“Web 2.0 . . . malware infections [increasingly require] no
intervention or awareness on the part of the user. To give some
idea of the threat posed, a Scansafe report analyzing malware
trends reported that risks from compromised websites increased
39
407% in the year to May 2008.”
The ENISA highlighted the tendency of Web 2.0 services to ask
users to grant the service (such as an online social network)
authorization to access a variety of their accounts without specifying
in a precise way what, if any, security precautions have been
implemented to prevent unauthorized access to the user’s
accounts:
Many Web 2.0 services ask users to delegate access
credentials to, for example, email accounts or bank
accounts. Currently, users often have to give away the
highest level of privilege, e.g., unlimited, permanent
access to all features of their email account rather than
just time-limited access to their address book, to access a
service. The lack of finer grained authorisation is a
barrier to the use of such applications and a serious risk
40
for those who do.
Apparently, an attacker was able to use similar information to
37. But see Josh Halliday, Law Firm Could Face £500,000 Fine Over Data Breach,
THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 28, 2010, 11:04 EDT), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media
/2010/sep/28/filesharing-acs-law.
38. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007) (describing
ethical violations that may result from technological problems).
39. EUR. NETWORK & INFO. SEC. AGENCY, WEB 2.0 SECURITY AND PRIVACY 2
(2008), available at http://www.ifap.ru/library/book392.pdf.
40. Id. at 3.
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gain access to multiple web-based applications in a May 2009
41
incident that Twitter acknowledged. The attacker reportedly took
advantage of the simplicity of Yahoo!’s web mail password recovery
or re-set system and hacked into a Twitter administrative
42
The hacker apparently used
employee’s e-mail account.
information obtained in that account to gain access to the
employee’s Google Apps account, which contained “cloud
computing services” such as Google Docs, Calendars, and “other
Google Apps Twitter relies on for sharing notes, spreadsheets,
43
ideas, financial details and more within the company.”
Twitter reported that the breach did not involve any flaw in
web applications, but instead was due to a failure to follow good
personal security guidelines, such as selection of a strong
44
But this explanation overlooks the fact that Twitter
password.
relied on web-based—i.e., cloud computing—applications, and that
the attacker’s additional penetration of Twitter’s files appears to
have been facilitated by Twitter’s use of such applications and the
45
Because the
linkage of the employee’s Web 2.0 accounts.
password reset feature at Yahoo!’s and Google’s web applications
(like many other sites) operates by asking a set of personal
questions in order to authenticate the user, who may select
questions and give answers that can be derived from the
information that he or she posts on social networking sites, hackers
interested in attacking a company can target an employee and
41. Biz Stone, Even More Open than We Wanted, TWITTER BLOG (July 15, 2009,
11:15 AM), http://blog.twitter.com/2009_07_01_archive.html.
42. Josh Lowensohn & Caroline McCarthy, Lessons from Twitter’s Security
Breach, CNET (July 15, 2009, 12:45 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-17939_10910287558-2.html.
43. Stone, supra note 41.
44. For example, in April 2011, Amazon’s cloud computing “Web Services”
experienced a prolonged outage with significant consequences to companies that
depended on it:
Cloud computing is learning the harsh reality of resiliency as Amazon
Web Services’ outage has crossed its second day. Meanwhile, startups
and a host of other AWS customers are in uncharted waters. On
Wednesday, the common belief was that startups could build their
infrastructure on AWS completely. Set the servers up and forget them . .
. . Given that AWS’ North Virginia data center has been out of whack for
more than 24 hours, it’s clear you need to procure more than one cloud.
You need a backup for your cloud provider’s backup.
Larry Dignan, Amazon’s Web Services Outage: End of Cloud Innocence?, ZDNET (Apr.
22, 2011, 7:27 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/btl/amazons-web-servicesoutage-end-of-cloud-innocence/47731.
45. The hacker gained access to the employee’s Yahoo! Mail as a means to
accessing Twitter’s Google Apps. See Lowensohn & McCarthy, supra note 42.
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equip themselves with data drawn from a social networking site
where the employee may have posted such information:
Like the breach of Gov. Sarah Palin’s Yahoo e-mail
account [in 2008], security researchers guessed that
Hacker Croll gained access to the Twitter employee’s
account using Google’s password reset feature, which
poses several personal questions to authenticate the user.
Hacker Croll likely dug up possible responses by rooting
through the Web for details on the assistant, then used
46
those to reset the password to one only he knew.
The attacker stole several hundred Twitter internal documents
and then forwarded them to websites, such as TechCrunch, that
decided to publish some of them despite objections by Twitter’s
47
legal counsel, as well as retransmitting some to other sites.
Twitter’s co-founder, Biz Stone, recognized the significance of this,
stating, “as they were never meant for public communication,
publishing these documents publicly could jeopardize relationships
48
with Twitter’s ongoing and potential partners.”
49
More recent data security breaches and outages at cloud
50
providers demonstrate the types and magnitude of risks that may
46. Gregg Keizer, Hacker Break-in of Twitter E-mail Yields Secret Docs,
COMPUTERWORLD (July 16, 2009, 1:16 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s
/article/9135591/Hacker_break_in_of_Twitter_e_mail_yields_secret_docs.
47. Devin Coldewey, Twitter’s Financial Forecast Shows First Revenue in Q3, 1
Billion Users in 2013, TECHCRUNCH (July 15, 2009), http://techcrunch.com
/2009/07/15/twitters-financial-forecast-shows-first-revenue-in-q3-1-billion-users-in2013.
48. Biz Stone, supra note 41.
49. As reported in August 2011:
A widespread cyber-espionage operation has penetrated 72 government
and other organizations, most in the US, copying everything from
military secrets to industrial designs. Analysts said circumstantial
evidence pointed to China as the most likely suspect . . . . News of the
newly discovered effort will put additional pressure on Washington
policymakers grappling with the challenge posed by such espionage.
Joseph Menn, Cyberattacks Penetrate Military Secrets and Designs, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 3,
2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d4f09016-bda3-11e0-babc-00144feabdc0
.html#axzz1YFednwOg.
50. Examples of 2011 cloud service, or cloud based product, outages at major
vendors include Sony, Microsoft, and Amazon:
In April, technology giant Sony (www.sony.com) faced an outage to its
Playstation Network that compromised approximately 100 million users
private information. Now, nearly a month later, the system is still down
and many experts are suggesting that this outage could have a much
larger impact on the way people perceive the security of the cloud.
....
According to a report by Arik Hesseldahl on CNET, Sony first
became aware of the attack on April 19 after it discovered “several

134

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

be present in cloud computing environments and online social
networking systems such as Twitter. Although the White House, in
51
May 2011, proposed an International Strategy for Cyberspace, its
implementation and effectiveness remain unclear and may be
hampered by budgetary constraints, which suggest that clients and

PlayStation Network servers had rebooted themselves unexpectedly.
Four servers were immediately taken offline in order to figure out what
was going on. By the next day, it was clear that another six had been
attacked, and they were taken offline as well.
Nicole Henderson, Noise Filter: Sony PlayStation Network Outage Raises Cloud Security
Concerns, THE WHIR (May 11, 2011), http://www.thewhir.com/web-hostingnews/051111_Noise_Filter_Sony_PlayStation_Network_Outage_Raises_Cloud_Sec
urity_Concerns.
Microsoft has served up another apology for the unreliability of its cloud
after burning converts to its BPOS collaboration service by killing their
email.
....
Customers on BPOS in the US and worldwide were kicked off their
hosted Exchange email systems, being unable to read, write, or access
their messages. All users were affected—from down in the cubicle farm
all the way up to the CEO’s corner office. The outages started Tuesday
and came after weeks of the service slowly degrading.
Gavin Clarke, Microsoft BPOS Cloud Outage Burns Exchange Converts, CHANNEL
REGISTER (May 13, 2011, 23:45 GMT), http://www.channelregister.co.uk
/2011/05/13/microsoft_bpos_apology.
Amazon’s cloud crashed, taking sites like Reddit, Foursquare, Quora,
Hootsuite, Indaba, GroupMe, Scvngr, Motherboard.tv and a few more
down with it. As reported several components of Amazon Cloud
portfolio like, EC2, Elastic Block Store (EBS), Relational Database
Service (RDS), Elastic Beanstalk, CloudFormation and lately MapReduce
were all impacted.
....
. . . [T]his has created a huge impact on the Cloud Adoption for the
large enterprises.
Srinivasan Sundara Rajan, Lessons from the Amazon Cloud Outage, CLOUD COMPUTING
J. (Apr. 27, 2011, 12:00 PM EDT), http://cloudcomputing.sys-con.com/node
/1805849.
51. THE WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE: PROSPERITY,
SECURITY, AND OPENNESS IN A NETWORKED WORLD (2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy
_for_cyberspace.pdf. If a reader of the Strategy looks in it for some enforcement
or protection mechanisms it probably rests in the asserted right of self-defense in
cyberspace as in territorial defense: “Consistent with the United Nations Charter,
states have an inherent right to self-defense that may be triggered by certain
aggressive acts in cyberspace.” Id. at 10. However, in light of the reported
incidents that appear to have originated outside of the countries attacked, it is
increasingly unclear what threshold countries will eventually settle upon as
constituting an attack that warrants a self-defense response or that might justify
preemptive action in self-defense. For further discussion of these issues, see David
P. Fidler, Was Stuxnet an Act of War? Decoding a Cyberattack, IEEE SEC. & PRIVACY,
July–Aug. 2011, at 56.
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their legal counsel cannot wait for such measures to safeguard their
digital assets from cyber-threats. Nor will such measures address
the ethical challenges that will probably accompany the adoption
of new communications technologies and the vulnerabilities that
such technologies bring with them in their design and in ways that
users manage them. To the extent that data security incidents, and
52
the occasional enforcement or private action related to them,
continue, they provide additional information on the nature of
risks that lawyers and law firms should be prepared to manage.
These are serious and complex ethical issues. Considering such
issues before the problem arises will help those affected formulate
better responses when problems do arise, as well as help to position
firms to present credible defenses to claims that they violated the
applicable rules of professional responsibility.
53
The Ethics Essays, focused on the New York Rules of
Professional Conduct (NYRPC), which became effective on April 1,
54
2009. This article retains the original presentation of the NYRPC
and expands the analysis to include the American Bar Association’s
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC). It also evaluates
selected opinions by state and local bar associations and decisions
by courts under both the NYRPC and MRPC.
The Ethics Essays anticipated the conclusions that bar
associations and courts have reached when asked to set forth
policies involving use of Web 2.0 and cloud computing. This
article reaches beyond the opinions and decisions of bar and bench
to probe the scope of lawyers’ and law firms’ ethical obligations to
their clients that may arise as new communications technologies
continue to evolve. New technologies will probably require
adjustments by lawyers and law firms in order to ensure that they
52. See Twitter, Inc., Docket No. C-4316 (F.T.C. Mar. 2. 2011), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923093/110311twitterdo.pdf
(deciding
and
ordering settling charges against Twitter, Inc. and ordering the corporation,
among other things, not to misrepresent the “extent to which [Twitter] maintains
and protects the security, privacy, confidentiality, or integrity of any nonpublic
consumer information, including . . . misrepresentations related to its security
measures to: (a) prevent unauthorized access to nonpublic consumer information;
or (b) honor the privacy choices exercised by users”).
53. The Ethics Essays are Roland Trope & Claudia Ray, The Real Realities of
Cloud Computing: Ethical Issues for Lawyers, Law Firms, and Judges, Essay for CLE
Program, ABA Annual Meeting, San Francisco, August 2010 and Roland Trope &
Claudia Ray, Head in the “Cloud”–Feet on the Ground: Understanding the Ethical
Challenges of Web 2.0for Lawyers, Law Firms and Judges (2010), each of which is on file
with the authors.
54. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200 (2011).
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continue to be in good positions to make the common sense
applications of the profession’s ethical precepts to the risks created
by the availability of new technologies and the choices in conduct
such technologies present. It is our belief that the development
and adoption of new communications technologies will seldom
require significant changes to the long-standing professional
ethical rules, however surprising, rapid, and disruptive the
technologies prove to be upon their emergence. When properly
understood, each new communications technology will be seen to
have advantages and drawbacks, competitive benefits and
unanticipated risks, and to the extent that those are not fully
explored, assessed, and appreciated early, they may put lawyers and
law firms that use them in positions where inadvertent ethical
lapses can occur. The lessons we try to draw during the course of
this discussion are intended to apply to any new communications
technology, not merely those under review at the time of this
writing. For that reason, this article will include discussion relevant
to three representative aspects of the most serious ethical risks that
lawyers and law firms may face when using Web 2.0 technologies:
those that may arise (1) in performing client-related work; (2) in
pursuing new clients; and (3) in the course of leisure activities.
Having identified what we believe to be the salient ethical risks, we
will suggest precautions that lawyers and law firms might consider
in order to put themselves in a good position to diminish, if not
avert, such risks.
In considering these issues, we assume that readers understand
that ethical issues are inherently fact dependent. To date, there
are few bar opinions or court decisions to guide this analysis. At
best, one can try to infer how a future disciplinary body might
decide these issues. We believe, however, that the greatest risks
from Web 2.0 technologies are likely to arise from inadvertent
actions or oversights that result from a lack of understanding of the
operations and use of these technologies, as well as an
underestimation of lawyers’ and law firms’ obligations under
applicable rules of professional conduct, such as the NYRPC and
55
the MRPC. For example, a firm might not understand that it may
55. The essays from which this article grew contained a discussion of the
kinds of risks that judges and members of their chambers might face in using Web
2.0 technologies and of the risks to lawyers and law firms from engaging in the use
of Web 2.0 technologies to make surreptitious recordings. See sources cited supra
note 53. Those issues are no less important than the issues on which we
concentrate in this article, but we have opted to defer discussion of that material
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arguably have an obligation to conduct meaningful risk assessments
of such technologies early and repeatedly in order to reach informed
conclusions and ensure that those conclusions do not need to be
changed in light of rapidly evolving technologies and practices.
The true potential of new communications technologies often is
56
not immediately clear. Lawyers and law firms are well advised to
be among the first to explore new communications technologies
and the associated customs and practices, given their access to, and
custody of, confidential client information and ethical obligation to
protect such information.
III. IMPLICIT DUTY UNDER THE NYRPC TO STAY ABREAST OF NEW
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES AND COMPARISON OF DUTIES
IMPOSED BY THE MRPC
Although neither the NYRPC nor the MRPC expressly require
counsel to stay abreast of the latest advances in communications
technologies, several of their provisions appear to imply a duty to
monitor such developments and understand the potential benefits
and risks of new communications technologies. The basis for this
implicit duty is derived from two explicit duties: (1) the duty to
provide “competent representation” in NYRPC Rule 1.1; and (2)
the duties to protect clients’ confidential information in NYRPC
Rule 1.6, including protection of the attorney-client privilege,
prevention of client embarrassment or detrimental disclosure of
information, and protection of information deemed confidential
by the client.
The next part of this article focuses on the origins and
applications of the implicit duty to stay abreast of new
communications technologies.
A. The Duty to Provide “Competent Representation” Implies a Duty to
Stay Abreast of New Communications Technologies
Rule 1.1 of both the NYRPC and the MRPC obligate lawyers to
57
This arguably
“provide competent representation to a client.”
requires lawyers and law firms to make reasonable efforts to
to a later article.
56. See Richard Waters, Cloud Control, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2009,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c9e3bf12-1973-11de-9d34-0000779fd2ac
.html#axzz1YcY9x6gn [hereinafter Cloud Control].
57. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.1 (2011); MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2007).
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recognize the risks inherent in a new communications technology
and to advise the client accordingly. For example, suppose counsel
has been engaged to advise on compliance with U.S. “dual use”
58
export controls under the Export Administration Act (EAR) or
with U.S. military export controls under the International Traffic in
59
“Competent representation” in that
Arms Regulations (ITAR).
case would require a clear understanding of the ways in which
digital transmissions can result in unlicensed, and thus illegal,
60
Such risks
releases of EAR-controlled or ITAR-controlled data.
have substantially increased with each new communications
technology, including the advent of Web 2.0 technologies.
The advent of e-mail increased risks of non-compliance with
ITAR and EAR, because such transmissions could cause an
extraordinary amount of ITAR-controlled or EAR-controlled data
to be exported overseas in an instant or to be a “deemed export” to
a foreign national within the United States. Similarly, the ease with
which videos can be discretely or covertly made and uploaded to a
Web 2.0 host such as YouTube now makes it possible for
unlicensed, unauthorized exports of a much broader range of
technical knowhow. A lawyer cannot meet the requirements of
MRPC Rule 1.1 in this context if he or she fails to become aware of
the emergence of new communications technologies and the
changes that they make in the capabilities to communicate—and
transfer—sensitive information in violation of applicable laws and
regulations.
Even if a lawyer does not have extensive knowledge of
communications technology, the comments to the MRPC appear to
contemplate that a lawyer can accept representation where the
requisite level of competence can be achieved by preparation and
61
study. As with legal issues, if a lawyer could either educate herself
on the risks, or associate herself with individuals who have a greater
understanding of the risks posed by new technologies, she will be
in a stronger position to fulfill the competence requirement. The
Initial Draft Proposals—Technology and Confidentiality composed
by the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 (ABA Commission’s Draft
Proposals)—supports this position. The ABA Commission’s Draft
58. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401–20 (2006).
59. International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120–129.10
(2010).
60. See Roland L. Trope, Immaterial Transfers with Material Consequences, IEEE
SECURITY & PRIVACY, Sept.–Oct. 2006, at 74.
61. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 1 (2007).
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Proposals concluded that a competent lawyer should be aware of
the benefits and risks of new technology and accordingly
recommended the following change to Comment 6 of MRPC Rule
1.1:
Maintaining Competence. [6] To maintain the
requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep
abreast of changes in the law and its practice, including
the benefits and risks associated with technology, engage
in continuing study and education and comply with all
continuing legal education requirements to which the
62
lawyer is subject.
Although, at the time of this writing, the ABA has not voted on the
measure, the ABA Commission’s Draft Proposals reflect the
Commission’s carefully considered view that to maintain
competence in representation of clients a lawyer should be aware
of the potential need to keep abreast of new technologies.
Moreover, the proposals appear to recommend that the standard
for keeping abreast in such circumstances involve, at a minimum,
understanding the technologies’ benefits and risks, both to the
client and to the lawyer.
Whether or not the proposals are adopted in the form
proposed, they contain prudent guidance. Consider, for example,
that a court issues an order of protection prohibiting a client from
contacting a particular person. It would be prudent for counsel to
advise the client that such a court order may well extend to and
prohibit even indirect communications via online social networks.
Doing less might, in some circumstances, evince a failure to
provide competent representation. If counsel is unfamiliar with
the use of such networks to communicate, he or she might
overlook or underestimate the ease with which the client could
contact the party named in the court order, thus violating the
63
Whether keeping abreast of new communications
order.
technologies is ultimately an ethical duty, express or implicit, the
fact remains that the competence of a lawyer’s representation will
be enhanced by making the often considerable effort it takes to
keep abreast of such new technologies. Notice that in the following
62. ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Initial Draft Proposals—Tech. and
Confidentiality 5 (2011), available at http://www.abanow.org/wordpress/wpcontent/files_flutter/1304367997ethics2020_technologyproposals050211.pdf.
63. See People v. Fernino, 851 N.Y.S.2d 339, 341 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2008)
(holding that defendant violated orders of protection mandating “NO
CONTACT” by sending a “friend request” message through the MySpace.com
Friend Request Manager system).
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commentary on the subject the ethical question may be open to
debate, but common sense nonetheless leads one to the conclusion
that keeping abreast of new communications technologies will
probably improve counsel’s ability to represent the client:
Given the increasing use of social networking sites, does
the duty of competent representation require that lawyers
obtain a basic understanding of navigating social
networking sites, and keep informed of rulings on the
discoverability and admissibility of evidence obtained
from these sites?
In at least some instances, standard practice among
practitioners of a particular legal discipline may dictate
the minimum amount of familiarity with social networking
sites that lawyers within that discipline should have.
The American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, for
instance, “reports that 66 percent of divorce attorneys use
Facebook as their primary source of online evidence.” It
would seem, therefore, that divorce attorneys lacking
familiarity with social networking sites would be hampered
in their ability to provide competent representation,
particularly when their adversaries are likely availing
64
themselves of all available online content.
The need to learn new or upgraded communications
technologies will probably become a priority for many practitioners
due to the enactment of statutes or promulgation of regulations
that mandate adoption of technology-based capabilities. Federal
examples include the Federal Trade Commission’s promulgation
65
of the Red Flags Rule Regulations and Guidelines pursuant to
section 114 of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of
2003 (under which “financial institutions and creditors must
develop a written program that identifies and detects the relevant
66
Counsel to
warning signs—or ‘red flags’—of identity theft”).
financial institutions and other entities to which the Red Flags rules
apply would find it difficult to advise on compliance with such
regulations without continuously updating their knowledge and

64. Boehning & Toal, supra note 11, at 7.
65. Identity Theft Red Flags and Address Discrepancies Under the Fair and
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 72 Fed. Reg. 63,718, 63,718–75 (Nov. 9,
2007) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R pts. 41, 222, 334, 364, 571, 717, and 16 C.F.R pt.
681), available at http://ftc.gov/os/fedreg/2007/November/071109redflags.pdf.
66. Red Flag Program Clarification Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–319, 124
Stat. 3457 (excluding lawyers and law firms from the scope of the Red Flags
regulations).
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understanding of the latest techniques used in identity theft and of
the indicia that must be detected early in order to protect against
67
such digitally based theft. Another example is the enactment of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), with its provisions
prohibiting circumvention of technological measures that control
access to copyrighted works, and the U.S. Copyright Office’s
successive rulemaking proceedings (mandated by the DMCA) in
68
2000, 2003, 2006, and 2009. Copyright and copyright litigation
counsel cannot fully appreciate the Copyright Office’s rules
changes without being up to date on the technologies addressed by
the rulemaking proceedings.
At the state level, examples include the continuing enactment
69
of certain state data breach reporting statutes, some of which
70
include requirements for various degrees of data encryption.
Counselors who advise on such matters would find it prudent to
ensure that they have expertise on the mechanics of encryption, as
well as the problems it can solve or may create, in order to advise
71
The
clients competently on the application of such statutes.
capabilities of new communications technologies may not be fully
disclosed to users. Counsel advising clients in such circumstances
probably cannot do so competently under the applicable ethics
rules without ensuring that they are fully briefed on the technology
and have worked with it sufficiently to appreciate its usefulness and
risks.
Risks from specific kinds of software, particularly anti-piracy
programs, help explain why this “keep abreast” philosophy may
67. Peter McLaughlin, Remarks at the United States Federal Trade
Commission Conference on Securing Personal Data in the Global Economy 19–21
(Mar. 16, 2009) available at http://htc-01.media.globix.net/COMP008760MOD1
/ftc_web/transcripts/031609_sess2.pdf.
68. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2006). Discussions about exemptions for
copy-protection circumvention took place in 2010. See generally Memorandum
from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, United States Copyright Office, to
James H. Billington, Librarian of Congress, Library of Congress, Recommendation
of the Register of Copyrights in RM 2008-8; Rulemaking on Exemptions from
Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Prot. Sys. for Access Control Techs.
(Jun. 11, 2010), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2010/initialedregisters-recommendation-june-11-2010.pdf.
69. As of September 2011, new security breach legislation had been
introduced in fourteen states. For a complete list, see Security Breach Legislation
2011, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Sept. 12, 2011),
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=22295.
70. E.g., S.B. 267, 2011 Leg., 79th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2011); MINN. STAT. §
62J.321 subdiv. (b) (2010).
71. McLaughlin, supra note 67, at 17.
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have an under-appreciated importance. For example, counsel to
software companies that experimented with creating “back doors”
and “time bombs” in their products to enforce their rights to
72
royalties may not have known of the existence of such devices
until a crisis arose from their use. One can imagine the challenges
faced by counsel to Amazon and the owners of the copyrights to
George Orwell’s 1984 and Animal Farm as they dealt with the
problems caused by buyers’ complaints to Amazon that copies of
those works sold by Amazon to its Kindle customers were removed
73
Amazon’s customers
without the customers’ permission.
apparently were unaware that Amazon had the technological
capability to issue an electronic command that could wirelessly
communicate with every Kindle (within the wireless range) and
cause selected works to be completely erased. Amazon’s customers
were surprised (and reportedly outraged) when Amazon did just
that after learning that it had inadvertently sold unauthorized
copies of Orwell’s works:
An Amazon spokesman, Drew Herdener, said in an e-mail
message that the books [1984 and Animal Farm] were
added to the Kindle store by a company that did not have
rights to them, using a self-service function. “When we
were notified of this by the rights holder, we removed the
illegal copies from our systems and from customers’
74
devices, and refunded customers,” he said.
Customers who had made notes on or annotated their Kindle
copies of the books lost those materials as well, despite the
assurance in Amazon’s terms of service that states that the customer
is granted a right to keep a “permanent copy of the applicable
75
Copyright counsel advising in such
digital content.”
circumstances would probably need to understand not only the
technology, but also the potentially unforeseen results of remotely
72. In fact, a federal court in New Jersey has ruled that allegations of “timebombs” in software were sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss claims under
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Kalow & Springnut, LLP v. Commence
Corp., No. 07-3442 (FLW), 2009 WL 44748, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 6, 2009). More
benign time-bombs are typically found on trial or “shareware” software. Alexia
Gaudeul, Software Marketing on the Internet: the Use of Samples and Repositories 2 (Dep’t
of Econ. and ESRC Centre for Competition Policy Univ. of East Anglia, CCP
Working Paper No. 08–23, 2008), available at http://www.uea.ac.uk
/polopoly_fs/1.104681!ccp08-23.pdf.
73. Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Two Classics from Kindle (One Is “1984”), N.Y.
TIMES, July 18, 2009, at B1.
74. Id.
75. Id. at B5.
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erasing infringing content along with a customer’s own additional
or even copyrighted material.
The significance of the undisclosed remote erasure capability
goes far beyond the Kindle episode; it demonstrates the capability
of wireless service providers to create electronic links that not only
give a customer access to data, but also can be used (and
potentially misused) to change, corrupt, or erase the customer’s
data even on a device the customer believes is within the
customer’s exclusive control. As companies and law firms come
increasingly to rely on wireless devices and on third-party providers
of remote and wirelessly accessible “cloud” data storage, the need
for counsel to keep abreast of new security risks will continue to
grow.
One of the most broad-ranging examples of a law making it
necessary for counsel to improve their knowledge and use of
communications technology is the Health Information Technology
for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act), which
76
requires the digitalization of health records. Under the HITECH
Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) must
“issue guidance on the most effective and appropriate technical
safeguards for use in carrying out” certain sections of the Act,
77
including certain security standards. The Act further requires the
Secretary to update “guidance specifying the technologies and
methodologies that render protected health information unusable,
unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized individuals” on an
78
The HITECH Act also imposes on vendors of
annual basis.
personal health records a duty to report the “discovery of a breach
79
of security of unsecured PHR [personal health record] identifiable
76. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-5, 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. (226 Stat.) 123 (2009).
77. Id. § 13401(c).
78. Id. § 13401(h)(2).
79. The HITECH Act defines a “personal health record” as “an electronic
record of PHR identifiable health information (as defined in section 13407(f)(2))
on an individual that can be drawn from multiple sources and that is managed,
shared, and controlled by or primarily for the individual.” Id. § 13400(11). In
addition, section 13407(f)(2) defines “PHR identifiable health information” as:
[I]ndividually identifiable health information, as defined in section
1171(6) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1320d(6), and includes,
with respect to an individual, information—(A) that is provided by or on
behalf of the individual; and (B) that identifies the individual or with
respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe that the
information can be used to identify the individual.
Id. § 13407(f)(2).
Moreover, the term “unsecured PHR health information” is defined in section
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health information that is in a personal health record maintained
80
or offered by such vendor . . . .” The security breach notice must
be sent to each U.S. citizen or resident whose “unsecured PHR
identifiable health information was acquired by an unauthorized
person as a result of such a breach of security” and to the Federal
81
Trade Commission (FTC).
Dispatch of such security breach notices under the HITECH
82
Act can involve a substantial cost, and notice to the FTC may
trigger an investigation resulting in a settlement agreement with
83
additional costly compliance burdens. Vendors seeking to avoid
such consequences might retain counsel to reduce the probability
of a security breach of unsecured PHR identifiable health
information, which the Act defines in terms of failure to adhere to
the Secretary’s annual guidance: “‘[U]nsecured PHR identifiable
health information’ means PHR identifiable health information
that is not protected through the use of a technology or methodology specified
by the Secretary in the [annual] guidance issued under section
84
Thus, counsel advising the affected vendors
13402(h)(2).”
appear to have an implied duty to keep abreast of the technologies
and methodologies that keep such electronic records “unusable,
unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized individuals,” and in
13407(f)(3) as:
(A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subparagraph (B), the term “unsecured
PHR identifiable health information” means PHR identifiable health
information that is not protected through the use of a technology or
methodology specified by the Secretary in the guidance issued under
section 13402(h)(2). (B) EXCEPTION IN CASE TIMELY GUIDANCE
NOT ISSUED.—In the case that the Secretary does not issue guidance
under section 13402(h)(2) by the date specified in such section, for the
purposes of this section, the term “unsecured PHR identifiable health
information” shall mean PHR identifiable health information that is not
secured by a technology standard that renders protected health
information unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized
individuals and that is developed or endorsed by a standards developing
organization that is accredited by the American National Standards
Institute.
Id. § 13407(f)(3).
80. Id. § 13407(a) (emphasis added).
81. Id. § 13407(a)(1)–(2).
82. A Colorado hospital spent more than $3 million on notifications alone
after a physical security breach. Jaikumar Vijayan, Insurer Says It’s Not Liable for
University of Utah’s $3.3M Data Breach, COMPUTERWORLD (June 4, 2010, 8:12 PM),
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9177702/Insurer_says_it_s_not_liable_
for_University_of_Utah_s_3.3M_data_breach?taxonomyId=144.
83. See Genica Corp., F.T.C. File No. 082 3113 (2008) (Agreement Containing
Consent Order).
84. HITECH Act § 13407(f)(3)(a) (emphasis added).
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particular, to those to be identified annually by the Secretary.
Depending on the nature and complexity of the applicable
laws, the level of understanding that lawyers and law firms need to
achieve may be significant. For example, as of 2004, merely
knowing how to use e-mail was probably not sufficient for trial
counsel to fulfill their duties to monitor and oversee a client’s
obligations to preserve electronic records in anticipation of
litigation, as it might not have alerted a lawyer or firm to the fact
that deletion of an e-mail does not necessarily purge it from a hard
drive (where it may remain recoverable). Nor would it necessarily
be apparent that daily, automatic backups of a company’s e-mails
might overwrite and render irrecoverable certain electronic
records that the company had a duty to preserve. The minimum
depth of understanding that counsel practicing in the Southern
District of New York need to have of such digital communications
technology was made clear in Judge Scheindlin’s Zubalake
85
decisions, and particularly in Zubalake V, where Judge Scheindlin
provided this instruction to counsel for a party obligated to
preserve electronic records:
Once a “litigation hold” is in place, a party and her
counsel must make certain that all sources of potentially
relevant information are identified and placed “on hold,”
to the extent required in Zubulake IV. To do this, counsel
must become fully familiar with her client’s document
retention policies, as well as the client’s data retention
architecture. This will invariably involve speaking with
information technology personnel, who can explain
system-wide backup procedures and the actual (as
opposed to theoretical) implementation of the firm’s
86
recycling policy.
Web 2.0 technologies have almost certainly expanded the
scope of potentially accessible and discoverable electronic records
beyond e-mail to include text messaging, Facebook postings,
Twitter broadcasts (tweets), videos uploaded to social network
87
Litigants and courts may be
websites, and cloud data storage.
85. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zublake V), 229 F.R.D. 442 (S.D.N.Y.
2004); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake
v. UBS Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg
LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
86. Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. at 432 (footnotes omitted).
87. As some commentators have observed, New York Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.3, which requires that lawyers “act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client,” may obligate counsel to make enhanced use
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drawn into controversies over the discoverability of records
generated by such technologies and stored in multiple locations,
whether they persist in mobile devices in possession of the sender
and the recipient (as in tweets and video stored on mobile phones
or display devices such as an iPod Touch), have been preserved in
company backups (if the transmission or reception became
recorded on company media) or have been stored on third-party
servers (as appears to be the current practice for tweets, Facebook
postings and geotagging features of social networking sites such as
88
foursquare), or in other cloud storage environments. The
litigation value of such “works” and the risks resulting from
creating and “sharing” them, if overlooked by litigation counsel,
may expose such counsel to serious risks of failing to fulfill the
ethical duty to provide clients with “competent representation” and
diligent representation.
To understand and appreciate the litigation value and risks,
counsel are likely to decide to do more than read newspaper or
blog accounts about the use and misuse of such technologies.
There is no substitute for understanding gained from hands-on
experience. Moreover, repeated use of a new technology can
reveal to the user unreported utilities and undisclosed capacity to
create vulnerabilities. It is worth remembering that “the most farreaching effects of new technology are normally ones that were not
of new technologies:
Presumably this rule [NYRPC 1.3] would require lawyers to search the
internet not only for information favorable to his or her client’s case, but
also for information detrimental to the client for the sake of being better
prepared to advocate on the client’s behalf. Not knowing that a client
routinely posts information on social networking sites, and not knowing
how to navigate such sites for information, could compromise a lawyer’s
ability to identify where relevant information is located, and may thus
hamper a lawyer’s effective and diligent representation.
Boehning & Toal, supra note 11, at 7.
88. See, e.g., Leanne Italie, Divorce Lawyers: Facebook Tops in Online Evidence,
WPTV.COM (June 29, 2010), http://www.wptv.com/dpp/news
/local_news/water_cooler/divorce-lawyers%3A-facebook-tops-in-online-evidence1277832262612 (“Oversharing on social networks has led to an overabundance of
evidence in divorce case.”); Belinda Luscombe, Facebook and Divorce: Airing the Dirty
Laundry, TIME, June 22, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time
/magazine/article/0,9171,1904147,00.html (describing how online social
networking sites provide lawyers an “evidentiary gold mine”); Molly McDonough,
Facebook Is ‘Unrivaled Leader’ for Online Divorce Evidence, Survey Says, ABA JOURNAL
(Feb. 12, 2010), available at http://www.abajournal.com
/news/article/facebook_is_unrivaled_leader_for_online_divorce_evidence_survey
_says/ (noting how clients should nix Facebook accounts during divorce
proceedings due to heightened levels of personal scrutiny).
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anticipated.”
Although the risks and benefits might be most apparent in the
litigation context, such knowledge can also benefit counsel in other
contexts. Incautious creation of electronic records and use of
technologies that facilitate their generation, dissemination, and
preservation cannot be avoided by actions of litigation counsel.
Thus, it is important for non-litigation counsel to understand the
new communications technologies and the customs and practices
that can cause indiscreet or recklessly foolish transmittals, whether
in e-mails, instant messages (IMs), tweets, or geotagging. Once
released, such electronic records may be lost to the sender’s
company, but may have been preserved at the recipient’s company,
giving the recipient’s company a litigation advantage that may not
be suspected by the sender’s company until it is used for
impeachment in a cross-examination.
Since the original essay and CLE were prepared, the authors
believe that many litigation counsel have continuously updated
their knowledge and understanding of the limitations to, and
potential fallacies in, the use of computer forensics on which so
much of electronic discovery depends. Just because electronic
records exist on a company employee’s computer, the company’s
servers, or a third-party provider of off-site electronic storage—a
cloud or otherwise—does not necessarily mean that the employee
or the company allowed it to be there or knew of its existence. It
may be incorrect and misleading for counsel to assume that the
owner of an electronic device intentionally placed digital data on it,
allowed the data to be stored there, or was aware of its existence
and presence. As a computer security expert observed:
[T]he data in “our” computers and other devices that
overzealous adversaries and prosecutors present as
evidence to courts as being “obviously” ours often isn’t.
Just because we paid the bill for a home computer doesn’t
mean that we placed an invisible force-field around it to
shield it from hackers and others who . . . could add,
remove, or alter any and all data in that computer without
our knowledge.
....
Classical computer forensics creates the illusion of an
airtight investigatory process by diverting attention away
from the crucial fact that forensics can’t determine who
put the data on a device, and focusing instead on the
89.

Cloud Control, supra note 56.
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mechanics of the forensic ritual: investigators create an
exact copy of data found on a digital device and present it
to a decision authority (court, employer, and so on)
without any ability to address the key question of who put
the data in that device . . . .
. . . Files can and do end up on our computers in myriad
90
ways without our knowledge, let alone our consent.
Several of the ways for data to become lodged in a hard drive,
such as by remote hacking, Wi-Fi hacking, war driving, malicious e91
mail attachments, and “web bugs” are familiar to many lawyers,
but nonetheless could be overlooked during the pressures and
exigencies of discovery. Other vulnerabilities that may be less
familiar to lawyers include the electromagnetic “compromising
emanations,” “Tempest radiation,” or “Van Eck radiation” that tend
to be broadcast by desktops, laptops, display monitors, and cables
(functioning as parasitic antenna) and that can be intercepted and
92
reconstructed by electronic eavesdroppers. When a computing
device is located on a high-elevation floor, its emanations become
all the easier to intercept because the signal has minimum
93
attention on its way to an interceptor’s device.
An ethical issue could arise if a law firm or its lawyers failed to
take reasonable precautions to shield their computers and other
devices from such emanations and client confidential information
is subsequently intercepted. Ethical issues might also arise if a law
firm or lawyer outsourced the storage of client data to a third party
off-site provider and did not make a “due diligence” inquiry to
determine if the provider had failed to implement reasonable
precautions against such interception of client confidential
90. Michael A. Caloyannides, Forensics is so “Yesterday,” IEEE SECURITY &
PRIVACY, Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 18, 19.
91. A “web bug” is a concealed HTML code that can cause a computing
device connected to the Internet to connect to a particular website each time the
user opens the document containing the bug or copies of such document. See
Aaron Burstein, Will Thomas DeVries & Peter S. Menell, The Rise of Internet Interest
Group Politics, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 5 n.12 (2004) (noting “web bugs,” among
tools that constantly monitor and record individual users’ activities, are
“shattering” anonymity on the Internet).
92. Id.; see also Marcus G. Kuhn & Ross J. Anderson, Soft Tempest: Hidden Data
Transmission Using Electromagnetic Emanations, INFORMATION HIDING 124 (David
Aucsmith ed. 1998), available at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/ih98tempest.pdf (observing that the discovery of such electronic data leakage dates
back to the 1960s, when the British government discovered the leakage of
electronic data in the process of attempting to intercept enciphered traffic among
French government officials).
93. Caloyannides, supra note 90, at 21.
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94

94. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451
(2008) [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 08-451] (setting forth standards for
outsourcing that would apply to cloud computing services as “nonlegal support
services”). The opinion concludes that under MRPC Rule 1.1 there is “nothing
unethical about a lawyer outsourcing legal and nonlegal services, provided the
outsourcing lawyer renders legal services to the client with the ‘legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation,’
as required by Rule 1.1.” Id. at 2. However, the opinion adds several important
cautions, including that “[a]t a minimum, a lawyer outsourcing services for
ultimate provision to a client should consider conducting reference checks and
investigating the background of the . . . nonlawyer providing the services as well as
any nonlawyer intermediary involved, such as a . . . service provider.” Id. at 3.
Furthermore, of particular importance to cloud computing services, which can
store client sensitive information offshore in possibly undisclosed countries, is the
opinion’s caution that “[c]onsideration also should be given to the legal landscape
of the nation to which the services are being outsourced, particularly the extent
that personal property, including documents, may be susceptible to seizure in
judicial or administrative proceedings notwithstanding claims of client
confidentiality.” Id. at 4; see also Benjamin W. Heineman, Jr., European Rejection of
Attorney-Client Privilege for Inside Lawyers, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE &
FIN. REG. (Oct. 2, 2010), available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010
/10/02/european-rejection-of-attorney-client-privilege-for-inside-lawyers (stating
that such cautions are particularly relevant in light of the 2010 decision of the
European Court of Justice in Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd I v. European Commission that
ruled that the attorney-client privilege applied solely to communications
connected to a “client’s right of defence” and in circumstances where such
communications came from “independent lawyers,” which the Court defined as
lawyers “not bound to the client by a relationship of employment,” i.e., those who
are not in-house counsel). Furthermore, the ABA opinion identified several
additional considerations that it stated “must be taken into account under the
Model Rules[,]” including that “at the outset, it may be necessary for the lawyer to
provide information concerning the outsourcing relationship to the client, and
perhaps to obtain the client’s informed consent to the engagement of . . .
nonlawyers . . . .” Formal Op. 08-451, supra, at 4. As we note elsewhere in this
article, it would be a prudent precaution to inform clients, and obtain their
consent, before taking on the additional and still uncertain risks of placing the
client’s sensitive information in a cloud computing vendor’s servers.
Additional guidance on the issue can be found in the recent opinions issued by
the New York State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics (NYSBA Op. 842 (2010))
that addresses the ethics of online storing of confidential information and the
opinion issued by the Arizona State Bar Ass’n Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l
Conduct (AZ Bar Ethics Op. 09-04 (2009)). NYSBA Op. 842 (2010) provides:
We conclude that a lawyer may use an online “cloud” computer data
backup system to store client files provided that the lawyer takes
reasonable care to ensure that the system is secure and that client
confidentiality will be maintained. “Reasonable care” to protect a client’s
confidential information against unauthorized disclosure may include
consideration of the following steps:
• Ensuring that the online data storage provider has an enforceable
obligation to preserve confidentiality and security, and that the
provider will notify the lawyer if served with process requiring the
production of client information;
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In short, as information technology (IT) has become a
cornerstone of corporate enterprises and critical to a company’s
communications both internally and with strategic allies, suppliers,
and customers, it has become increasingly important for boards of
directors and their lawyers to understand IT and each wave of new
communications technologies that impact it. Not infrequently,
however, such changes and their commercial significance are
difficult for a board to appreciate, making it all the more important
for legal counsel to stay abreast of changes in new communications
technologies. For example, there were reports that companies and
their boards were struggling to figure out the advantages of Web
2.0 technologies, and particularly those supporting online social
networks and the collaborative ways of working such networks can
facilitate. As a June 2009 report stated:
Company boards don’t recognize what IT is or does any
more . . . . It used to be a thing that you used to increase
productivity or automate processes, but that’s been done.
Even chief information officers, who thoroughly
understand enterprise IT, have been left behind by social
95
IT—which they can’t control.
Given such developments, competent representation arguably
implies a duty to stay abreast of new communications technologies.
The failure to do so can quickly erode counsel’s ability to
anticipate, prepare for, and offer advice about the actions,
communications, contexts, and crises that such technologies can
create or alter. New communications technologies may be most
risky when a client has achieved a comfort level with such
technology without being aware of recent changes made to the
technology by its developer that may have enhanced its features,
deleted features, and created new risks for users. In addition, a
company’s business culture may be changed by use of a technology
with little awareness (or only belated understanding) of the
consequences. For example, companies that have fully integrated
•

Investigating the online data storage provider’s security measures,
policies, recoverability methods, and other procedures to determine
if they are adequate under the circumstances;
• Employing available technology to guard against reasonably
foreseeable attempts to infiltrate the data that is stored . . . .
New York State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 842 (2010)
[hereinafter New York Op. 842], available at http://www.nysba.org/Content
/ContentFolders/EthicsOpinions/Opinions825present/EO_842.pdf.
95. Peter Whitehead, Does Business Understand Technology Anymore?, FIN. TIMES,
June 17, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9dabb29e-5a0d-11de-b687
-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1.

2011]

RED SKIES IN THE MORNING

151

e-mail use into their business often regret their over-reliance on
internal e-mails, which are rarely if ever drafted with an eye to their
96
possible disclosure in the context of litigation. The same thing
can happen with records created and published with Web 2.0
technologies.
B. The Duties to Protect Client Confidential Information Imply a Duty to
Keep Abreast of New Communications Technologies
A second source of an implied duty for lawyers and law firms to
keep abreast of new communications technologies may be found in
NYRPC Rule 1.6 “Confidentiality of Information,” which defines
“confidential information” as consisting of:
[I]nformation gained during or relating to the
representation of a client, whatever its source, that is (a)
protected by the attorney-client privilege, (b) likely to be
embarrassing or detrimental to the client if disclosed, or
(c) information that the client has requested be kept
97
confidential.
We conclude that the “confidential information” category is
broader than information covered by the “attorney-client
privilege,” and arguably includes all information covered by the
“attorney work product” doctrine (given that disclosure of such
information would be “detrimental to the client”).
Even
information that has been obtained indirectly through the use of a
new communications technology should probably be treated as
“confidential information” under the NYRPC, if it contains or may
subsequently become client confidential information.
NYRPC Rule 1.6(a) requires that, unless certain specified
98
conditions have been met, a “lawyer shall not knowingly reveal
confidential information, as defined in this Rule, or use such
information to the disadvantage of a client or for the advantage of

96. See, e.g., Ann O’Neill, E-mail Can Bounce Back to Hurt You, CNN (Nov. 7,
2005), http://articles.cnn.com/2005-11-03/justice/email.legal_1_e-mail
-office-cubicle-fema?_s=PM:LAW (explaining that e-mails are in the range of
litigation discovery, and therefore, improperly drafted e-mails can have significant
consequences).
97. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.6(a) (2011) (emphasis
added).
98. Id. (specifying three alternative conditions: (1) informed consent by the
client; (2) the disclosure is impliedly authorized to advance the client’s best
interests; or (3) the lawyer reasonably believes the disclosure is necessary to avert
serious harm such as death, bodily injury, commission of a crime, etc.).
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99

the lawyer or a third person.”
It is unclear whether such disclosure would be considered
“knowing” if a lawyer or law firm disregarded well-known risks that
could lead to an inadvertent disclosure. Although NYRPC Rule 1.6
does not explicitly adopt a “knew or should have known” standard,
counsel who do not keep abreast of new communications
technologies could find themselves being held to such a standard if
the risks involved were brought to their attention (in, for example,
a commissioned risk assessment) or were the subject of widely
100
reported incidents.
The MRPC, on the other hand, does not have a “knowing”
requirement for disclosure. Rather, MRPC Rule 1.6 states instead
that a “[l]awyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent,
[or] the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the
101
The Rule adds that a lawyer “may reveal
representation . . . .”
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent
102
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary.” under certain specified
circumstances. However, based on the nature of the circumstances
listed in the Rule, it does not appear that disclosure through
communications technologies is “necessary.” Rather, MRPC Rule
1.6(b) seems to contemplate that disclosure is necessary only in
situations where the safety or financial viability of an individual or
an entity is at risk due to the client’s actions or potential actions.
MRPC Rule 1.6(a) ultimately embodies the general principle
underlying attorney-client relationships: that, absent informed
consent, the lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the
representation. The absence of a qualifying subjective mental
element in 1.6(a) suggests that the MRPC impose a higher
standard than under the NYRPC. Thus, it is possible that a lawyer’s
inadvertent failure to understand the risks posed by
99. Id. at 1.6 (2011) (emphasis added).
100. Henry Blodget, Amazon’s Cloud Crash Disaster Permanently Destroyed Many
Customer’s Data, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 28, 2011, 7:10 AM), http://www.
businessinsider.com/amazon-lost-data-2011-4; Richard Waters, Technology: Grand
Theft Data, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1718ec227290-11e0-96bf-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1Whhbzxxu (providing that the security
breach at Sony not only compromised private information, but it also temporarily
prevented the online multiplayer functionality in PlayStation 3 games from
working as Sony found it necessary to take the network offline after discovering
that an unknown hacker had misappropriated names, e-mail addresses, user IDs
and passwords of over 77 million participants in the PlayStation Network).
101. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007).
102. Id. at 1.6(b).
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communications technologies—risks that could result in
unauthorized disclosure of client information—would increase the
likelihood of putting the lawyer at risk of violating MRPC Rule
1.6(a).
However, Comment 5 to MRPC Rule 1.6 appears to diminish
the strength of such an argument by stating, “[e]xcept to the
extent that the client’s instructions or special circumstances limit
that authority, a lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures
about a client when appropriate in carrying out the
103
This guidance seems to indicate, first, that a
representation.”
lawyer should be aware of the risks that communications
technologies pose, and second, that a lawyer should inform the
client of such risks in order to determine whether the client has
any special requests for guarding the confidentiality of its
information. Nevertheless, it seems that there might be room for
the lawyer to utilize his or her traditional method of storing client
information in spite of some risk of disclosure. A properly vetted
communications technology, for example, which is standard for the
firm or for the lawyer, would seem to be “appropriate” in
representing the client, although it would be prudent to disclose to
the client the use of any new communications technology that
could put the confidentiality or secure storage of the client’s
information at enhanced risk and to obtain the client’s consent
before subjecting the client’s information to such risks.
NYRPC Rule 1.6(c) arguably sets an elevated standard, however,
when the source of the disclosure is a non-lawyer whose services are
utilized by the lawyer or law firm, stating that “[a] lawyer shall
exercise reasonable care to prevent the lawyer’s employees,
associates, and others whose services are utilized by the lawyer from
104
disclosing or using confidential information of a client . . . .” The
underlying principle appears to be that where the disclosure or use
might be committed by a non-lawyer, such persons should not be
assumed to be as aware of the risks and sensitivities of the
information as would be a lawyer.
A provision similar to NYRPC Rule 1.6(c) can be found in
Comment 16 of the MRPC. As it currently reads, Comment 16 to
MRPC Rule 1.6 states that a lawyer must act “competently to
safeguard information relating to the representation of a client
against inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure by the lawyer or
103.
104.

Id. at 1.6 cmt. 5 (2007).
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.6(c) (2011).
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other persons who are participating in the representation of the
105
In
client or who are subject to the lawyer’s supervision.”
borrowing the competence language of MRPC Rule 1.1, Comment
16 indicates that with reference to protecting client information, a
lawyer must recognize the risks that technology poses, particularly
106
The
where a third party might have access to the information.
competence requirement embodied in the MRPC does not seem to
differ substantially from the “reasonable care” requirement of the
NYRPC. Thus, in addition to recognizing risks, to competently
safeguard information, the lawyer must similarly assume and
provide for the fact that third-party communications providers are
not likely to protect client information as zealously as the client’s
107
advocate should.
The ABA Commission’s Draft Proposals for amendments to
the MRPC and comments has recommended that MRPC Rule 1.6
be amended by the addition of a new section (c) that states: “A
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to prevent the inadvertent
disclosure of, or unauthorized access to, information relating to the
108
representation of a client.”
The Proposals also recommended that additional guidance be
inserted in Comment 16 containing, among other changes, the
following statement concerning the obligations under the
proposed new section (c) to MRPC Rule 1.6:
Factors to be considered in determining the
reasonableness of the lawyer’s efforts include the
sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of disclosure
105. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 16 (2007).
106. ABA Formal Op. 08-451, supra note 94 (concluding that a lawyer may
outsource support services, but recognizing that the lawyer ultimately remains
responsible for rendering competent legal services to the client).
107. This view is consistent with the guidance provided by the New York State
Bar Association, Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion 842 from 2010 on the
topic of “[u]sing an outside online storage provider to store client confidential
information,” which observes, in pertinent part:
Rule 1.6(c) provides that an attorney must “exercise reasonable care to
prevent . . . others whose services are utilized by the lawyer from
disclosing or using confidential information of a client” except to the
extent disclosure is permitted by Rule 1.6(b). Accordingly, a lawyer must
take reasonable affirmative steps to guard against the risk of inadvertent
disclosure by others who are working under the attorney’s supervision or
who have been retained by the attorney to assist in providing services to
the client. We note, however, that exercising “reasonable care” under
Rule 1.6 does not mean that the lawyer guarantees that the information is
secure from any unauthorized access.
New York Op. 842, supra note 94, ¶ 5.
108. ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, supra note 62, at 6.
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if additional safeguards are not employed, and the cost of
employing additional safeguards. Whether a lawyer may
be required to take additional steps to safeguard a client’s
information in order to comply with other law, such as
state and federal laws that govern data privacy or that
impose notification requirements upon the loss of, or
unauthorized access to, electronic information, is beyond
109
the scope of these Rules.
In explanation, the ABA Commission acknowledged that the duty
to protect a client’s confidential information was “already implicit
in MRPC Rule 1.6[,]” but that “in light of the pervasive use of
technology to store and transmit confidential client information,
this obligation should be stated explicitly in the black letter of
110
The Commission may also have been mindful
MRPC Rule 1.6.”
that some lawyers may check the black letter rules without taking
time to also consult the comments, and therefore, thought it was
advisable to ensure the widest possible audience for this
enhancement of the existing guidance. We remind readers that
our purpose in writing this article is not to create liability for
lawyers and law firms, but to assist them in identifying and avoiding
the vulnerabilities that they are facing now and will face in the
future.
We would note also that the proposed addition to Comment
16 basically makes “reasonable efforts” subject to a common sense
judgment call by the lawyer, rather than imposing stringent duties
that might quickly become obsolete in light of technologies that
may emerge in the near future.
However, it should be
remembered that the ethical standards set forth in the NYRPC and
the MRPC are not intended as the highest standard to which a
lawyer should adhere. They set standards below which lawyers
should not allow their conduct to go. Common sense and what is
for most lawyers the relentless pursuit of their clients’ interests will
often motivate a lawyer to implement safeguards that exceed those
required or recommended in the MRPC. Such common sense
often appears most clearly in the ethics opinions thoughtfully
prepared by state and city bar associations, as illustrated in the New
York State Bar’s additional observations in its opinion on using an
online system (such as the cloud) to store a client’s confidential
information, which emphasizes the need to stay abreast of new
technologies:
109.
110.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 2.
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Not only technology itself but also the law relating to
technology and the protection of confidential
communications is changing rapidly. Lawyers using
online storage systems (and electronic means of
communication generally) should monitor these legal
developments, especially regarding instances when using
technology may waive an otherwise applicable
privilege. . . .
This Committee’s prior opinions have addressed the
disclosure of confidential information in metadata and
the perils of practicing law over the Internet. . . . [T]he
duty to “exercise reasonable care” to prevent disclosure of
confidential information “may, in some circumstances,
call for the lawyer to stay abreast of technological
advances and the potential risks” in transmitting
information electronically. N.Y. State 782 (2004), citing
N.Y. State 709 (1998) (when conducting trademark
practice over the Internet, lawyer had duty to “stay abreast
of this evolving technology to assess any changes in the
likelihood of interception as well as the availability of
improved technologies that may reduce such risks at
reasonable cost”) . . . . The same duty to stay current with
the technological advances applies to a lawyer’s
111
contemplated use of an online data storage system.
A 2008 ABA Opinion on outsourcing legal services provides
additional insight into the precautions that a lawyer would be wise
to take in retaining outside services. The Opinion states that at a
minimum, a lawyer outsourcing services, which will ultimately
involve client information, should “consider investigating the
security of the provider’s premises, [and] computer network . . .
112
.” Only through a proper vetting process of the communications
technology provider will the lawyer have made an attempt to carry
out his or her services competently. Additionally, a lawyer’s
obligations under MRPC Rule 1.6 arguably extend to outside
service providers under MRPC Rule 5.3(b). The rule requires
lawyers who retain outside services of non-lawyers to make
“reasonable efforts to ensure that the person’s conduct is
113
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer.”
Given these obligations, it could be argued that both MRPC
Rule 1.6(a) and NYRPC Rule 1.6(c) impose an implicit duty on
111.
112.
113.

New York Op. 842, supra note 94, ¶¶ 11–12.
ABA Formal Op. 08-451, supra note 94, at 3.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3(b) (2007).
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lawyers and law firms to keep abreast of new communications
technologies. Yet new communications technologies may be
adopted without a clear understanding of the attendant risks of
inadvertent disclosure. For example, Bluetooth, as a wireless
transmission method, arguably makes the conversations it transmits
114
Similarly, users of ear-buds for
vulnerable to interception.
mobile phones often do not realize that the voice of their
interlocutor can be overheard in elevators if the volume has not
115
been adjusted to account for the close proximity of third parties.
A lawyer or law firm that ignores such vulnerabilities may be at
risk of violating NYRPC or MRPC Rule 1.6(a) if they use such
technologies for communicating confidential information.
Moreover, as upgrades boost or enhance a communications
116
technology and as “potential adversaries” probe and identify
vulnerabilities in the new technologies and plan attacks that exploit
such vulnerabilities, it is important for lawyers and law firms to
understand those developments and to implement appropriate
precautions. For example, counsel to financial institutions would
find it prudent to ensure that their review and assessment of such
developments and their responses with appropriate updated
precautions should not lag behind that required by regulators of
their financial institution clients. In that regard, the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) decided in
2011 that the guidance it had issued in 2005 for a risk management
framework for financial institutions offering Internet-based
products and services to customers, entitled Authentication in an
Internet Banking Environment (the 2005 Guidance), needed
reinforcement and a substantive upgrade to keep abreast of the
subsequent evolution of external and internal cyber-threats and to
ensure that financial institutions responded accordingly. For
example, the FFIEC explained that its 2005 Guidance had stated
that “institutions should use effective methods to authenticate the
114. Indeed, mobile application developers are developing programs that will
only make eavesdropping easier. See Amplify’d, JOONITI, http://jooniti.com
/products/amplifyd (last visited Oct. 18, 2011).
115. Even more common is the use of smart phones and e-mail-enabled PDAs
while in an elevator in the apparent belief that the information displayed on the
device’s brightly lit and easily read display screen is not visible to others.
116. We use the term “potential adversaries” to refer to any individual, group,
organization, government, or government-sponsored entity that seeks
unauthorized access to an enterprise’s digital assets with the objective of gaining
advantage over the enterprise and damaging its defenses, financial well-being, or
reputation.
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identity of customers and that the techniques employed should be
commensurate with the risks associated with the products and
services offered and the protection of sensitive customer
117
The FFIEC further explained the standards and
information.”
measures it expected as a minimum that financial institutions
would implement and maintain, such as periodic reassessments of
the risks and implementation of layered defenses:
The
Guidance
provided
minimum
supervisory
expectations for effective authentication controls
applicable to high-risk online transactions involving access
to customer information or the movement of funds to
other parties. The 2005 Guidance also provided that
institutions should perform periodic risk assessments and
adjust their control mechanisms as appropriate in
118
response to changing internal and external threats.
Apparently, the FFIEC had concluded that the 2005 Guidance
had ceased to be sufficiently effective, and that the enhancements
by adversaries of their capabilities to attack and successfully
penetrate financial institution defenses was outdistancing the
efforts to defend against and avert such exploits. Thus, the release
of updated guidance, entitled Supplement to Authentication in an
Internet Banking Environment (the 2011 Guidance), came with
several strong cautions that reflected the FFIEC’s assessment of the
growing gap between attacker’s capabilities (and successes) and the
regulated financial institutions’ defenses (and breaches):
The Agencies are concerned that customer
authentication methods and controls implemented in
conformance with the Guidance several years ago have
become less effective. Hence, the institution and its
customers may face significant risk where periodic risk
assessments and appropriate control enhancements have
not routinely occurred.
....
Since virtually every authentication technique can be
compromised, financial institutions should not rely solely on
any single control for authorizing high risk transactions,
but rather institute a system of layered security, as
119
described herein.
117. Press Release, FFIEC, Supplement to Authentication in an Internet
Banking Environment 1 (2011), available at http://www.fdic.gov
/news/news/press/2011/pr11111a.pdf.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
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....
. . . [T]he Agencies are concerned that fraudsters are
utilizing increasingly sophisticated and malicious
techniques to thwart existing authentication controls, gain
control of customer accounts, and transfer funds to
money mules that facilitate the movement of those funds
beyond the reach of financial institutions and law
120
enforcement.
The 2011 Guidance requires at least annual review and update
of a financial institution’s online risk assessment, which should
consider, but not be limited to, “changes in the internal and
external threat environment” (focusing apparently on the
capabilities of those posing the threats) and “changes in the
customer functionality offered through electronic banking”
(focusing apparently on the vulnerabilities that new technologies
121
The 2011 Guidance, in its Appendix,
would bring or create).
highlighted forms of attack that, in some instances, may have been
only theoretical possibilities at the time of the 2005 Guidance’s
publication, but that by 2011 had led to widely reported, severely
damaging attacks, such as the following noted in the 2011
Guidance Appendix:
• Fraudsters use of keyloggers to obtain the logon IDs,
passwords, and challenge question answers of financial
institutions’ customers.
• Sophisticated malware allowing fraudsters to perpetrate man122
in-the-middle (MIM) or man-in-the-browser (MIB) attacks.
It would not be surprising if many lawyers, even those who
advise financial institutions, were not acquainted with and may not
even have ever read accounts of MIM/MIB attacks. However,
counsel who advise defense contractors and nuclear power plant
operators should have at least seen mention of MIM since it was
one of the more sophisticated elements of the Stuxnet worm that
attacked the uranium processing facilities in Natanz, Iran and was
123
As explained by the
finally discovered and reported in 2010.
2011 Guidance:
In a MIM/MIB attack, the fraudster inserts himself
between the customer and the financial institution and
120. Id. at 9.
121. Id. at 3.
122. Id. at 9.
123. William J. Broad et al., Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear
Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011
/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html.
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hijacks the online session. In one scenario, the fraudster is
able to intercept the authentication credentials submitted
by the customer and log into the customer’s account. In
another scenario, the fraudster does not intercept the
credentials, but modifies the transaction content or
inserts additional transactions not authorized by the
customer which, in most cases, are funds transfers to
accounts controlled by the fraudster. The fraudsters
conceal their actions by directing the customer to a
fraudulent website that is a mirror image of the financial
institution’s website or sending the customer a message
claiming that the institution’s website is unavailable and to
try again later. Fraudsters may have the capacity to delete
124
any trace of their attack from the log files.
MIM attacks on SCADA systems have come to be viewed by
security experts as the “ultimate aggressive attack,” because:
[N]ot only [is] the controller . . . no longer in control, but
the controller doesn’t even recognize that [it is] no
longer in control. And certainly the SCADA, the HMI,
and the operators also do not recognize . . . what’s going
on . . . . If you were to implement this type of an attack on
a pipeline leak detection system, back in the control
center [they] would think everything is fine because [they
would be] getting replay data showing that the liquids
were flowing through as [expected] and there were no
leaks, when in fact [liquids] could be gushing out
125
somewhere.
124. FFIEC, supra note 117, at 9–10. The MIM reportedly used by Stuxnet,
resembled deceptions illustrated in the film Ocean’s Eleven (where the thieves
substitute fictitious pre-recorded video for what is supposed to be the real-time
video feed from the on-site surveillance observation cameras). Stuxnet’s MIM
reportedly concealed from the uranium processing plant’s SCADA system and the
plant operating personnel the unauthorized changes that Stuxnet was executing
in the speed of the centrifuge motors, causing them to spin intermittently at
excessively high, then excessively low, speeds. As explained by security expert
Ralph Langner:
Rogue code intercepts physical I/O [inputs/outputs] and provides the
legitimate program running on the controller with ‘normal’ input
patterns that are actually pre-recorded by Stuxnet . . . .The controller is
no longer controlling I/O, but doesn’t recognize that. The same is true
for the HMI [human machine interface] and for operators. In the
meantime, Stuxnet writes to outputs at its discretion [to cause the
variations in the frequency of the centrifuge motors].
Ralph Langner, How to Hijack a Controller: Why Stuxnet Isn’t Just About Siemens’ PLCs,
CONTROLGLOBAL (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.controlglobal.com/articles/2011
/IndustrialControllers1101.html.
125. Interview by Dale Peterson with Ralph Langner, at 21:05–23:40, DIGITAL
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In light of the 2011 Guidance and the reported exploits that
occurred in 2010 and 2011, we believe that in interpreting the
scope of an ethical requirement to keep abreast of new
technologies, it would be reasonable and prudent to infer that such
scope could well include not only the development of new
communications technologies and the vulnerabilities they bring or
create, but also the development of new and enhanced forms of
attacks launched by adversaries, since clients will need to defend
against and respond to such attacks and, counsel will be in a far
better position to advise clients in such situations if counsel has
kept abreast of such developments. However, we understand that
client and counsel will probably always be attempting to catch up
with such developments.
Such an interpretation would be prudent to apply also to the
use of new technologies by associates, employees, and others whose
services the lawyers and law firms utilize. Supervising lawyers need
to be aware of the potential risks and vulnerabilities that may be
introduced into their legal practice in order to take appropriate
precautions, which may include instructing such personnel on the
potential risks and ways to avoid disclosing confidential
information. Of course, the adequacy and timeliness of such
supervision depends on law firms and lawyers remaining abreast of
126
emerging developments in communications technologies.
On initial reading, Comment 17 to MRPC Rule 1.6, which has
no parallel in the NYRPC, seems to address several of these
technological concerns. Comment 17 states that when a lawyer is
“transmitting a communication” that includes client information,
“the lawyer must take reasonable precautions to prevent the
information from coming into the hands of unintended
127
However, the Comment goes on to state that the
recipients.”
duty does not require the lawyer to put special security measures in
place “if the method of communication affords a reasonable

BOND (Dec. 15, 2010), available at http://www.digitalbond.com/2010/12/15
/december-podcast-ralph-langner-stuxnet-interview.
126. As observed in an article in the ABA Journal: “If the history of technology
in the legal profession is any guide, most lawyers will eventually understand the
utility of today’s latest technology as well as any of today’s college students do.
And they’ll come to that understanding about the same time as those college
students make partner.” Edward A. Adams, Web 2.0 Still a No-go: Lawyers Slow to
Adopt Cutting Edge Technology, ABA JOURNAL, Sept. 1, 2008, at 52,
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/web_20_still_a_no_go.
127. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 17 (2007).

162

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

128

expectation of privacy.”
In light of the rapid and extensive
erosion of privacy that has resulted from the development and use
of Web 2.0 technologies, such guidance is far from clear and may
appear, to some, to amount to putting lawyers in the position of
trying to speculate on the present and future boundaries of an
already admittedly controversial grey area—that of what constitutes
129
a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”
As a 2010 California State Bar opinion illustrated, courts have
come to different conclusions on the degree of privacy that lawyers
should expect from communications technologies, such as e130
mail. Some courts have indicated that, unlike postal mail, e-mails
are generally not sealed or secured in the same fashion and thus
131
Nevertheless, a majority of state bar
pose a greater security risk.
associations have taken the position that e-mails enjoy the same
132
sense of security as traditional postal mail. An ABA Formal Ethics
133
In that opinion, the ABA
Opinion from 1999 supports this view.
states that lawyers may transmit information relating to client
representation through unencrypted e-mail without violating the
MRPC “because the mode of transmission affords a reasonable
expectation of privacy from a technological and legal
134
Furthermore, the ABA found that the same privacy
standpoint.”
afforded to U.S. mail applies to e-mail, but it noted that the lawyer
should nevertheless consult with the client regarding any specific
135
instructions about transmitting highly sensitive information.
Although there is a threat that information transmitted through
either method will be intercepted, lawyers are under no greater
128. Id.
129. Some privacy experts have begun to argue that the focus on “reasonable
expectation of privacy” is misplaced and that the locus of discussion should be
changed. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND SECURITY 114 (2011) (“For a long time, I believed the fix was for the
Supreme Court to adopt a more sophisticated and forward-looking view of privacy.
I now realize that I was wrong. The entire debate over reasonable expectations of
privacy is futile, for it is not focused on the right question.”).
130. See California State Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility &
Conduct, Formal Op. 2010-179, at 3 (2010) [hereinafter California Formal Op.
2010–179], available at http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket
=wmqECiHp7h4%3D&tabid=837.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999)
[hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 99-413].
134. Id. It should be noted, however, that the Committee’s conclusions in this
opinion were based upon the information available to it in 1999.
135. Id.
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security obligations when using technological transmission than
136
they would be in using postal services.
However, it is possible that Comment 17 is not broad enough,
or that it was not intended to address the expansion of
technologies such as Bluetooth or products and services based on
cloud computing platforms. Arguably, Comment 17 suggests that
lawyers can expect a reasonable degree of privacy when
transmitting e-mails through the lawyer or the law firm’s secure
137
But where a lawyer utilizes a third party mechanism or a
system.
less secure communications technology, additional precautions
may be warranted, particularly if it becomes apparent—as it should
be with data stored in the cloud—that counsel will have less control
over the handling of client data stored, processed, copied, and
relocated at off-site server farms, and if, in relinquishing such
control, counsel is unable to satisfy herself or himself that the
client’s data is as well protected against unauthorized access,
disclosure, damage, or destruction as it was before moving such
138
data to the cloud.
136. See id. (“It is not . . . reasonable to require that a mode of communicating
information . . . be avoided simply because interception is technologically
possible.”).
137. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 17 (2007).
138. ABA Formal Op. 99-413, supra note 133; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 17 (2007). As Alabama Bar Ethics Opinion 2010-02 observes
and cautions:
The duty of reasonable care requires the lawyer to become
knowledgeable about how the provider will handle the storage and
security of the data being stored and to reasonably ensure that the
provider will abide by a confidentiality agreement in handling the data.
Additionally, because technology is constantly evolving, the lawyer will
have a continuing duty to stay abreast of appropriate security safeguards
that should be employed by the lawyer and the third-party provider. If
there is a breach of confidentiality, the focus of any inquiry will be
whether the lawyer acted reasonably in selecting the method of storage
and/or the third party provider.
Alabama State Bar, Formal Op. 2010-02 (2010), available at http://www.alabar
.org/ogc/PDF/2010-02.pdf.
Moreover, even the experts that counsel may consult in attempting to assess risks
to digital systems and data stored and processed on them may find that the experts
have underestimated the capabilities of really determined, well-funded, potential
adversaries. As noted in a recent Scientific American article:
[T]he average control system engineer would have once dismissed out of
hand the possibility of remotely launched malware getting close to
critical controllers, arguing that the system is not directly connected to
the Internet. Then Stuxnet showed that control networks with no
permanent connection to anything else are still vulnerable. Malware can
piggyback on a USB stick that technicians plug into the control system,
for example. When it comes to critical electronic circuits, even the
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IV. MINIMIZING LAWYERS’ ETHICAL RISKS IN CLOUD COMPUTING
SERVICES
In this section, we provide an overview of how cloud
computing services work as a general proposition. Next, we
evaluate the risks that at present appear inherent in the use of such
services and some of the ethical challenges and risks that may arise
when lawyers and law firms consider whether to entrust client data
to cloud computing service vendors. And, finally, we suggest some
measures that may help to minimize those risks.
A. Cloud Computing Services
By 2007, individuals and enterprises were already deciding to
migrate various kinds of data to third party vendors who
maintained large server farms in order to store, process, and make
wirelessly accessible such data to the data customers. Referred to
by names such as “grid, utility, or cloud computing,” such services
promised the data customer that if it would outsource the hosting
of hardware and software, the customer could “just link” to the data
139
The more companies that decide to
and software when needed.
locate, at least, part of their data in the cloud and the more
sensitive the data that they entrust to the cloud, the greater the
probability that potential adversaries will come to view cloud servers
as a treasure trove of digital assets and may be tempted to probe
such servers for vulnerabilities and to design attacks to exploit
them. Our concern is that the decision for clients, lawyers, and law
firms about whether to make use of cloud services carries with it
risks that are difficult to assess, in part because the vendors keep
the structure and operation of their cloud computing services
remarkably opaque to customers, and in part because the use of
cloud computing involves creation of potentially multiple copies
smallest back door can let an enterprising burglar in.
David M. Nicol, Hacking the Lights Out, SCI. AM. (July 2011), available at
http://www.cs.virginia.edu/~robins/Hacking_the_Lights_Out.pdf. For at least
two years, it has for such reasons been impermissible for faculty at Department of
Defense (DoD) educational institutions, such as the U.S. Military Academy, to
insert USB sticks into the institution’s networked computers. Of course, for the
military, as for counsel, the problem with such safeguards is whether they can be
consistently enforced, or whether human nature and the pressure of coping with
exigencies will lead someone to violate the prohibition in order to achieve a
valuable convenience without realizing that it only takes one such lapse for the
locked door to swing open to a potential adversary’s malware.
139. M. Mitchell Waldrop, Data Center in a Box, SCI. AM. (Aug. 2007), available
at http://www.angelfire.com/folk/thegrieves/transfer/200708.pdf.
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whose location the data customer will not be aware of. As a result,
clients may be at risk of underestimating the risks to their
intellectual property of keeping sensitive data in the cloud (e.g., it
would seem a premature and perilous exercise for an enterprise to
authorize the storage of any copy of its trade secret information in
the cloud), and counsel face a double risk: the challenge of
advising clients and ensuring that their interests will be protected if
they decide to move their data to the cloud and the challenge of
deciding in what circumstances a lawyer or law firm may authorize
the uploading of client data to the cloud without putting at risk
their obligations to the client, the client’s trust, and their
professional ethical duties. We will explore such issues in this
section and attempt to identify the most important considerations
that lawyers and law firms should inform themselves of and assess
before deciding whether any client data should be stored in the
cloud, and if so, what kinds of data can be and what kinds should
probably not be moved there.
1.

Overview of the “Cloud” —Features and Potential Benefits

Time-shared computing preceded the proliferation of
140
“Big,
personal computers into each office of a company.
expensive computers were kept behind big glass walls, tended by
shrouded acolytes. For the rest of us, it was ‘keep your hands off.’
141
You rented computation by the second for your dumb terminal.”
Before the advent of the Web, visionaries hailed the coming
era of “desktop publishing,” in which each office would boast a
computer linked to nearby printers, enabling each member of an
142
The World Wide Web’s
enterprise to publish in hard copy.
emergence made “desktop publishing” into an unexpectedly
shortsighted vision of what would become computer-aided
dissemination, but it still promoted the decentralization of
computing—where each employee would have a terminal on their
desk, and later each would have a laptop, a smart phone, or a tablet
to take on business trips, on the daily commute, or for working
remotely from home.
140. See Robert W. Lucky, Cloud Computing, IEEE SPECTRUM (May 2009),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/software/cloud-computing (remembering
the days of time-shared computing).
141. Id.
142. See History of Desktop Publishing, TEXAS SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF, http://www
.tsd.state.tx.us/cte/careertech/desktoppublishing/historyDTP.HTM (last visited
Oct. 18, 2011).
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Today, the amount of data processed is growing daily, and the
need for company personnel to access it from nearly everywhere
143
has become compelling. The costs of providing such capabilities
are substantial, and once invested, a company is stuck with the
processing capability even if it is underutilized and, therefore, an
inefficient investment. In response to these challenges, major high
tech firms have built enormous server farms and are offering to
take on the computer processing and information technology
144
Potential clients
responsibilities for numerous corporate clients.
are being encouraged to scrap their in-house servers and save on
the associated costs by outsourcing their data storage and
processing to off-premises server farms that promise to provide
145
The
each customer with access to its data and to no one else’s.
promise is a “virtual computing environment that’s dynamically
146
allocated to meet user needs.”
The term “cloud computing” is imprecise and ambiguous,
because cloud services and the meaning of the term “cloud
computing” (and related terms and concepts such as
“virtualization”) are rapidly evolving. As NIST has observed,
“[c]loud computing is still an evolving paradigm. Its definitions,
use cases, underlying technologies, issues, risks, and benefits will be
refined in a spirited debate by the public and private sectors.
These definitions, attributes, and characteristics will evolve and
147
change over time.”
In 2009, NIST proposed a working definition that described
“cloud computing” as “a model for enabling convenient, ondemand network access to a shared pool of configurable
computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications,
143. See Roger Cheng, So You Want to Use Your iPhone for Work? Uh-oh, WALL ST.
J. Apr. 25, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052748704641604576255223445021138.html.
144. See, e.g., Mark Milian, What Makes Apple’s iCloud Different from Google and
Amazon Services, CNN TECH (June 6, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/TECH
/web/06/06/apple.icloud/index.html?iref=allsearch (discussing Apple’s new
iCloud service and how it compares to Google and Amazon’s similar services).
145. Sharon K. Sandeen, Kenneth L. Dorsey, Theodore F. Claypoole, James
Garrity & Christopher Kudlick, Protecting Trade Secrets in the Cloud: What Efforts are
Reasonable Enough?, CLE Presentation, Boston (Apr. 2011) (copy of handout on
file with the authors).
146. John Harauz, Lori M. Kaufman & Bruce Potter, Data Security in the World of
Cloud Computing, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, July–Aug. 2000, at 61, available at
http://www.idi.ntnu.no/emner/tdt60/papers/05189563.pdf.
147. Peter Mell & Timothy Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing
(Draft), NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., 1 (June 1, 2009), available at
http://www.newinnovationsguide.com/NIST_Cloud_Definition.pdf.
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and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with
148
minimal management effort or service provider interaction.”
NIST identified five essential characteristics of “cloud computing”:
[1.] On-demand self-service. A consumer can unilaterally
provision computing capabilities, such as server time and
network storage, as needed automatically without
requiring human interaction with each service’s provider.
[2.] Broad network access. Capabilities are available over the
network and accessed through standard mechanisms that
promote use by heterogeneous thin or thick client
platforms (e.g., mobile phones, laptops, and PDAs).
[3.] Resource pooling. The provider’s computing resources
are pooled to serve multiple consumers using a multitenant model, with different physical and virtual resources
dynamically assigned and reassigned according to
consumer demand.
There is a sense of location
independence in that the customer generally has no
control or knowledge over the exact location of the
provided resources but may be able to specify location at a
higher level of abstraction (e.g., country, state, or
datacenter). Examples of resources include storage,
processing, memory, network bandwidth, and virtual
machines.
[4.] Rapid elasticity. Capabilities can be rapidly and
elastically provisioned, in some cases automatically, to
quickly scale out, and rapidly released to quickly scale in.
To the consumer, the capabilities available for
provisioning often appear to be unlimited and can be
purchased in any quantity at any time.
[5.] Measured service. Cloud systems automatically control
and optimize resource use by leveraging a metering
capability at some level of abstraction appropriate to the
type of service (e.g., storage, processing, bandwidth, and
active user accounts). Resource usage can be monitored,
controlled, and reported, providing transparency for both
149
the provider and consumer of utilized service.
150
NIST announced changes to its standards in May 2011.
148. Id.
149. Peter Mell & Timothy Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing
(Draft), NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., 2 (Jan. 2011) [hereinafter 2011 NIST
Standards], available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-145/SP800145.pdf.
150. NIST CLOUD SYNOPSIS, supra note 13, at 2-1. These changes are discussed,
to the extent relevant to this article, in Part VI, infra.
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A major objective of cloud computing is the linkage and
integration of the numerous computing devices that are purchased
for specialized tasks so that the data stored on each and the
processing each performs can be done on commands from
portable or office-based (or home-office based) devices. As one
observer emphasized, “[c]loud computing means that information
is not stranded on individual machines; it is combined into one
digital ‘cloud’ available at the touch of a finger from many
151
different devices.”
At present, three main delivery models for cloud computing
have been developed:
[i] Cloud Software as a Service (SaaS). The capability
provided to the consumer is to use the provider’s
applications running on a cloud infrastructure. The
applications are accessible from various client devices
through a thin client interface such as a web browser (e.g.,
web-based e-mail). The consumer does not manage or
control the underlying cloud infrastructure including
network, servers, operating systems, storage, or even
individual application capabilities, with the possible
exception
of
limited
user-specific
application
configuration settings.
[ii] Cloud Platform as a Service (PaaS). The capability
provided to the consumer is to deploy onto the cloud
infrastructure consumer-created or acquired applications
created using programming languages and tools
supported by the provider. The consumer does not
manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure
including network, servers, operating systems, or storage,
but has control over the deployed applications and
possibly application hosting environment configurations.
[iii] Cloud Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). The capability
provided to the consumer is to provision processing,
storage, networks, and other fundamental computing
resources where the consumer is able to deploy and run
arbitrary software, which can include operating systems
and applications. The consumer does not manage or
control the underlying cloud infrastructure but has
control over operating systems, storage, deployed
applications, and possibly limited control of select

151. Steve Hamm, Cloud Computing’s Big Bang for Business, BUS. WK., June 15,
2009, at 43.
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152

networking components (e.g., host firewalls).
Unless otherwise specified, reports concerning cloud
153
Such
computing tend to refer to cloud “software as a service.”
services typically are marketed as “pay-per-use” with projections of
substantial cost reductions because they replace costly, licensed
software with purportedly less expensive access to software on an as
needed basis. The charges are based on usage and allow
companies to scale up or down their use to fit their needs by
accessing remotely stored programs instead of purchasing licensed
154
In essence, cloud “software as a service”
software and upgrades.
is an outsourcing of data processing and storage that previously
occurred within a customer’s enterprise. Such services involve a
vendor’s provision of raw data processing power and storage
capacity at times of need, or even to replace in-house capacities
155
altogether.
Two examples of prodigious cloud storage are “Amazon
156
Simple Storage Service” and Microsoft’s Azure cloud computing
platform. Microsoft Azure is built on more than one million
157
servers in the company’s data centers and charges “12 cents an
hour for computing, 15 cents per gigabyte for storage and 10 cents
158
Amazon has emerged as one
per 10,000 storage transactions.”
159
leader in this business. As one observer noted, “[m]ore than half
the online bookseller’s computing resources are being consumed
152. 2011 NIST Standards, supra note 149, at 2–3.
153. See, e.g., Gene Marks, Beware the Hype for Software as a Service, BUS. WK. July
24, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/jul2008
/tc20080723_506811_page_2.htm (describing cloud “service as software” myths).
154. See, e.g., Jessica Hodgson & Scott Morrison, “Cloud Computing” Prices
Announced by Microsoft, WALL ST. J., July 15, 2009, at B5 (detailing Microsoft’s
pricing model for Azure, Microsoft’s new “cloud computing” platform).
155. See, e.g., Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2), AMAZON WEB
SERVICES, http://aws.amazon.com/ec2 (last visited Oct. 18, 2011) (“[Amazon
EC2] is a web service that provides resizable compute capacity in the cloud. It is
designed to make web-scale computing easier for developers.”).
156. Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3), AMAZON WEB SERVICES,
http://aws.amazon.com/s3 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). Amazon Simple Storage
Service has been operating for three years. According to Amazon, “the service has
grown to store over 52 billion objects and serve over 1 trillion requests per year
from customers in over 90 countries.” Id.
157. Richard Waters, Azure to Boost Microsoft’s Online Presence, FIN. TIMES, July 15,
2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6203b286-70d4-11de-9717-00144feabdc0
.html#axzz1Ynwuf4MJ.
158. Hodgson & Morrison, supra note 154, at B5. The article also reports that
Amazon charges “12.5 cents an hour and 15 cents a gigabyte for storage in two of
its pricing models.” Id.
159. Blodget, supra note 100.
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by other companies, which run their own applications in its data
centres . . . . Customers include the New York Times and
160
Small to medium-size companies may benefit as they
Nasdaq.”
gain access to computing advantages previously available only to
large companies, by “buying computing capacity from a ‘cloud,’
161
rather like electricity from the grid.”
In addition to the three kinds of delivery of cloud computing
services, there are four different ways for such computing services
to be deployed:
(1) “public clouds” operated by third-party providers and made
162
available to the general public or a large industry group;
(2) “private clouds” operated by companies that have the funds
available to invest in off-site or on-site servers to serve their
163
own personnel (or that can hire a third party to manage);
(3) “community clouds” located on-premise or off-premise,
managed by the participating organizations or a third party,
shared by participating organizations, and used to support a
specific community that shares certain objectives (such as
mission objectives, security requirements, or legal compliance
164
requirements); and
(4) “hybrid clouds” composed of two or more clouds (private,
public, or community), each of which remains a separate
entity, that are linked by shared standards or shared
proprietary technology that enhances the portability and
165
movement of data and applications.
For example, a “hybrid cloud” can be set up to allow a
customer to operate and store data on its own private cloud, but in
times of a surge in need for computing resources, the customer can
“burst” into and utilize the resources of a “community cloud” or
166
One
“public cloud”—a process known as “cloud bursting.”
commentator explained the distinction between public and private
clouds as follows:
160. Cloud Control, supra note 56.
161. Gathering Clouds: The Takeover Talks Between IBM and Sun Highlight a Shift in
the Industry, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 19, 2009, http://www.economist.com/node
/13331334 [hereinafter Gathering Clouds].
162. Id.
163. Id. For a distinction between public and private clouds, see infra note 167
and accompanying text.
164. See 2011 NIST Standards, supra note 149, at 2.
165. Id.
166. For a discussion of “cloud bursting” see Jeff Barr, Cloudbursting—Hybrid
Application Hosting, Amazon Web Services Blog, AMAZON WEB SERVICES (Aug. 28, 2008),
http://aws.typepad.com/aws/2008/08/cloudbursting-.html.
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Thanks to ever more powerful chips and new software,
servers and other hardware can now be “virtualized,”
meaning physically separate systems can act as one. This
enables computing power to become a utility: it is
generated somewhere on the network (“in the cloud”)
and supplied as a service. To simplify their complex data
centres and cut costs, more and more companies are
thinking about building in-house computing utilities,
called “private clouds,” or outsourcing computing to
“public clouds” of the kind Sun [Microsystems]
167
launched.
In 2009, some observers predicted that cloud-based computing
would increasingly become the primary platform for web
168
As measured in 2011 by the subsequent actions of
applications.
major software and cloud computing developers, the forecast
appears to have been accurate. For example, in October 2010,
Microsoft announced that the next generation of its Office suite
169
In June
software, Office 365, would be a cloud-based version.
2011, Apple announced its iCloud services that reportedly would
include storage of documents created using iCloud Storage APIs
and that would “automatically” push them to the user’s mobile
170
Measured by
devices; Apple deployed iCloud in October 2011.
the number of hours that they are accessed by users, cloud-based
networks already have become a significant platform, and in some
171
According to the Aspen
activities, the predominant platform.
Institute’s 2009 report, Identity in the Age of Cloud Computing:
The cloud has become our entertainment network: we are
spending hundreds of millions of hours on sites like
YouTube, Hulu and Flickr. The cloud has become our
social network: Facebook, MySpace, Bebo, hi5 and similar
167. Gathering Clouds, supra note 161.
168. J.D. Lasica, Identity in the Age of Cloud Computing: The Next-Generation
Internet’s Impact on Business, Governance and Social Interaction, THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, 9
(Apr. 21, 2009), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default
/files/content/docs/pubs/Identity_in_the_Age_of_Cloud_Computing.pdf.
169. Press Release, Microsoft Inc., Microsoft Announces Office 365 (Oct. 19,
2010), available at http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2010/oct10/1019office365.mspx.
170. Press Release, Apple Inc., Apple Introduces iCloud (Jun. 6, 2011),
available
at
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2011/06/06Apple-IntroducesiCloud.html.
171. The Pew Research Center reported in September 2008 that sixty-nine
percent of “online Americans” use cloud computing services. See John B.
Horrigan, Cloud Computing Gains in Currency, PEW RES. CENTER (Sept. 12, 2008),
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/948/cloud-computing-gains-in-currency.
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sites now claim hundreds of millions of members. The
cloud has become our virtual library: when we do a
Google search we are fingering the cloud. The cloud has
become our workbench: we manage projects in Basecamp,
share large files with Pando, tweak photos in online photo
editors like Adobe Photoshop Express and Picnik, and
edit videos online with JayCut and Jumpcut (now closed).
The cloud has become our development network: open
source programmers trade code on sites like
172
SourceForge.net and Drupal.org.
The promised benefits of cloud computing, however, appear
to be outpacing many users’ ability to identify and understand the
attendant risks and what might qualify as adequate safeguards to
avert or minimize such risks. The reported benefits of cloud
computing include reduced costs, scalable use of resources,
utilization of enhanced computer processing power, and almost
ubiquitous availability by company personnel to company records
173
Other advantages purportedly include “[allowing
and data.
users] to flexibly experiment with new services, and to remove
unneeded capacity when demand slackens. . . . The cloud is also
easier to manage—you can install a single software patch to cover
174
all of a company’s users . . . .”
There are, however, serious risks—some known, some guessed
at, and some that will probably arise and surprise even the vendors
themselves. For example, as reported in early August 2011, security
researchers at the Black Hat USA security conference
demonstrated ways in which users of Amazon’s Elastic Compute
Cloud (EC2) services had been “tricked into using virtual machines
175
that could have included ‘back doors’ for snooping.” It would be
naïve to assume that cloud computing, unlike previous new
communications technologies related to cyberspace, will not result
in serious data breaches. Although it is a difficult fact for vendors,
clients, customers, and lawyers to accept, if data needs to be kept
secure and safe from unauthorized access (as needed to protect
trade secrets, privacy of personally identifiable data, safeguards for
172.
173.

Lasica, supra note 168, at 5.
Peter Laudenslager, Six Cloud Computing Benefits for SMBs,
INFORMATIONWEEK (June 2, 2010, 7:00 AM), http://www.informationweek.com
/news/225200751.
174. See Lucky, supra note 140.
175. Joseph Menn, Security Experts Find Flaws in Cloud Computing, FIN. TIMES,
Aug.
2,
2011,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/6cc04ca2-7f8e-11de-85dc00144feabdc0.html#axzz1UFSXDpwA.
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nuclear power plants, national security information, etc.), then
such data should not be accessible from the Internet and should be
kept “air gapped” from the Internet. Otherwise, it is probably only
a matter of time before it will be compromised, often without the
owner’s or custodian’s knowledge. These concerns have been
echoed by analysts seeking to get security taken seriously, as
illustrated in the following three observations by such analysts:
“The security of these cloud-based infrastructure services is like
Windows in 1999. It’s being widely used and nothing tremendously
bad has happened yet. But it’s just in early stages of getting
176
exposed to the internet, and you know bad things are coming.”
Ryan Rubin, U.K. head of security and privacy at Protiviti, an IT
security company, says: “There aren’t many people putting missioncritical data in the cloud. The crown jewels—customer records, for
177
A
example—are still very much embedded in the organisation.”
director at one London investment bank says: “We use the cloud
for things such as e-mail. We would never put our client services on
178
it.”
Technology vendors who know or suspect that risks exist may
be reluctant to disclose them for fear that such disclosure would
179
give prospective customers pause and thus undermine sales.
Nonetheless, counsel should consider at least the currently known
risks, particularly before they and their law firms adopt cloud
computing and put their own and their clients’ records into the
cloud. This article also argues that lawyers and law firms should
review developments in cloud computing and risks on a dynamic
basis as cloud capacities change and reports of specific risks or
incidents emerge.
2. Potential Ethical Risks for Lawyers and Law Firms from Cloud
Computing
The ethical risks for lawyers and law firms from cloud
176. Id. (quoting John Pescatore, security analyst at Gartner). Note, however,
that the comment that “nothing tremendously bad has happened yet” appears
already inaccurate and obsolete, in light of reports of offshore hacking, such as
those disclosed in the Operation Shady RAT report. Dmitri Alperovitch, Revealed:
Operation Shady RAT, MCAFEE 2–3 (Aug. 2, 2011, 9:14 PM), http://
www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-operation-shady-rat.pdf.
177. Palmer, supra note 7.
178. Id.
179. JOHN N. STEWART, EXECUTIVE PERSPECTIVE: VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE
(2006), available at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/cspo/docs
/article_vulnerability-Disclosure20060701.pdf.
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computing are most likely to originate from the security risks that
cloud computing presents to all of its users, including risks from
Internet facilitated breaches (malware, hackers, etc.), risks from
careless or disgruntled insiders (resulting in data shared with
unauthorized persons), and risks from state surveillance and
180
The
interception under the auspices of legal authority.
discussion below focuses on public clouds, as it seems unlikely that
law firms will initially set up their own private clouds (such
investments are hard to justify during recessions), or will find it
impractical at this time to negotiate participation in a legalcommunity cloud or in a hybrid cloud.
a.

Security Risks Inherent in the Use of Public Clouds

Some of the mystery and confusion surrounding the concept
of cloud computing can be eliminated by simply viewing it as a type
of outsourcing.
Certain risks can be predicted from the
181
outsourcing experience, but many of the risks inherent in cloud
computing are new and require an understanding of underlying
features of the cloud that goes beyond what is needed in order to
182
The cloud service providers themselves
use cloud-based services.
180. Although we believe that ethical risks from cloud computing will probably
arise in connection with inadvertently and inadequately handled security risks, we
would point out that the ABA’s Commission on Ethics 20/20’s Working Group on
the Implication of New Technologies clearly distinguished between “best
practices” for security and ethically required security measures, and emphasized
that there is not only a gap, but that the standard for what is ethically required is
below that of “best practices.” As the Working Group carefully explained:
As an initial matter, the Commission recognizes that there may be a
gap between technology-related security measures that are ethically
required and security measures that are merely consistent with “best
practices.” For example, it may be consistent with best practices to install
sophisticated firewalls and various protections against malware (such as
viruses and spyware), but lawyers who fail to do so or who install a more
basic level of protection are not necessarily engaged in unethical
conduct. Similarly, it might be inadvisable to use a cloud computing
provider that does not comply with industry standards regarding
encryption, but it is not necessarily unethical if a lawyer decides to do so.
ABA Comm’n. On Ethics 20/20, Issues Paper Concerning Client Confidentiality and
Lawyers’ Use of Technology (Sept. 20, 2010), available at http://myshingle.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/11/cloudcomputing.pdf.
181. See Oxford Analytica, IT Outsourcing Poses Risks, FORBES (Oct. 22, 2009,
6:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/21
/information-technology-outsourcing-risks-technology-oxford.html.
182. See Jon Brodkin, Gartner: Seven Cloud-Computing Security Risks, INFOWORLD
(July 2, 2008), http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/gartner-seven-cloudcomputing-security-risks-853.
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tend not to provide such information, however, and customers may
be ill equipped to assess the risks involved in placing sensitive data
in the cloud.
One of BAE’s deputy chief technology officers has reasoned
that the cloud-computing environment “requires an implicit level
183
of trust as well as an explicit level of vigilance to ensure success.”
Unless cloud service providers explicitly explain what is being taken
on trust, customers and their legal counsel (and customers who are
lawyers, law firms, or judges) will be well advised to conduct an
enhanced and rigorous due diligence review of the cloud
provider’s security measures and of the particular cloud’s
architecture and methods of operation. Moreover, by encouraging
and cooperating with an enhanced security due diligence, a cloud
service provider can also avoid risks, such as learning belatedly that
it is alleged to have participated in violations of laws involving
certain kinds of sensitive data whose movement out of the
originating jurisdiction or into a jurisdiction may be impermissible.
In the discussion below, we identify what appear at present to
be the most severe cloud security risks. In the following section, we
discuss how those potential security risks can lead to ethical risks
for lawyers and law firms.
b.

Instabilities of Cloud Software
i.

Program Instability and Defects

Programs like Google Docs have a relatively short track record
or performance history. Thus, their stability—their ability to
remain operable without intermittent or prolonged interruption
from “crashes” and “outages”—has to be taken on faith. Cloud
service providers offer seemingly high levels of service availability
until one looks closely at the meaning of the specified availability,
e.g., “Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud, its virtualized server
offering, promises 99.95% uptime, but calculates uptime based on
the whole year rather than individual months. That means uptime
could fall below the promised level for an entire month without
184
customers becoming eligible for service credits.”
That level of availability would not meet the requirements set
183. See Harauz, Kaufman & Potter, supra note 146, at 62.
184. Jon Brodkin, U.S. Government Launches Cloud Push, Demands Strict Uptime
and Service Levels, NETWORKWORLD (Aug. 5, 2009, 4:06 PM), http://www
.networkworld.com/news/2009/080509-federal-government-cloudcomputing.html.
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by the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) in the request
for quotation (RFQ) it issued on July 30, 2009 for cloud service
offerings to support a “Cloud Computing Storefront Site—which
185
will enable Government purchasers to buy . . . service offerings.”
Presumably to avert such shortcomings, the GSA’s RFQ requires
the contractor to provide availability based on a monthly
calculation as follows: “Service Availability (Measured as Total
Uptime Hour / Total Hours within the Month) displayed as a
percentage of availability up to one-tenth of a percent (e.g.
186
99.95%).”
The problem with such specifications for “uptime” is the kind
commonly encountered in any computer-based, mission-critical
system (such as flight control and military fire-control systems).
Unless the specified requirement is simple and straightforward,
and can be verified with tests based on facts accessible to the
customer or end-user, the requirement becomes incomputable,
hopelessly vague, and ultimately unenforceable. For example, a
military tactical display (in a fighter aircraft or submarine) must be
updated rapidly, at consistently timed intervals, and completely, or
else the end-user will lose sight of the tactical environment and be
“blind” to changes in the adversary’s position and in weapons fired.
If the specified response time for such a display is “every 0.5
187
second,” that must be measurable with data accessible to the enduser. Regrettably, the typical service level agreement of cloud
vendors expresses the crucial value of “uptime” in a percentage
whose calculation requires facts that only the vendor possess (such
as processing time for all requests during a specified interval) or
that neither party has access to (such as excluding the “time for
transmittal from a customer’s system to the cloud vendor’s servers).
The apparent precision carried out to two places past the decimal
point (99.95%) and the apparent high probability of system
“uptime” (which looks so close to 100%) are illusory. Since the
consumer cannot compute “uptime,” the precision is a disguised
185. General Services Administration, U.S. Federal Cloud Computing
Initiative, Request for Quotation, Attachment C, Statement of Work, § 3.2, at 3 (July 30,
2009), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/17914883/US-Federal-CloudComputing-Initiative-RFQ-GSA.
186. Id. at 6 tbl.2.
187. See, e.g., COALITION WARRIOR INTEROPERABILITY DEMONSTRATION 2005 FINAL
REPORT: COMMON OPERATING PICTURE PRODUCT LINE 1 (2005), available at
http://123.204.62.144/JL/Image/Web_Research/Web_Research_12.pdf
(last
visited Oct. 16, 2011) (discussing the COP-Tactical Display System product as
“maintaining near real time refresh rates (sub-second)”).
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inexactitude. Since the vendors also include numerous caveats and
exclusions for “downtime” that will not be counted against the
promised “uptime” percentage, the seemingly high reliability
188
proves to be something less and indefinite.
Moreover, the service level agreements apply a “red tape”
barrier that creates extraordinary hurdles to a customer seeking a
credit for a failure of the cloud vendor’s system to achieve the
specified “uptime.” Consider the steps that a leading cloud vendor
requires the customer to complete in order to qualify for a credit
that it even then might not necessarily receive:
To receive a Service Credit, you must submit a request by
sending an e-mail message to aws-sla-request @
amazon.com. To be eligible, the credit request must . . .
(ii) include, in the body of the e-mail, the dates and times
of each incident of Region Unavailable that you claim to
have experienced including instance ids of the instances
[sic] that were running and affected during the time of
each incident; (iii) include your server request logs that
document the errors and corroborate your claimed
outage (any confidential or sensitive information in these
logs should be removed or replaced with asterisks); . . . .
If the Annual Uptime Percentage of such request is
confirmed by us and is less than 99.95% for the Service
Year, then we will issue the Service Credit to you . . . .
Your failure to provide the request and other information
as required above will disqualify you from receiving a
189
Service Credit.
The record of outages and the opaque and often delayed
explanations the vendors tend to give for the causes suggests that
customers are being asked to treat the “uptime” percentages as a
sufficiently high reliability to entrust their data and processing to
the cloud, but without any effective recourse or remedy in the
event of an outage or a denial of access that the vendor can impose
in its sole discretion. Amazon, for example, requires the customer
to agree that Amazon may take “any of the corrective action
regarding Customer Accounts to the extent we deem necessary or
190
appropriate, in our sole discretion,” and that such action may
188. We provide an example of the regressive and ultimately incomputable
calculations infra note 513.
189. Amazon EC2 Service Level Agreement, AMAZON WEB SERVICES (Oct. 23, 2008),
http://aws.amazon.com/ec2-sla.
190. AWS Service Terms, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, § 7.10, http://aws.amazon.com
/serviceterms (last updated Aug. 22, 2011).
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include “suspending, canceling or closing of Customer
191
Accounts.” Moreover, the agreement further authorizes Amazon
to “throttle, suspend or terminate your access to SES (Simple Email
192
Service), or block or decline to send any SES Email,” in Amazon’s
sole discretion if it determines that certain events have occurred,
including alleged customer noncompliance with the agreement.
That is extraordinary leverage when the pressure the vendor can
apply is denial of access to, and use of, a communications mode
that is as fundamental to current business as e-mail.
ii. Operating System Instability and Defects
The same risks of unproven, long term stability arise equally
with regard to a cloud vendor’s operating systems as with any
operating system whose uptime and reliability must be sufficient to
avoid a costly and untimely disruption to a customer’s business
activities. Anyone who used an early Windows-based computer has
probably had the experience of adding new applications that
conflicted with, or would not operate reliably on top of, the
Windows operating system. Similarly, such conflicts would often
appear with distressing results when a new version of the operating
system was issued or patched. At least, in such instances, the
individual user or the business enterprise could decide what
applications to add or remove to reduce the frequency and severity
of conflicts and disruptions. However, when a customer elects to
use a cloud vendor’s services, such decisions also are entrusted to
the sole discretion of the cloud vendor, which can put customers at
risk without them knowing when the vendor is taking the risks by
adding or subtracting applications or making so-called “routine”
maintenance updates to its operating system, which may result in a
sustained outage. As one commentator has observed:
[With a software-as-a-service cloud system] [y]ou would
have no control over what other applications are sharing
the same server; each other application provides a
potential point of entry for hackers, and poorly written
software might have adverse effects on the stability of the
operating system . . . . [I]n the event of server instability,
the hosting company could easily transfer the site to a
different server. You would however be reliant upon them

191.
192.

Id.
Id. § 22.2.
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193

to monitor their systems closely and expedite the move.
....
In addition, there is the issue of loss of control.
Providers like Amazon reserve the right to shut off the
server without prior notice if it is behaving in a way that
leads them to believe it has been compromised by
hackers, or if they think we are using it for unethical
activities like spamming. This means that if you were to
end up on a blacklist by mistake, the consequences would
194
be worse than with a non-cloud server.
iii. Upgrade Instability and Defects
Upgrades often introduce new instabilities or instabilities
whose symptoms and recovery times are unfamiliar to the user.
Indeed, the chief executive of Hyundai Capital, which is South
Korea’s largest consumer-finance company, recently observed:
We need to put a price tag to every IT door and window.
Maybe we want to have another website, and we think the
development cost is $500,000. But that could also mean
there is an additional hacking route. So that adds to the
cost and consideration. Before this, we were crazy making
apps. Apps are more convenient for us and for the
clients. But now, we understand that each application
creates a new route for hacking. We are now slowing
down the whole organization. How things look and how
195
they work is now secondary. Security is now first.
Law firms do not usually rush to be the “first on their block” to
adopt the latest version of software, preferring instead to see the
reported experiences of “early adopters.”
If a program is
reportedly “buggy,” causes frequent program or system “crashes,”
or wipes out data or documents that the user thought had been
saved when the “Save” button was clicked, a law firm or lawyer may
prudently postpone purchasing a license for the new version or
upgrade. The law firm that relies on the cloud may find it has
given up that control and the ability to limit its exposure to such
risks. The cloud provider may insist that, when it upgrades or
introduces a new version of software, every customer must accept it.
193. Neil Turner, Cloud Computing: A Brief Summary, LUCID COMMC’NS LTD., §
2.1 (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.lucidcommunications.co.uk
/Content/whitePapers/CloudComputing.pdf.
194. Id. § 3.1.
195. Evan Ramstad, Executive Learns from Hack, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2011, at
B6.
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This may happen regardless of, whether the customer wants the
risks and whether the customers are prepared for those risks and
for the accompanying learning curve for using the software.
The risks in cloud computing remain hard to assess. That they
are not imaginary or far-fetched has been demonstrated by
196
reported “crashes” and “outages” of cloud computing services,
197
corruption of data in at least one instance, and unauthorized
198
An early example of the types of risks
release of customer data.
cloud computing may raise occurred on February 24, 2009, when
Google’s e-mail service, which at the time had over 100 million
customers (including both individuals and businesses), suffered a
complete world-wide shut down, depriving customers of access to
199
Because it
their Gmail accounts for more than two hours.
occurred at 1:30 a.m. Pacific Standard Time, most U.S. customers
200
were unaffected.
Users in Europe and Asia had a brief experience of a “worstcase scenario” for users of a public cloud software as a service: an
inability to send, receive, or to gain access to their remotely stored
201
On March 10, 2009, Google’s ee-mail data and attachments.
mail service went down for an undisclosed reason, but apparently a
significant number of users found service restored within a half
hour, but others reportedly remained without access to their
202
A similar shut down of Gmail
accounts for several hours.
203
A May 14, 2009 “outage at Google”
occurred in August 2008.
196. See Blodget, supra note 100 (noting that Amazon experienced a “massive
service outage” that led to gaps in customers’ historical data).
197. Id.
198. Liana B. Baker & Jim Finkle, Sony PlayStation Suffers Massive Data Breach,
REUTERS (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/26/us-sonystoldendata-idUSTRE73P6WB20110426 (stating that about 77 million Sony users
had their identities stolen because of a massive breach of Sony’s video game
network).
199. Chris Nuttal, Google E-mail Crash Hits Millions and Raises Fears over Web
Services, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0950a2b602de-11de-b58b-000077b07658.htmlWTO#axzz1YuyDoGKi.
200. Id.
201. See generally Four Hours Without Gmail, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2009, 9:47 AM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/24/four-hours-without-gmail/
(noting
that millions of users in Europe were without e-mail access during work hours, and
those in Asia were without services post-work).
202. Andrew Morse, Google Mail Hit by Outage, Second in Less than Month, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 11, 2009, at B5.
203. See Murad Ahmed, Google Mail Users Hit by Global Outage, SUNDAY TIMES
(Feb. 24, 2009), http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and
_web/article5797157.ece (“The last major Gmail outage was in August 2008, when
the service shut down for ‘a couple of hours.’”).
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204

disabled use of Google’s cloud services for many of its customers.
Google has yet to reveal the cause of the August 2008 shut
down. Google eventually disclosed the cause of the February 2009
shutdown, but the explanation revealed further risks that
customers take when they rely on public cloud computing services.
The failure occurred during routine maintenance of Google’s
European data centers when Google staff was moving data to a
205
back-up center to allow for maintenance to proceed:
[T]he relocation triggered a software program that is
designed to direct data to the centre nearest to where
users are based, a measure that improves the response
time for online applications.
As it unexpectedly set to work on the new mass of
data, the code greatly increased the workload on the
reserve data cent[er] and triggered an overload, causing
data to be pushed automatically into a third cent[er].
That in turn led to another overload, eventually
triggering a series of failures that toppled Google’s data
206
cent[er]s like falling dominoes.
The so-called “rogue code” that caused the shutdown was written by
207
one of Google’s in-house programmers.
iv. Potentially Irrevocable Losses of Data or Data
Temporarily Inaccessible
As noted in the Introduction to this article, serious data
breaches and outages have been reported in 2011 concerning
cloud computing services offered or used by several major vendors
such as Google, Amazon, and Sony. Although the vendors
acknowledge that such incidents are regrettable and try to play
down their significance, the consequences from security breaches,
to cloud and non-cloud computing systems, appear to be growing
208
Sony, for
in severity, financial cost, and reputational damage.
204. Steve Hamm, Cloud Computing’s Big Bang for Business, BUSINESSWEEK, Jun.
15, 2009, at 44.
205. Richard Waters, Rogue Code Led to Gmail Shutdown, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 1,
2009, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/c5dd4574-06a3-11de-ab0f
-000077b07658.html#axzz1QoIjDiB7.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. One of the most costly breaches to date involved the March 2011 breach
by an advanceMD persistent threat attack of RSA’s SecurID two-factor
authentication tokens reportedly used by “40 million employees to access sensitive
corporate and government networks.” Dan Goodin, RSA Breach Leaks Data for
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example, whose online gaming system is “delivered through the
209
reported that its April 2011 security breach, which
cloud,”
resulted in the theft of “names, addresses, passwords and possibly
210
credit card details of 77m accounts,” would probably cost it
211
However, probably the worst adverse consequence for
“¥14bn.”
data customers is the potential irrevocable loss of data. Illustrative
of such a loss is the one that occurred at Ma.gnolia, a cloud
provider of bookmarking services, (i.e., one that enables customers
212
Ma.gnolia revealed in
to bookmark web sites and web pages).
February 2009 that it “could not recover” customers’ work “from a
corrupted database.” “There was also no recoverable back-up,
meaning many users would have lost their carefully cultivated
213
collections.” As one commentator noted:
We have been led to believe that the advantage of web
[cloud] services is that they are ubiquitous and always
available, but instead have discovered that they are
sometimes difficult to find or have disappeared
altogether.
....
Data can be lost in the fog of cloud computing,
whereas with traditional local hard drives and client-based
software, users have more control over, and responsibility
214
for, the data.
After Amazon’s April 2011 outage, it was reported that “[s]ome

Hacking SecurID Tokens, THE REGISTER (Mar. 18, 2011, 00:39 GMT),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/03/18/rsa_breach_leaks_securid_data. RSA’s
parent, EMC, disclosed in July 2011 that to deal with the cyber attack it spent $66
million in second quarter 2011, most of which was devoted to transaction
monitoring for its corporate customers who were concerned that their RSA
security tokens had been compromised as a result of the attack. Hayley
Tsukayama, Cyber Attack on RSA Cost EMC $66 million, WASH. POST (July 26, 2011,
4:46 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-tech/post/cyber-attack-onrsa-cost-emc-66-million/2011/07/26/gIQA1ceKbI_blog.html.
209. Online Reputations in the Dirt, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 30, 2011, at 65.
210. Id.
211. Jonathan Soble, Tax Charge Takes Sony Into $3bn Loss, FIN. TIMES, May 23,
2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/bf4fd94a-8506-11e0-871e-00144feabdc0
.html#axzz1Z1J8FfJ5.
212. Michael Calore, Ma.gnolia Suffers Major Data Loss, Site Taken Offline, WIRED
(Jan. 30, 2009, 12:56 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/01/magnoliasuffer.
213. Chris Nuttall, Global Crashes Spark Crisis of Confidence, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bb4a1fea-0d0d-11de-a555-0000779fd2ac,dwp
_uuid=b50bc45e-0d16-11de-a555-0000779fd2ac.html.
214. Id.

2011]

RED SKIES IN THE MORNING

183

215

data seem to have been lost permanently.”
Data that becomes temporarily inaccessible can have profound
consequences for a lawyer or law firm whose clients need work
performed urgently. Delays in getting to data can translate into
serious disadvantages for the client’s interests in a negotiated
transaction or in the midst of time-pressured trial or arbitration
preparations.
Data that is released or made available to
unauthorized persons could compromise client confidentiality or
result in waivers of privilege. It may also deprive a client of
enforceable trade secrets, or if the data was subject to the attorneyclient privilege, it might result in a waiver of the privilege. Such
issues would require investigation if a cloud provider lost control
over access to data it stores for customers, which occurred with
Google Docs in March 2009. As Google disclosed to certain Google
Docs customers, a glitch allowed unauthorized shared access to
certain documents stored online with Google Docs:
We’ve identified and fixed a bug which may have caused
you to share some of your documents without your
knowledge. This inadvertent sharing was limited to people
with whom you, or a collaborator with sharing rights, had
previously shared a document . . . . The issue only occurred
if you, or a collaborator with sharing rights, selected
multiple documents and presentations from the documents
list and changed the sharing permissions. This issue
affected documents and presentations, but not
216
spreadsheets.
v.

Ethical Issues

If a lawyer or law firm is considering the use of a public cloud
for storage or processing of records that include confidential client
information, certain precautions are advisable in order to protect
the client’s interests and to ensure compliance with the NYRPC and
the MRPC. Because outsourcing such functions can reduce the
extent to which a law firm customer can be sure of continuous
access to such data, it also may increase the risk that the law firm
might fall short of complying with NYRPC Rule 1.1(a) to “provide
competent representation” and NYRPC Rule 1.1(c)(2): [A] lawyer
shall not intentionally . . . prejudice or damage the client during
215. Online Reputations in the Dirt, ECONOMIST, Apr. 30, 2011, at 65.
216. Stephen Shankland, Google Docs Suffers Privacy Glitch, CNET (Mar. 9, 2009,
7:05 AM), http://news.cnet.com/google-docs-suffers-privacy-glitch.
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the course of the representation . . . .”
The NYRPC does not define “intentionally.” However, it gives
the following interpretive guidance for the use of the word
“knowingly”: “A person’s knowledge may be inferred from
218
Similarly, it would be reasonable to infer a
circumstances.”
lawyer’s intentions “from circumstances.”
If circumstances
surrounding a law firm’s selection of a cloud provider evidence a
clear lack of care for widely publicized risks such as temporary loss
of access to data, the law firm could arguably be viewed as taking
the risk of prejudicing or damaging the client in breach of NYRPC
Rule 1.1(c)(2). Suppose a law firm engages the services of a public
cloud provider that a due diligence review would have revealed to
be an unreliable vendor or provider of unreliable access to data.
The law firm could be at risk of appearing to have acted with
insufficient care for its client’s interests. Suppose that as a result of
such engagement, the law firm found itself for a period of time
unable to gain access to a client’s documents stored in the cloud.
The firm could then be at risk of having breached not only NYRPC
Rule 1.1(c)(2), but also NYRPC Rule 1.3(a) and 1.3(b), which
provide that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client” and “[a] lawyer shall not
219
neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.”
The “competent representation” requirement in the MRPC
contains far less detail than NYRPC Rule 1.1. MRPC Rule 1.1
merely states that “a lawyer shall provide competent
representation,” which “requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
220
Thus, as previously discussed, MRPC Rule 1.1
representation.”
provides no requisite mental limitations for competent
representation, perhaps inferring the broader reach of the
221
Consequently, a lawyer who fails to take reasonable care
MRPC.
to investigate the risks involved with a particular cloud provider
217. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R.1.1 (2011).
218. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word “knowingly” as “with knowledge;
consciously; intelligently; willfully; intentionally. An individual acts ‘knowingly’
when he acts with awareness of the nature of his conduct.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 827 (6th ed. 1991). Courts use a similar definition of the term
“knowingly” in civil cases. See, e.g., Baywood Elec. Corp. v. N.Y. State Dep’t of
Labor, 649 N.Y.S.2d 28, 30 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (defining “knowingly” as when
the accused “knew or should have known” that he or she was committing a
violation).
219. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.3(a)–(b) (2011).
220. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2007).
221. See supra Part III.
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might similarly have violated MRPC Rule 1.1. As a result, lawyers or
firms seeking to utilize cloud providers must review the vendors to
ensure that their services are both reliable and secure.
vi. Considerations and Precautions
Lawyers and law firms may need to choose between adoption
of a public cloud service (and carefully examining the provider) or
postponing such adoption until the technology is mature, proven,
and reliable. Firms considering use of a public cloud should
conduct a thorough due diligence review of the cloud service
provider. The review might examine the service provider in light
of the inherent risks of any public cloud. Such a review also might
explore how the service provider would respond to incidents
involving the shutdown of the system or inability to provide the law
firm access to its client’s confidential information.
If the law firm was outsourcing storage of hard copy to a
domestic or overseas warehouse, it would be prudent to question
the warehouse operator about its experience with an inability to
provide access to documents on short notice. Similarly, a law firm
should question a cloud provider about all outages it has
experienced, what back-up copies it makes (if any), and what
formal written policies and procedures it has for detecting loss of
access to electronic records and for responding to temporary loss
222
The firm also should
of access to records stored in its servers.
negotiate terms of service that require the cloud vendor to assist
the firm in fulfilling its duties to collect, preserve, and produce a
client’s electronic records under applicable e-discovery rules.
It may appear unrealistic to expect that major cloud providers
such as Google, Microsoft, IBM, and Amazon will cooperate with
any request for such a due diligence review and negotiate terms of
service based on that review’s findings. However, if law firms were
to weigh the risks to their clients, their reputations, and their
compliance with the NYRPC or the MRPC, the need to conduct a
due diligence review could appear compelling. In addition, a
cloud vendor’s refusal to assist counsel in fulfilling its e-discovery
obligations could expose lawyers and clients to sanctions.
222. See, e.g., Contract Between the City of Los Angeles and Computer Science
Corporation for the SAAS E-Mail and Collaboration Solution (SECS), City of L.A.
Inter-Departmental Correspondence (Oct. 2, 2009), available at http://
www.infolawgroup.com/uploads/file/City%20of%20Los%20Angeles%20and%20
CSC-Google%20Contract%281%29.pdf
(explaining
prudent
procedures
regarding the implementation of a cloud computing system).
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Moreover, the New York State Bar Association’s Committee on
Professional Ethics (NYSBA Ethics Committee), in a 2008 opinion
on the use of an e-mail service provider that scans e-mails for
advertising purposes, cautioned that “[a] lawyer must exercise due
care in selecting an e-mail service provider to ensure that its
223
policies and stated practices protect client confidentiality.”
Complying with the guidance in the NYSBA’s 2008 opinion will
now be particularly difficult because Yahoo! and Google use or
have used terms of service that allow them to scan the contents of
224
A New York disciplinary body
outgoing and incoming e-mails.
might expect a comparable exercise of due care by a lawyer or a law
firm in selecting a public cloud service provider.
Similarly, the ABA has cautioned lawyers to investigate the
security of a provider’s premises and network before outsourcing
225
any client services. Particularly where confidential information is
at stake, a lawyer must “recognize and minimize” the risk that a
service provider could reveal client information to unauthorized
226
The ABA opinion suggests that a written confidentiality
parties.
agreement be drafted to prevent wrongful disclosure—a precaution
that might be difficult if utilizing the services of a large cloud
227
provider.
223. New York State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 820
(2008), available at http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Ethics
_Opinions&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=40117.
224. Terms of Service, YAHOO!, ¶ 6, http://info.yahoo.com/legal/us/yahoo
/utos/utos-173.html (last updated Nov. 24, 2008); Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE
¶¶ 11.1, 11.2, http://www.google.com/accounts/TOS (last visited Oct. 20, 2011);
Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/privacy/privacy-policy.html (last
updated Oct. 3, 2010). For analysis of these types of content licenses and policies,
see Yahoo Amends Ts and Cs to Scan and Analyse Users’ Emails, COMPUTER ACT!IVE
(Aug. 7, 2011), http://www.computeractive.co.uk/ca/news/2091488/yahooamends-ts-cs-scan-analyse-users-emails; Google’s Scan of User E-mail: Fair or Creepy?,
CROSSCUT.COM (Nov. 18, 2007), http:crosscut.com/2007/11/18/seattle/9222
/Google-s-scan-of-user-e-mail:-fair-or-creepy-.
225. ABA Formal Op. 08-451, supra note 94.
226. Id.
227. Id.
The ABA Opinion emphasizes that “[w]ritten confidentiality
agreements are, therefore, strongly advisable in outsourcing relationships.” Id.
However, the ABA Opinion adds a recommendation that would be difficult for
major customer law firms to follow if the same cloud vendor provided services to
even a few of the largest United States based law firms: “Likewise, to minimize the
risk of potentially wrongful disclosure, the outsourcing lawyer should verify that
the outside service provider does not also do work for adversaries of their clients
on the same or substantially related matters; in such an instance, the outsourcing
lawyer could choose another provider.” Id. If the ABA continues to hold that
view, then it would appear that the reasonable inference to be drawn is that it may
well be impracticable for large law firms, if not any law firms, to store client
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Reasonable care in the selection of a cloud vendor may not be
sufficient to protect a client’s interests to the extent we believe may
be required by MRPC Rule 1.1 or the NYRPC Rule 1.1(c)(2) to
avoid intentionally damaging a client’s interests.
The security risks and ethical challenges involved in the
decision to rely on a public cloud are substantially greater than
those faced by law firms when they elected to adopt e-mail
communications. Some of the most costly lessons learned from the
reliance on e-mail communications came from mistakes that were
easy for lawyers to make and that had sometimes irreversible
228
Selection of a trustworthy e-mail service provider
consequences.
may not have averted such mistakes, but such mistakes are
confidential data with a major cloud computing service provider and to follow the
ABA Opinion’s recommendation.
228. As John Barkett perceptively observed:
I do not know of a lawyer who has not suffered from Microsoft Outlook’s
propensity automatically to fill in the e-mail address of a recipient for a
sender in a hurry who types a couple of letters of a name and then does
not scroll down for the list of potential recipients to identify the intended
addressee. This failure to protect a client confidence is usually
immediately remedied by the recipient who responds: “I don’t think you
intended this e-mail for me. I am immediately destroying it.” After
sending a “thank you” e-mail, the sender will resolve to be more careful:
After all, Rule 1.6 is prescriptive unless the lawyer has received the
client’s informed consent to make the disclosure.
JOHN M. BARKETT, THE ETHICS OF E-DISCOVERY 43 (2009). There are several
examples of irreversible mistakes which led to a waiver of privilege because
counsel did not verify whether the client had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in e-mail communications sent to counsel from the client’s place of
employment. See Stengart v. Loving Care Agency, Inc., No. BER-L-858-08,
2009 WL 798044 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 5, 2009) (“[W]hen an
employee sends an E-mail to their attorney through an E-mail account issued
by their employer over their employer’s servers, several courts have found that
such correspondence is generally not protected by the attorney client
privilege if the employer maintains a policy warning its employees that E-mail
correspondence from company issued E-mail accounts are subject to
review.”); see also Scott v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., Inc., 847 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Sup.
Ct. 2007) (holding that e-mails between a hospital employee and his personal
attorneys were not privileged because employer’s policy regarding computer
use and e-mail monitoring stated that employees had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in e-mails sent over the employer’s e-mail server); In re
Asia Global Crossing, Ltd., 322 B.R. 247 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding a
party waived any attorney-client privilege they had with respect to e-mail
communications between themselves and their attorneys by sending
communications to a third party, but requiring additional facts regarding the
existence of a policy against personal use of a corporation’s e-mail system or
the existence of a policy of monitoring employee e-mail before deciding the
question of whether the party waived their attorney-client privilege in that
regard); Kaufman v. SunGard Invest. Sys., No. 05-cv-1236, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 28149 (D.N.J. May 9, 2006).
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sometimes foreseeable if one takes the time to consider ways in
which lawyers working under time pressures might err in their
manipulation of a computer and program software. Sending an email to the wrong recipient, which almost every e-mail user has
done, is an example of this type of error. The mistakes occurred,
nonetheless. And if compared to similar mistakes made with the
earlier communications technology of facsimile transmittals, the
consequences were much greater and the mistakes were far easier
to make.
For example, a confidential document could be faxed to an
unintended recipient by misdialing a number (a risk somewhat
reduced as fax machines were developed with a capacity to store
numbers). The number of misdirected transmittals when such a
mistake occurred was usually one, or only a few, serious and
potentially costly errors, but one that seldom caused the transmittal
to compromise a client’s interests, provided that the recipient was
not a party with interests adverse to the client’s. Often the
misdirected document arrived at an office with no relationship to
the matter whatsoever, and the recipient would cooperate with
efforts by the sender to mitigate the damage (such as destroying
the document without making any use of it).
Misdirected
transmittals by e-mail have tended to cause far larger and more
229
Instead of one unintended recipient, there
serious problems.
may be many. Instead of transmittals to a randomly misdialed
number, the misdirected transmittals have often gone to recipients
230
whose addresses are automatically suggested by the software.
Because counsel often corresponds by e-mail to opposing counsel,
there is a heightened risk (however implausible it may seem) of an
inadvertent transmittal to parties with interests adverse to those of
the client. Because security risks and risks from breaches of
confidentiality from use of public clouds could be even greater
than those experienced with e-mail, the lessons learned from
229. See, e.g., Joseph R. Chenelly, Misdirected Email Doomed Convoy,
MILITARY.COM (Apr. 9, 2008), http://www.military.com/news/article/misdirectedemail-doomed-convoy.html (explaining how a misdirected e-mail sent an
unarmored convoy into a deadly fighting zone, leaving seventeen dead).
230. See generally Katherine Eban, Lilly’s $1 Billion E-Mailstrom, PORTFOLIO.COM
(Feb. 5, 2008), http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/top-5/2008/02/05/EliLilly-E-Mail-to-New-York-Times (providing an illustrative example of a confidential
e-mail misdirected to an individual with the same surname as the intended
recipient). Indeed, as this article was in its final drafting, one of the authors
received a misdirected e-mail from a former employee of an organization on
whose board the recipient serves that contained information personal to the
employee.
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adoption of e-mail technologies should be viewed as useful, but less
than the minimum, precautions a law firm should take when
deciding whether and when or to what extent to rely on a public
cloud for software services and document storage.
A helpful guide for considerations appropriate for e-mail
technologies can be found in a 2008 opinion by the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York’s Committee on Professional and
Judicial Ethics (ABCNY Ethics Committee) on the subject of “A
Lawyer’s Ethical Obligations to Retain and to Provide a Client with
Electronic Documents Relating to a Representation” (Opinion
231
Opinion 2008-1 summarized certain substantive
2008-1).
changes in the realities of law practice in the digital era:
Lawyers routinely use e-mail to formally convey important
information and documents to clients, colleagues, and
other counsel. Just as routinely, lawyers use e-mail to
conduct informal conversations. In many law practices,
lawyers are as likely to send an e-mail as to pick up the
telephone or walk down the hall to a colleague’s office.
The growing reliance by lawyers on digital
technology, of course, is not limited to e-mails. Virtually
all correspondence, transactional documents, and court
filings originate as electronic documents . . . . In addition,
many lawyers and law firms, taking advantage of widely
available document imaging technology, convert their
paper records into electronic documents for
232
organizational and storage purposes.
In light of those changes in practice, the ABCNY Ethics
Committee believed “it would be useful to address some of the
ethical issues implicated by a lawyer’s reliance on e-mails and other
233
On the issue of a client’s access to
electronic documents.”
electronic records, the ABCNY Ethics Committee did not believe
that “a lawyer has any ethical obligation to organize electronic
documents in any particular manner, or to store those documents
234
But it added an important
in any particular storage medium.”
caution: “From an ethical standpoint, a lawyer should ensure that
231. THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, COMM. ON PROF’L AND
JUDICIAL ETHICS, Formal Op. 2008-1 (2008) [hereinafter ABCNY Opinion 2008-1],
available at http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/2008-opinions
/799-a-lawyers-ethical-obligations-to-retain-and-to-provide-a-client-with-electronicdocuments-relating-to-a-representation-.
232. Id. pt. 1.
233. Id.
234. Id. pt. 3.
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the manner of organization and storage does not (a) detract from
the competence of the representation or (b) result in the loss of
documents that the client may later need and may reasonably
235
expect the lawyer to preserve.”
236
Because public clouds have been temporarily shut down,
and the risks of additional shutdowns will likely persist, and possibly
grow, if the occurrences of cyberattacks increase, law firms arguably
should not rely incautiously on a public cloud. Law firms already
should know not to rely solely on storage of electronic records on
the computer used to create them, that backups are needed, and
that on-site and off-site storage of backups are prudent measures.
Law firms should endeavor to ensure that they do not relinquish
the only current copies of any client confidential information to a
public cloud. Nor should they do so for any copies of client related
documents that might be needed urgently to provide the client
with competent representation consistent with the requirements of
NYRPC Rules 1.1(a) and (c).
Unfortunately, there is also the risk that law firms may be
persuaded by a cloud provider’s promised benefits and fail to take
certain reasonable precautions. For example, if a law firm retains a
digital copy on its premises of all data stored in the cloud, it might
sacrifice some of the benefits of outsourcing storage but retain the
ability to protect its clients’ documents. The representations for
Google Docs all but discourage such precautions by stating:
Because Google Docs saves to a secure, online storage
facility, you can create documents, spreadsheets and
presentations without the need to save to your local hard
drive. You can also access your documents from any
computer. In the event of a local hard drive crash, you
won’t lose your saved content.
While we can’t give you exact figures, please be
assured that we back up data almost as often as you can
237
change it.
235. Id.
236. See supra note 50.
237. Save Your Documents, GOOGLE, http://docs.google.com/support/bin
/answer.py?hl=en&answer=44665&topic=1360900 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
Google subsequently modified its description of Google Docs. Google deleted the
words: “You can also access your documents from any computer. In the event of a
local hard drive crash, you won’t lose your saved content. While we can’t give you
exact figures, please be assured that we back up data almost as often as you can
change it.” Google substituted the following: “Your presentation will begin saving
within Google Docs almost as soon as you begin entering text.” Create and Save a
Presentation, GOOGLE , http://docs.google.com/support/bin/answer
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In light of the potential ethical issues, including the problem
noted below, that can arise if a cloud computing service agreement
places the responsibility for security of a customer’s data on the
individual or organization that sent the information to the cloud,
lawyers and law firms might well be reluctant to rely too much on
this assurance.
The ABCNY Ethics Committee Opinion 2008-1 also
recommended a step that many firms may be reluctant to take, but
that warrants strong consideration: disclosure to, and discussion
with, the client. Large firms with large numbers of clients may well
find such disclosure and discussion particularly burdensome and
potentially risky if some clients concur in the use of a public cloud
and others resist it. As explained in Opinion 2008-1 (in the context
of e-mail, but applicable also to the public cloud), such disclosure
and discussion recognizes that a client may be entitled to know of
the risks at the start of the engagement and to reflect a shared
understanding of safeguards in the letter of engagement:
In light of the exponential growth in e-mails and other
electronic documents, and the pace of technological
change involving the organization and storage of
electronic documents, it may be prudent for a lawyer and
client to discuss the retention, storage, and retrieval of
electronic documents at the outset of an engagement.
Lawyer and client may find it worthwhile to discuss and
reach agreement at the outset on issues such as (i) the
types of e-mail and other electronic documents that the
lawyer needs to retain, given the nature of the
engagement; (ii) how the lawyer will organize those
documents; (iii) the types of storage media the lawyer
intends to employ; (iv) the steps the lawyer will take to
make e-mail and other electronic documents available to
the client, upon request, during or at the conclusion of
the representation; and (v) any additional fees and
expenses in connection with the foregoing . . . . [T]hose
costs should accord with the lawyer’s customary fee
schedule and must not be excessive. By raising these
issues at the outset of the representation, perhaps as part of
the engagement letter, a lawyer and a client will be able to
make informed decisions about the appropriate manner
.py?hl=en&answer=69074 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). The authors found no
redline of the changes to such descriptions or to Google’s Terms of Service. Thus,
only by printing and saving the Terms of Service at a moment in time would users
be able to trace changes in the master agreement most users have with Google.
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of retention, storage, and retrieval of electronic
documents to which a client has a presumptive right of
238
access.
Even stronger cautions appear in the California State Bar
Opinion No. 2010-179 (Opinion No. 2010-179) on the need to
inform clients when use of technology may result in a heightened
risk to their data. The opinion examined an attorney’s duties when
using technology to transmit or store confidential client
information when such technology “may be susceptible to
unauthorized access by third parties,” describing that “[t]he greater
the sensitivity of the information, the less risk an attorney should
take with technology. If the information is of a highly sensitive
nature and there is a risk of disclosure when using a particular
technology, the attorney should consider alternatives unless the
239
client provides informed consent.”
Among the risks to its data that should be reviewed with a
client is that of an inadvertent disclosure of privileged or
confidential information or work product that might result in a
court deciding that such disclosure waived the applicable attorneyclient or attorney work product privilege. Moreover, as Opinion
No. 2010-179 noted, even the mere use of an insufficiently secure
technology without a disclosure could be deemed to have waived
the privilege:
[I]t is possible that, if a particular technology lacks
essential security features, use of such a technology could
be deemed to have waived these protections. Where the
attorney-client privilege is at issue, failure to use sufficient
precautions may be considered in determining waiver.
Further, the analysis differs with regard to an attorney’s
duty of confidentiality. Harm from waiver of attorneyclient privilege is possible depending on if and how the
238. ABCNY Opinion 2008-1, supra note 231, pt. 6 (emphasis added). The
Opinion concludes: “In New York, a client has a presumptive right to the lawyer’s
entire file in connection with a representation, subject to narrow exceptions.” Id.
239. To clarify what it meant by “informed consent,” California State Bar
Opinion No. 2010-179 explained in a footnote that:
For the client’s consent to be informed, the attorney should fully advise
the client about the nature of the information to be transmitted with the
technology, the purpose of the transmission and use of the information,
the benefits and detriments that may result from transmission (both legal
and nonlegal), and any other facts that may be important to the client’s
decision . . . . It is particularly important for an attorney to discuss the
risks and potential harmful consequences of using the technology when
seeking informed consent.
California Formal Op. 2010–179, supra note 130, at 5 n.15.
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information is used, but harm from disclosure of
confidential client information may be immediate as it
does not necessarily depend on use or admissibility of the
information, including as it does matters which would be
embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client
240
if disclosed.
Prior to 2010, although some state bar associations had issued
ethics opinions on issues related to a lawyer’s storage of client data
241
in a cloud computing platform, no New York ethics opinion had
issued guidance on the ethics of storing client confidential
information online, which includes storing information in a cloud
computing vendor’s off-site servers where it would be accessible
wirelessly. Lawyers and law firms subject to the NYRPC will find
instructive the New York State Bar Association (NYSBA) Committee
on Professional Ethics’ Opinion 842 (Opinion 842), issued on
September 10, 2010. The opinion addresses whether a lawyer may
“use an online system to store a client’s confidential information
without violating the duty of confidentiality or any other duty,” and
if so, what steps the lawyer should take to “ensure that the
242
information is sufficiently secure.” Opinion 842 concluded that a
lawyer “may use an online ‘cloud’ computer data backup system to
store client files provided that the lawyer takes reasonable care to
ensure that the [cloud vendor’s] system is secure and that client
243
confidentiality will be maintained.”
Although that conclusion, as stated, may appear to require that
“reasonable care” under NYRPC Rule 1.6 must guarantee “that
client confidentiality will be maintained[,]” that was not the
Committee’s intended guidance as reflected in its explanation that
“exercising ‘reasonable care’ under Rule 1.6 does not mean that
the lawyer guarantees that the information is secure from any
244
Of particular value is the Committee’s
unauthorized access.”
identification of the steps that a lawyer may take to protect client
confidential information against unauthorized disclosure,
including:
240. Id. at 6 (footnotes omitted).
241. Such ethics opinions include the following: Alabama State Bar Ass’n,
Formal Op. 2010–02, supra note 138; California Formal Op. 2010–179, supra note
130; Nevada State Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility,
Formal Op. 33 (2006), available at http://ftp.documation.com/references
/ABA10a/PDfs/3_12.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
242. New York Op. 842, supra note 94.
243. Id. ¶ 9.
244. Id. ¶ 5.
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Ensuring that the online data storage provider has an
enforceable obligation to preserve confidentiality and
security . . . .;
• Investigating the online data storage provider’s security
measures, policies, recoverability methods, and other
procedures to determine if they are adequate under the
circumstances;
• Employing available technology to guard against reasonably
245
foreseeable attempts to infiltrate the data that is stored[.]
Lawyers, however, will probably in the near future find it a
significant challenge to follow the Committee’s recommendation
that the data storage provider have “an enforceable obligation to
preserve confidentiality and security.”
There are at least three significant obstacles to overcome in order to
fulfill that obligation in negotiation of a cloud computing service
level agreement with a major vendor.
The first obstacle is
identification and understanding of the vulnerability points in a cloud
platform’s structure and processes; such vulnerability points may be in
the cloud vendor’s servers, the data customer’s computers and
networks, or in the communication between those two systems.
The second obstacle is determining whether the cloud computing
service vendor or the data customer is ultimately responsible for security
under the terms of their service level agreement. Although marketing
language on a vendor’s website will usually offer assurances
concerning the security of data stored on its cloud servers, a careful
examination of the vendor’s standard service level agreement
usually reveals that the vendor disclaims responsibility and declares
it the data customer’s responsibility. For example, Amazon offers
the following assurance concerning security of its EC2 cloud
service: “Secure – Amazon EC2 provides numerous mechanisms for
246
securing your computer resources” and Amazon supports that
assurance with a referral to a link to its security white paper,
247
However,
entitled Amazon Web Services: Overview of Security Process.
those assurances are undercut and the responsibility for security is
firmly placed on the data customer by the standard Amazon Web
Services Customer Agreement, which asserts that while Amazon
“will implement reasonable and appropriate measures designed to
help you secure Your Content against accidental or unlawful loss, access or

245.
246.
247.

Id. ¶ 9.
Amazon Elastic Computer Cloud (Amazon EC2), supra note 155.
Id.
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248

disclosure,” the ultimate responsibility for security rests with you—
the data customer:
4. Your Responsibilities
....
4.2 Other Security and Backup. You are responsible for
properly configuring and using the Service Offerings and
taking your own steps to maintain appropriate security,
protection and backup of Your Content, which may
include the use of encryption technology to protect Your
Content from unauthorized access and routine archiving
249
Your Content.
Amazon is not unique among cloud computing vendors in its
insistence that the data customer accept responsibility for security
of its data stored on Amazon’s cloud servers that Amazon has
exclusive custody of and over which Amazon exercises exclusive
control. Although it may seem paradoxical that cloud service
vendors offer to be bailees of a data customer’s digital assets and
yet refuse to be responsible for the security of such data while in
their servers, on their premises, and under their control, that
appears to be the emerging standard (at least for data customers
who lack the leverage to negotiate a different allocation of
responsibilities for data security). One of the major criticisms
directed at cloud vendors in the aftermath of the data security
incidents in the second quarter of 2011 is the insufficiency of
security provided by the cloud vendors for the customer’s data:
The biggest complaint in the wake of recent data
breaches, whether it’s Sony or Epsilon, has centered on
the lack of security controls in place to protect customer
data. A recent Ponemon Institute report found that cloud
providers don’t think that’s their job.
A shocking 73 percent of U.S. service providers and
75 percent of their European counterparts said their
cloud services did not substantially protect and secure
their customers’ confidential or sensitive information,
according to the recent Security of Cloud Computing
Providers report from the Ponemon Institute. Nearly 62
percent of U.S. providers and 63 percent of European
providers were not confident that their cloud applications
and resources were secure.
248. Amazon Web Services Customer Agreement, AMAZON WEB SERVICES,
http://aws.amazon.com/agreement (last updated Aug. 23, 2011) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter August 2011 AWS Customer Agreement].
249. Id. § 4.2.
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....
A majority of the surveyed [cloud] vendors don’t
even have dedicated security personnel to oversee the
security of their applications, infrastructure or platform,
the report found. On average, providers allocated 10
250
percent or less of their resources to address security.
Such findings suggest that obtaining an enforceable
agreement from a cloud service vendor to be responsible for the
security of a customer’s data could prove a formidable challenge.
The third obstacle is that cloud computing vendors tend to include in
their service level agreements the right to suspend a customer’s access to its
data as a remedy triggered by the vendor’s sole determination that the data
251
Although suspending a
customer is the source of a security risk.
customer’s access to its data does not constitute a direct violation of
the confidentiality and security of such data, it renders both
concepts rather hollow since the same agreement both makes the
customer responsible for security of its data in the cloud computing
vendor’s servers and gives the vendor the right to suspend
customer access to such data, making it impossible thereafter for
the customer to monitor or otherwise protect such data. An
example of such a provision, in the August 2011 Amazon Web
Services Agreement, states:
We may suspend your or any End User’s right to access or
use any portion or all of the Service Offerings immediately
upon notice to you if we determine: (a) your or an End
User’s use of the Service Offerings (i) poses a security risk
to the Service Offerings or any third party, (ii) may
adversely impact the Service Offerings or the systems or
Content of any other AWS customer, or (iii) may subject
252
us, our affiliates, or any third party to liability . . . .
A noteworthy omission from such agreements further
compounds the problem: there is no undertaking by the cloud
computing vendor that it will provide the data customer with any
notice of a security breach that might have affected the customer’s

250. Fahmida Y. Rashid, Cloud Service Providers Say Data Security ‘Not My Job’:
Study, EWEEK (May 7, 2011), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Cloud-ServiceProviders-Say-Data-Security-Not-My-Job-Study-381728 (noting that cloud providers
are in the business of giving their customers what they want).
251. See, e.g., Legal Cloud Services Agreement, LOGICWORKS, § 4, http://www
.logicworks.net/legal/cloud-services-agreement (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) (giving
the vendor the right to suspend the customer’s access to his or her own data).
252. August 2011 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 248, § 6.1(a).
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253

data.
As a result, there is also no requirement that the vendor
alert the customer to the need to take precautions to protect its
data or its enterprise from unauthorized use of its data or that the
vendor give the customer any information of the kind of attack, the
vulnerability it exploited, or other information that would be
crucial to a customer. The precautions are not only for the data
protection, but in order to ensure that it complies with applicable
laws and regulations that might require it to give notice to third
parties that their data too may have been affected by the security
254
Also omitted from cloud service agreements are any
breach.
grants of rights to the data customer to audit the vendor’s
maintenance of security or to gain access to the vendor’s premises
and to interview its staff in order to investigate a security breach.
If such serious omissions are not corrected in the negotiated
definitive service agreement between a cloud computing vendor
and a lawyer or law firm, then counsel may find it difficult, if not
impossible, to fulfill other important obligations required by
Opinion 842 which cautions:
[T]he lawyer should periodically reconfirm that the
[cloud] provider’s security measures remain effective in
light of advances in technology. If the lawyer learns
information suggesting that the security measures used by
the online data storage provider are insufficient to
adequately protect the confidentiality of client
information, or if the lawyer learns of any breach of
confidentiality by the online storage provider, then the
lawyer must investigate whether there has been any
breach of his or her own clients’ confidential information,
notify any affected clients, and discontinue use of the
service unless the lawyer receives assurances that any
255
security issues have been sufficiently remediated.
In that passage, the standards set for a New York lawyer or law
firm would appear to be significantly higher than those described
in the ethics opinions on cloud computing by other states’ bar
256
associations, the ABA, and the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20.
253. See, e.g., id. (illustrating that the vendor does not have to inform its
customer of a security breach).
254. Cf. Peter Fretty, Turbulence in the Clouds, PETERFRETTY.COM (Feb. 25, 2011),
http://www.peterfretty.com/2011/02/25/turbulence-in-the-clouds
(explaining
precautions taken by cloud computing vendors and the purpose of these
precautions).
255. New York Op. 842, supra note 94, ¶ 10.
256. See Cloud Computing Among Issues of Ethics 20/20 Hearing in Atlanta, ABA
(Feb. 12, 2011), http://www.abanow.org/2011/02/cloud-computing-among-
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The obligations to ensure that counsel receive prompt notice of a
security breach, that counsel can effectively investigate such breach,
and that counsel “discontinue use of the service” if the vendor fails
to provide assurances that “any security issues have been sufficiently
remediated” arguably create a potential Armageddon scenario if
counsel have not negotiated a cloud computing service agreement
257
that contains provisions that would avert such an outcome.
Moreover, the considerable disruption of work and the resulting
financial and reputational costs that would ensue from counsel
having to discontinue use of cloud computing services (and
notifying any affected clients) after having become dependent
upon such services would appear to set a very high entry barrier for
New York lawyers and law firms that might be considering moving
client confidential data from onsite computers to a cloud
computing server. We doubt whether fulfillment of Ethics Opinion
842 obligations would be possible under the customer service
agreements that cloud computing service vendors currently have
posted on their web sites as their standard terms and conditions.
Therefore, if a lawyer or law firm does not negotiate appropriate
modifications of such agreements to ensure that they have the
means to achieve such compliance, they would appear to be
putting themselves in potential conflict with their ethical
obligations under the NYRPC rules as interpreted by Ethics
258
However, it should also be noted that Ethics
Opinion 842.
Opinion 842 might also provide a lawyer or law firm with leverage
in negotiations with a cloud computing vendor, since such opinion
could be cited as an applicable standard that a vendor would need
to ensure that a data customer lawyer or law firm could fulfill under
any definitive cloud computing service level agreement.
Continued occurrences of data breaches that affect cloud
computing services would probably also further raise the ethical
entry barrier for New York lawyers and law firms—and for counsel
practicing in other jurisdictions that decide to follow or
incorporate the obligations set forth in Ethics Opinion 842.
Moreover, Ethics Opinion 842 does not address, and thus leaves
unclear, whether the ethical obligations it identifies apply also to
in-house counsel of government agencies, companies, and financial
institutions (such as the New York Federal Reserve Bank) whose
issues-of-ethics-2020-hearing-in-atlanta.
257. See Rebecca S. Eisner, Clear Skies or Stormy Weather for Cloud Computing: Key
Issues in Contracting for Cloud Computing Services, 1060 PLI/Pat 393 (2011).
258. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.2 (2011).
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259

offices are located within New York state.
To what extent are
such counsels subject to, or relieved of, obligations identified by
Ethics Opinion 842 if their employers decide, without consulting
them, to move the enterprise’s confidential data to a cloud
computing vendor’s servers? Clarification of such issues in a future
NYSBA Ethics Opinion would help avert confusion at a time when
many enterprises are attempting to decide when, and to what
extent, to move data of varying sensitivities to the cloud.
c.

Diminished Ability to Locate Faults

When a firm runs its own network, it tends to develop the
ability to locate the source of a “crash” or other fault in the system’s
performance (such as a plummeting pace of performance). When
major functions like word processing are outsourced to the cloud,
it may become quite difficult to determine whether a fault
originates within the law firm’s networks or within the cloud
260
provider’s networks. The law firm’s partners can require their IT
staff to report fully and promptly any problems they have found,
but depending on the cloud service agreement such reports may
not be available on demand, or contain complete or sufficiently
reliable information for the firm to learn the cause of a problem.
An isolated instance of a complete and prolonged loss of wordprocessing capabilities may be important to trace to its cause as
261
such losses occur briefly but repeatedly.
The significance of the ability to locate faults in the cloud
becomes clearer when one considers that the architecture of a
cloud service provider and its reliance on multiple entities make
the cloud increasingly likely to have vulnerabilities and the rich
store of sensitive data in the cloud is a highly attractive target for
262
John Harauz explains the cloud architecture
cyber-exploitation.
vulnerabilities as follows:
Clouds can comprise multiple entities, and in such a
259. See New York Op. 842, supra note 94.
260. See Matthew A. Verga, Cloudburst: What Does Cloud Computing Mean to
Lawyers, 5 J. LEGAL TECH. RISK MGMT. 41, 46 (2010) (“Depending on the service
provider chosen and the configuration of its facilities, the data could be in one
facility or several, and the facilities could be almost anywhere in the world. Where
the data is located will dictate the laws to which it is subject.”).
261. See, e.g., Jack Newton, Putting Your Practice in the Cloud a Pre-Flight Checklist,
73 TEX. B.J. 632 (2010).
262. See, e.g., Harauz, Kaufman & Potter, supra note 146, at 63 (discussing that
if a cybercriminal finds out the identity of a vulnerable cloud computing provider,
then it becomes an easy target).
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configuration, no cloud can be more secure than its
weakest link. If a cybercriminal can identify the provider
whose vulnerabilities are the easiest to exploit, then this
entity becomes a highly visible target. The lack of security
associated with this single entity threatens the entire cloud
in which it resides. If not all cloud providers supply
adequate security measures, then these clouds will
become high-priority targets for cybercriminals. By their
architecture’s inherent nature, clouds offer the
opportunity for simultaneous attacks to numerous sites,
and without proper security, hundreds of sites could be
263
comprised [sic] through a single malicious activity.
Moreover, if the cloud provider does not implement
encryption of data at rest in its servers or has a breach of security
concerning the encryption’s keys, then the principle of “access to
one gives access to all” will apply and multiply the risks to all
customers’ data. Put differently, a cloud that has not been
optimized for security (for the customer’s benefit) will be likely to
have been inadvertently optimized for a breach (for the attacker’s
benefit):
The best case (from an attacker’s standpoint) is when the
same vulnerability exists at all levels within large
interconnected systems, where “redundant” resources can
be compromised, resulting in cascading effects. This
situation could allow an adversary to very quickly
commandeer a large and diverse population of systems, as
has been witnessed in various worm outbreaks over the
264
past few years.
With such risks in mind, consider the U.S. intelligence
community’s 2009 annual threat assessment with respect to cyberexploitation (a term that “refers to the penetration of adversary
computers and networks to obtain information for intelligence
265
purposes . . . .”):
263.
264.

See id.
COMM. ON OFFENSIVE INFO. WARFARE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF
CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 157–58 (William A. Owens et al. eds., 2009), available at
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12651&page=R1.
265. Id. at IX. The report explains:
Cyberexploitations do not seek to disturb the normal functioning of a
computer system or network from the user’s point of view—indeed, the
best cyberexploitation is one that such a user never notices.
....
. . . [I]f the targeted party does not know that its secret information has
been revealed, it is less likely to take countermeasures to negate the
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A growing array of state and non-state adversaries are
increasingly targeting—for exploitation and potentially
disruption
or
destruction—our
information
infrastructure,
including
the
Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and
embedded processors and controllers in critical
industries. Over the past year, cyber exploitation activity
has grown more sophisticated, more targeted, and more
serious. The Intelligence Community expects these
266
trends to continue in the coming year.
i.

Ethical Issues

The ethical issues discussed in the context of public cloud
instabilities are much the same as those raised by a law firm’s
diminished ability to locate faults. They differ, however, in one
important respect: with diminished ability to locate faults comes a
diminished ability to mitigate adverse consequences and to avert
reoccurrences. The diminished ability to mitigate and avert
consequences and reoccurrences may implicate a law firm’s ability
267
to provide competent representation.
Here again, a review of the cloud provider’s Terms of Service
may reveal that the magnitude of risks and the probability of their
manifestation in the cloud are greater than customers might
anticipate. Enhanced risks and probabilities of problems will likely
affect a law firm’s assessment of the ethical issues. For example, the
2009 Google Docs Terms of Service contain, in the “Exclusion of
Warranties,” a provision that raises such risks and probabilities with
respect to a law firm’s need to know the location and nature of
faults that develop in the operation of the cloud:
14.3 IN PARTICULAR, GOOGLE, ITS SUBSIDIARIES
AND AFFILIATES, AND ITS LICENSORS DO NOT
REPRESENT OR WARRANT TO YOU THAT: . . .
(C) ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED BY YOU AS A
RESULT OF YOUR USE OF THE SERVICES WILL BE
ACCURATE OR RELIABLE, AND
(D) THAT DEFECTS IN THE OPERATION OR
FUNCTIONALITY OF ANY SOFTWARE PROVIDED TO
compromise.
Id. at 11, 151.
266. DENNIS C. BLAIR, ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEE FOR THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 39 (Feb. 12,
2009), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/090212/blair.pdf.
267. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2007).
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YOU AS PART OF THE SERVICES WILL BE
268
CORRECTED.
The 2011 text of the same section 14.3 replicates the
269
warranties from 2009.
Thus, under the standard Terms of Service, there appears to
be no assurance that a customer would be given any explanation of
faults in the system. Moreover, Google disclaims any responsibility
to correct “defects in the operation or functionality” of the cloud
270
A law firm user might lack the information to know
software.
whether the fault occurred within its system, in Google’s, or in a
conflict between software installed on the user’s network and
software installed in Google’s cloud servers. Under the Terms of
Service, a law firm would also have no right to require Google to
attempt to correct faults or defects or any right to require Google
271
to attempt to mitigate the damage to the law firm customer.
These represent potentially significant negatives that could make
the promised potential cost reductions, scalability of computing
power, and ubiquitous access appear transitory or illusory in the
long term.
Moreover, while a commercial enterprise may decide it can
accept the tradeoffs of potential benefits and potential risks, a law
firm’s fiduciary relationships with each of its clients and its ethical
obligations—under NYRPC Rule 1.1(a) to provide “competent
272
and Rule 1.1(c) to “not intentionally . . .
representation”
prejudice or damage the client during the course of the
273
representation,” may change the calculus of such assessments.
The disclaimers may increase the law firm’s need to take
precautions in order to avoid seeming to “intentionally” disregard
the risks of damage to the client that could arise if faults in the
cloud remained uncorrected.
MRPC Rule 1.1’s competency requirement provides an
274
Providing
obligation analogous to that in NYRPC Rule 1.1(a).
competent representation appears to require a law firm to ensure
268. Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, § 14.3(c)–(d) (Apr. 16, 2007),
http://www.google.com/accounts/TOS [hereinafter 2011 Google Terms of Service].
269. See supra text accompanying note 237.
270. See supra text accompanying note 237; Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, § 14
(Feb. 24, 2009), http://www.tosback.org/version.php?vid=134 [hereinafter 2009
Google Terms of Service].
271. 2011 Google Terms of Service, supra note 268.
272. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.1(a) (2011).
273. Id. R. 1.1(c).
274. Id. R. 1.1(a).
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that the technologies it utilizes do not hinder a client’s objectives
through technological faults. The inability to correct functional
flaws in a cloud system, particularly those that are recurring,
arguably detracts from the lawyer’s effectiveness and ultimately
could harm the client’s fiduciary interests by imposing additional
costs or by delaying action necessary to the advancement of the
case.
Similarly, NYRPC Rule 1.1(c) may find an analogue in MRPC
Rule 1.3’s diligence requirement. MRPC Rule 1.3 requires a lawyer
275
to act with “reasonable diligence” in representing a client.
Diligence requires a lawyer to pursue a client’s interests despite any
276
The essence of MRPC Rule 1.3 is that
obstacles that may arise.
lawyers take “whatever lawful and ethical measures are required” to
ensure that the client’s objectives are achieved and to ensure that
the client is not prejudiced through the lawyer’s dilatory actions.
Arguably, an inability to control the technology through which
client information is processed could be construed as a failure to
pursue the client’s interests through the lawful means available to
the lawyer.
ii. Considerations and Precautions
The security risks concerning faults in the cloud, and the lack
of an obligation to attempt to correct them, heighten the need for
lawyers and law firms, as prospective customers, to consider
precautions beyond those noted above in the discussion of cloud
instabilities. This may mean having contingency plans to minimize
the consequences in the event such problems occur. Such issues
could be addressed in the Terms of Use, to the extent such terms
are negotiable. Law firms also might seek to negotiate whether the
Terms of Use agreed to with the law firm would be subject to the
typical practice of online service providers who reserve the right to
change the terms unilaterally, at any time, and without notice to the
customer. Some terms of use or terms of service, such as those for
Google Docs, not only claim the right to vary the terms unilaterally,
but also to treat the continued use of the service after such changes
as acceptance of those changes even though a customer may not
have been aware of the change because posting of such changes is
277
A law firm
not accompanied by any e-mail notice to the users.
275.
276.
277.

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2007).
See id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1.
2011 Google Terms of Service, supra note 268, § 19.2.
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entering into standard Terms of Use for a public cloud software
service that gave such rights to the cloud provider might want to
give careful consideration to the attendant ethical risks, as these
terms may mean relinquishing the right to review and veto the
terms (and therefore the risks to be taken with clients’ electronic
records).
The Terms of Service for Google Docs make interruption of
access to a customer’s documents a virtual certainty, given that
Google requires the customer to agree that Google has the right to
intentionally interrupt or to disable such access—temporarily or
permanently:
4.2 Google is constantly innovating in order to provide the
best possible experience for its users. You acknowledge
and agree that the form and nature of the Services which
Google provides may change from time to time without
prior notice to you.
4.3 As part of this continuing innovation, you
acknowledge and agree that Google may stop (permanently
or temporarily) providing the Services (or any features within
the Services) to you or to users generally at Google’s sole
discretion, without prior notice to you . . . .
4.4 You acknowledge and agree that if Google disables
access to your account, you may be prevented from
accessing the Services, your account details or any files or
278
other content which is contained in your account.”
The significance of these provisions can readily be understood
by simply substituting for “any files” the words “any files containing
client related or client confidential information.” Instead of
assessing the probability of temporary loss of access due to a
random disruption of cloud services, law firms should infer from
the quoted provisions a near certainty that there will be temporary
or permanent losses of access “or any features within the services”
such as, for example, recovery of certain purportedly “saved”
documents. Such provisions may make the ethical risks foreseeable
(rather than speculative) and the need to address them, before
consenting to terms of service, much more compelling.
In addition, lawyers and firms should negotiate specifically
with the cloud provider over rights upon termination of their
relationship. Will the lawyer or firm be assured that all electronic
278. 2011 Google Terms of Service, supra note 268, §§ 4.2–4.4 (emphasis added).
These terms are identical in text and formatting to the 2009 version. 2009 Google
Terms of Service, supra note 270, §§ 4.2–4.4.
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copies will not merely be “deleted” but irrecoverably purged from
the cloud provider’s servers wherever located? Will the law firm
receive a certification that such purging of records has been
completed? Unlike the usual experience with an Internet service
provider where continuation of service tends to be the norm, the
Google Docs Terms of Service arguably make discontinuation or
termination of service significantly more likely:
13.3 Google may at any time, terminate its legal
agreement with you if: . . .
(C) the partner with whom Google offered the Services to
you has terminated its relationship with Google . . .
(D) Google is transitioning to no longer providing the
Services to users in the country in which you are [a]
resident or from which you use the service; or
(E) the provision of the Services to you by Google is, in
279
Google’s opinion, no longer commercially viable.
Without special provisions, there is no assurance of retrieval of
documents stored in Google Docs at the time of termination, or
any assurance regarding Google’s responsibility concerning the
purge of records after termination.
The City of Los Angeles negotiated a cloud service contract
with Google. An October 7, 2009 final draft is available. The draft
covers some of the contingencies discussed and negotiations
280
Thus, we conclude that, with the
suggested in this article.
negotiating resources of a major city and possibly of other large
enterprises, Google may make more favorable terms available to
customers.
Another cloud provider, Amazon, has made numerous
changes to its terms of service on the subjects of post-termination
services and the retrieval of electronic records in its “Amazon Web
Services™ Customer Agreement” (Amazon Agreement) that
281
governs its “Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud” (Amazon EC 2).
279. 2011 Google Terms of Service, supra note 268, §13.3.
280. Memorandum from Miguel A. Santana, City Admin. Officer, City of Los
Angeles, to Chair, Budget and Fin. Comm. 9 (Oct. 2, 2009), available at
http://www.infolawgroup.com/uploads/file/City%20of%20Los%20Angeles%20a
nd%20CSC-Google%20Contract%281%29.pdf.
281. Compare AWS Customer Agreement, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, §§ 6.2(d), 7.3(b),
http://web.archive.org/web/20110703131958/http://aws.amazon.com/agreeme
nt (last updated May 23, 2011) [hereinafter May 2011 AWS Customer Agreement]
(stating that in the event of suspension, Amazon will “not erase any of Your
Content . . . except as specified elsewhere in this Agreement”; and in the event of
termination other than for cause, Amazon will not “erase any of Your Content”
during the thirty days following termination, and undertakes to allow retrieval of
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However, the Amazon Agreement only provides for preservation of
data stored on Amazon EC 2 if the suspension or termination is
282
The October 2010 Amazon Agreement
“other than for cause.”
provided, to those terminated other than for cause, that:
(i) we will not take any action to intentionally erase any of
your data stored on the Services for a period of thirty (30)
days after the effective date of termination; and (ii) your
post termination retrieval of data stored on the Services
will be conditioned on your payment of Service data
storage charges for the period following termination,
payment in full of any other amounts due us, and your
compliance with terms and conditions we may establish
283
with respect to such data retrieval.
In the October 2010 version of the Amazon Agreement, customers
suspended or terminated for cause could read a starker warning in
section 3.7.3 that Amazon would “have no obligation to continue to
store your data during any period of suspension or termination or
to permit you to retrieve the same.” That warning is omitted from
the August 2011 version of the Agreement, which merely states:
284
“[A]ll your rights under this Agreement immediately terminate.”
From the provisions of the October 2010 and later versions of
the Amazon Agreement cited immediately above, the authors infer
all of the following:
• Amazon has changed its commitment from one promising that
it will not “intentionally erase” a customer’s data after an
other-than-for-cause termination, to one that more forcefully
promises not to erase data. In neither the October 2010 nor
August 2011 versions of the Agreement does Amazon give
assurance that it will take precautions to protect such data or to
ensure that post-termination protection will be equal or in any
way comparable to pre-termination protection.
• Post-termination “retrieval of data stored” in the cloud is not
content only on payment of charges for post-termination use and other amounts
due and to provide “the same post termination data retrieval assistance that we
generally make available to all customers”), with August 2011 AWS Customer
Agreement, supra note 248, §§ 6.2(d), 7.3(b). Implicit in the preamble to section
7.3(a) and (b), respectively, is the fact that termination can be “immediately upon
notice to you [the customer].” May 2011 AWS Customer Agreement, supra.
282. AWS Customer Agreement, AMAZON WEB SERVICES § 3.7.2, http://
web.archive.org/web/20101029051446/http:/aws.amazon.com/agreement (last
updated Oct. 21, 2010) [hereinafter October 2010 AWS Customer Agreement]; August
2011 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 248, § 7.3(b).
283. October 2010 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 282, § 3.7.2.
284. August 2011 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 248, § 7.3(a)(i).
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unconditional even in terminations other than for cause. It is
conceivable in the October 2010 and August 2011 versions of
the Agreement on payment of Service, data storage charges
post-termination, as well as payment in full of any other
amounts due before allowing retrieval of data by a customer
285
who has not committed a breach.
• If Amazon elects to terminate the service, it makes no
commitments to keeping stored data whatsoever or to allow
any retrieval of data. Customers might lose data while they
attempt to cure the causes that led to the termination.
• If a law firm customer urgently needed to retrieve clientrelated data shortly following termination of the cloud service,
even if the law firm was willing to pay for the release of the
data (or for the right to attempt to retrieve it from Amazon’s
“Elastic Computing Cloud”), any settlement could be “hung
up” if Amazon itself has not assembled a comprehensive
invoice at the hour that the law firm needs to retrieve the data.
• The final condition, the customer’s compliance with “terms
and conditions we may establish with respect to such data
retrieval,” asks the customer to consent to terms and
conditions that are not disclosed at the time of entry into the
agreement and that may not be disclosed at the moment of
termination (since the Amazon Agreement does not specify
286
A law firm should
when such terms will be disclosed).
consider carefully whether it is a reasonable, and reasonably
defensible, risk to entrust a client’s data to a public cloud with
such uncertain conditions attaching to its retrieval in the event
of a termination for convenience by Amazon.
These are not speculative concerns even in the absence of
intentional suspension or termination. As revealed by the 2011
interruption of service that Amazon suffered, some cloud
customers were unable to access their data and others suffered a
287
permanent loss of data. Moreover, whether a client’s data should
be stored where the bailee could hold it a virtual hostage or imperil
its recovery is a troubling proposition. Lawyers and law firms may
want to address these potential risks in order to avert the possibility
of an ethical issue arising under the NYRPC requirements for
285. E.g., id. § 7.3(a)(ii); October 2010 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 282, §
3.7.2.
286. October 2010 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 282, §3.7.2.
287. Blodget, supra note 100 (describing how data loss resulting from reliance
on cloud service providers is catastrophic for small firms).
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competent representation and avoidance of damage to a client.
Thus, some lawyers or law firms might find the failure to reach an
agreement on the handling of such issues a deal breaker with the
cloud vendor. Furthermore, if a law firm accepts a cloud vendor’s
standard service agreement, the firm needs to address the risk that
vendors typically reserve the right to change the terms of their
service agreements at any time without prior notice to the
customer, which could leave a law firm dissatisfied with the
288
protections as to its clients’ confidential data.
The potential ethical issues are sharper and more difficult to
address in the event of termination allegedly for cause where the
law firm customer disputes that it has breached the Amazon
Agreement. A termination for default releases Amazon of any
responsibility for a customer’s data stored in Amazon’s cloud,
which could imperil a contractually compliant law firm if its client’s
data become indefinitely inaccessible: “In the Event of [a
termination for cause, Amazon] shall have no obligation to
continue to store your data during any period of suspension or
289
termination or to permit you to retrieve the same.”
The Amazon Agreement uses control over the continued
storage and retrieval of data as collateral to protect its interests
290
A law firm may endeavor to renegotiate such
without limitation.
terms and should give consideration to disclosing the resulting
arrangement with its clients so that the clients may decide whether
they are willing to allow access to their documents by their counsel
under these types of conditions. Of course, if the law firm retained
a copy of all client documents on its premises in its own computers
or digital storage media, the ethical risks relating to competent
representation would diminish substantially.
On-premises backups do not address the other ethical issues
inherent in the arrangement proposed by the Amazon Agreement.
The agreement does not mention in the termination clauses any
post-termination obligation to either prevent unauthorized access
to data stored on its cloud by a terminated customer, or to purge
all copies of such data if a customer requests it (for example, where
destruction of previously disclosed litigation material is required by
288. See, e.g., August 2011 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 248, §§ 2.1–2.3,
12.
289. October 2010 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 282, § 3.7.3. The
companion provision in the 2009 version was section 3.7.3. See AWS Customer
Agreement, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, http://web.archive.org/web/ 20090804041357
/http://aws.amazon.com/agreement (last updated July 9, 2009).
290. October 2010 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 282, § 3.7.
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iii. Risks of Noncompliance with E-Discovery Obligations
Damage to or loss of client data and documents stored in a
public cloud can pose an additional ethical risk where the client
and his or her counsel reasonably anticipate that the client may be
the subject of a federal government investigation or a party to
litigation in federal courts, thereby possibly incurring a duty under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 to preserve all potentially
relevant data and documents, including all electronically stored
“records.” Issuance of a “litigation hold” and supervision of its
implementation has become an increasing concern for counsel as
courts have, on occasion, viewed counsel as responsible for a
292
If such responsibilities are not properly
client’s compliance.
handled by counsel or fall short of the standard applied by a court
in a given case, and the court imposes sanctions for spoliation,
serious damage to the client’s interests as well as those of the firm
can result.
To understand the risks involved, suppose an adversary raises a
spoliation claim as to documents, stored in a public cloud,
damaged or lost or belatedly produced because of the cloud
provider’s failure to preserve the relevant data and documents posttermination of the law firm’s relationship with the cloud provider.
Suppose also the court ordered the client to permit an adversary,
an adversary’s expert, or a government agent to make a “mirror
image” of hard drives containing the potentially relevant data and
documents, and such order arguably would apply to hard drives on
the public cloud provider’s servers. How would a law firm address
such issues to ensure fulfillment of duties under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Rule 37 (Failure to Make Disclosures or to
Cooperate in Discovery; Sanctions), compliance with the court’s
orders, and avoidance of potential disputes that might arise if other
customers of the public cloud learned of the order and objected to
having their client’s data and documents “swept up” and made
291. Id. § 3.
292. F. Brenden Coller, I’m Responsible to Do what? Counsel’s Affirmative Duty to
Ensure Compliance with Litigation Holds, E-DISCOVERY L. REV. (Aug. 18, 2011),
http://www.ediscoverylawreview.com/2011/08/articles/im-responsible-to-dowhat-counsels-affirmative-duty-to-ensure-compliance-with-litigation-holds
(“[C]ourts all over the country have emphasized the duty placed on counsel—
both in-house and outside—to ensure that clients comply with their discovery
obligations.”).
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potentially accessible to third parties and government agents?
There appears to be a reasonable possibility of other serious
logistical problems—for counsel and their clients—when
attempting to address duties to preserve data and documents where
the electronic copies are stored not on the client’s controlled
computers or on counsel’s controlled computers, but on servers
293
Who would be
controlled by the public cloud provider.
responsible for determining the locations of all such servers?
Cloud providers’ standard agreements typically do not explicitly
provide for the maintenance of records of all locations of a
customer’s data or specify the locations where such data will be
stored or to which it might be transferred. If a court orders that a
party deliver a “mirror image” of records stored at a specific
location, would the law firm customer be entitled to notice that such
an image was going to be made to obtain data of another customer
but that might also include the law firm’s client confidential
information?
If the law firm in such a scenario had client data stored with
public cloud provider Soonr, during the first nine months of 2011,
Soonr’s Terms of Service and End User License Agreement
provision on termination arguably intensified these risks. The
relevant Soonr contract provisions stated:
Upon cancellation by Soonr or at your direction, you may
request a file of your data, which Soonr will make
available for a fee. You must make such request at the
notification of cancellation to receive such file within
thirty (30) days of termination. Otherwise, ANY DATA
YOU HAVE STORED ON SOONR’S SYSTEMS MAY
NOT BE RETRIEVED, and Soonr shall have no
obligation to maintain any data stored in your account or
294
to forward any data to you or any third party.
Law firms might find it useful to consider such scenarios and
293. EUROPEAN NETWORK AND INFO. SEC. AGENCY, CLOUD COMPUTING: BENEFITS,
RISKS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INFORMATION SECURITY, 9–11 (Nov. 2009),
available at http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/rm/files/ deliverables/cloudcomputing-risk-assessment/at_download/fullReport. For an excellent analysis of
these issues and related e-discovery decisions, see John M. Barkett, Zubulake
Revisited:
Pension
Committee
and
the
Duty
to
Preserve
(2010),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/trial_skills/docs/pensioncommittee-zubulake.pdf.
294. Soonr Terms of Service and End User License Agreement, SOONR, § 10.3,
http://www.soonr.com/security/eula.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2011). The terms
of Soonr’s Terms of Service and End User License Agreement, as well as its privacy
policy, all changed in August 2011, during the editing of this article.
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questions as well as the potential breakdowns of public cloud
service in the context of a firm’s efforts to monitor and supervise a
client’s compliance with “litigation hold” orders in order to avoid
potential ethical issues arising under NYRPC Rule 1.1(c)(2)’s
295
requirement to avoid prejudice or damage to the client. A lawyer
or law firm also might want to include in such considerations a
potential for an ethical issue arising under Rule 1.4(a)(2) that
requires that a “lawyer shall . . . reasonably consult with the client
about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be
296
accomplished.”
Such discussions would benefit from a review of the cloud
provider’s applicable terms of use. It is reasonable to infer that
incidents for which the cloud provider expressly disclaims
responsibility are ones that it believes are reasonably likely to occur.
For example, the Google Docs Terms of Service and the Amazon
Agreement each address and, thus, highlight potential incidents
involving loss of data. The Google Docs Terms of Service provide
that:
YOU EXPRESSLY UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT
GOOGLE . . . SHALL NOT BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR . . .
ANY LOSS OR DAMAGE WHICH MAY BE INCURRED
BY YOU, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO LOSS OR
DAMAGE AS A RESULT OF . . . THE DELETION OF,
CORRUPTION OF, OR FAILURE TO STORE, ANY
CONTENT AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS DATA
MAINTAINED OR TRANSMITTED BY OR THROUGH
297
YOUR USE OF THE SERVICES.
The Amazon Agreement provides:
We strive to keep Your Content secure, but cannot
guarantee that we will be successful at doing so, given the
nature of the Internet. Accordingly, . . . you acknowledge
that you bear sole responsibility for adequate security,
protection and backup of Your Content . . . . We strongly
encourage you, where available and appropriate, to . . .
use encryption technology to protect Your Content from
unauthorized access [and] routinely archive Your
Content . . . . We will have no liability to you for any
unauthorized access or use, corruption, deletion,
298
destruction or loss of any of Your Content.
295.
296.
297.
298.

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.1(c)(2) (2011).
Id., § 1200 R. 1.4(a)(2).
2011 Google Terms of Service, supra note 268, § 15.1(B)(III).
October 2010 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 282, § 7.2.

212

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:1

In preparing for issuance of a “litigation hold” and in its
implementation, counsel may find it necessary to learn how a
client’s computers store, backup, and overwrite data and how such
computers, if they “go on an excursion” or malfunction, could
cause data to be corrupted, rendered inaccessible to electronic
searches, or destroyed. If the law firm or the client has stored
relevant data and documents on a public cloud, the “litigation
hold” preparations and discussions may be aided by considering
the issues that could arise from efforts to preserve and to produce
records on the public cloud. Such ethical issues may persist, and
we return to them later in the discussion of other security risks.
d. Diminished Control over, and Knowledge of, New Software
Code
When a law firm buys a license to use a software product, it can
decide before making the purchase whether the product has been
adequately tested and can control the circumstances in which new
code is added to its computer networks (provided that its defenses
prevent malware from intruding into its networks). Because new
code may not have been tested with all of the code previously
running on the law firm’s networks, the issue of installing software
updates (“patches”) has been a difficult challenge for firms. The
patch may conflict with other code residing on the firm’s networks,
causing degradation in performance, corruption of data, or system
crashes.
A cloud service provider, however, is not subject to the
decisions of any one of its customers. If it wants to load new code
on its system and if the terms of service do not provide otherwise, it
can do so without reporting to its customers that (1) such code will
be installed, (2) certain problems are known to be likely to occur
with certain existing programs, or (3) after installation certain
problems have been found to have resulted. Indeed, cloud
providers and their supporters often present as a significant benefit
of a public cloud that customers will all receive security patches
simultaneously and will not need to involve their IT personnel in
299
However, the service level agreements of the major
the process.
299. Top Ten Advantages of Google’s Cloud, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com
/apps/intl/en/business/cloud.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). Microsoft, for
example, touts as a benefit of its Azure cloud platform that “[c]ustomers and
partners can focus on delivering services and value to their customers—and not on
managing technology infrastructure,” which includes, by necessity, patching.
Windows Azure Platform FAQs, WINDOWS AZURE, http://www.microsoft.com
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cloud vendors do not, at present, promise that all customers will
receive each security patch simultaneously, and in the absence of
such promise a vendor could issue patches gradually or
300
incompletely in so-called “roving patches.” Of course, it is always
possible that a buggy patch will affect all customers simultaneously.
Since there may be no notice to customers that the patch has even
been installed, the patch can introduce a glitch into a law firm’s
networks or cause a cascading response of adverse consequences
that reach beyond the cloud and back to the law firm’s networks.
In another of its exclusions of warranties, the Google Docs Terms
of Service disclaim any responsibility for problems introduced by
such required downloads from the cloud:
ANY MATERIAL DOWNLOADED OR OTHERWISE
OBTAINED THROUGH THE USE OF THE SERVICES IS
DONE AT YOUR OWN DISCRETION AND RISK AND
THAT YOU WILL BE SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY
DAMAGE TO YOUR COMPUTER SYSTEM OR OTHER
DEVICE OR LOSS OF DATA THAT RESULTS FROM
301
THE DOWNLOAD OF ANY SUCH MATERIAL.
i.

Ethical Issues

The security risks that arise from the unannounced installation
of new code are roughly the same as those that arise from cloud
instability, but with one difference: the corruption or loss of data in
the cloud, caused by the new code, can migrate back to the law
firm’s customer and threaten the data stored on its Internet-linked
302
If the law firm’s routine
computers and digital storage devices.
backup servers are linked directly or indirectly to the Internet, then
those, too, could be put at risk by new code introduced by the
cloud provider. If a lawyer or law firm allows a client’s documents
to be corrupted, lost, or destroyed, a lawyer or firm may find that
/windowsazure/faq (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) (expand “What are the key benefits
of the Windows Azure platform?” hyperlink). However, in Amazon’s web services,
the vendor is only responsible for “patching systems supporting delivery of service
to customers,” but the customer is responsible for patching their own “guest
operating systems, software and applications.” AMAZON WEB SERVICES: RISK AND
COMPLIANCE 10 (May 2011), available at http://d36cz9buwru1tt.cloudfront.net
/pdf/aws-risk-and-compliance-whitepaper.pdf.
300. Woody Leonhard, The Perils of Patching in the Cloud, INFOWORLD (Aug. 13,
2010), http://www.infoworld.com/t/software-service/the-perils-patching-in-the
-cloud-872?page=0,1.
301. 2011 Google Terms of Service, supra note 268, § 14.4. The 2009 Terms of
Service were similar. 2009 Google Terms of Service, supra note 270, § 14.4.
302. See EUROPEAN NETWORK AND INFO. SEC. AGENCY, supra note 293.
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they have inadvertently breached their duty to preserve a client’s
records and files. The former New York Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code) and its replacement, the NYRPC, do not
expressly mandate record-retention requirements except with
respect to “a small number of discrete documents, such as retainer
agreements, bills to clients, bank statements, and records of
303
However, as Opinion 2008-1
transactions in escrow accounts.”
observed (with respect to the Code and that applies with equal
cogency to the NYRPC):
The Code . . . contains several provisions that implicitly
impose on lawyers an obligation to retain documents. For
instance, . . . a lawyer has an obligation to represent a
client competently . . . . Similarly, . . . “[a] lawyer shall not
intentionally . . . [p]rejudice or damage the client during
the course of the professional relationship . . . .”
....
As is the case with paper documents, which e-mails
and other electronic documents a lawyer has a duty to
retain will depend on the facts and circumstances of each
representation.
Many e-mails generated during a
representation
are
formal,
carefully
drafted
communications intended to transmit information, or
other electronic documents, necessary to effectively
represent a client, or are otherwise documents that the
304
client may reasonably expect the lawyer to preserve.
The MRPC do not contain a bookkeeping requirement similar
to that contained in the NYRPC. However, in Informal Opinion
1384, the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility stated that while “[a] lawyer does not have a general
duty to preserve all of his files permanently,” clients have a
reasonable expectation that valuable information from the lawyer’s
files “will not be prematurely and carelessly destroyed, to the
305
Consequently, if a lawyer allows a client’s
clients’ detriment.”
files to be lost or destroyed due to the installation of new code, the
lawyer or law firm could be at risk of breaching MRPC Rule 1.1 or
MRPC Rule 1.3. By failing to account for the possibility of lost files,
303. ABCNY Opinion 2008-1, supra note 231, pt. 2 (discussing a lawyer’s
ethical obligations to retain and to provide a client with electronic documents
relating to representation). All such documents are required to be retained for a
period of “seven years after the events that they record.” N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.15(d)(1) (2011).
304. ABCNY Opinion 2008-1, supra note 231, pt. 2.
305. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1384 (1977).
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the law firm has arguably demonstrated a lack of competence by
not educating itself on the risks that its choice of technology poses
to client files. Additionally, in allowing client files to be lost or
destroyed, the lawyer is subjecting the client to harm, which could
306
arguably implicate MRPC Rule 1.3’s diligence standard.
ii. Considerations and Precautions
A lawyer and law firm’s chief concern should be to avert the
loss of all copies of any document of importance to the client’s
interests. Opinion 2008-1 reiterated an earlier-expressed view that
at the end of a representation and “before destroying any
documents that belong to the client, the lawyer should contact the
client and ask whether the client wants delivery of those
307
It could be difficult for a lawyer or law firm to
documents.”
follow that recommendation if it failed to take available
precautions to avert the destruction of the client’s documents by
rogue code from a cloud provider.
e. Diminished Control over, and Knowledge of, Network
Defenses
When a law firm sets up its internal network, it can control the
defenses for that network and the monitoring and reporting of,
and responses to, unauthorized access (from within the firm) and
unauthorized intrusions (from outside the firm). Unless provided
by express terms in the cloud service agreement, however, such
control and knowledge probably will be substantially diminished.
Moreover, unless the cloud service agreement requires it, the law
firm may be at risk of not receiving any timely reports of a breach
in the defenses. Furthermore, a firm may misunderstand the
306. See supra note 87 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Alabama State Bar,
Ethics Op. 2010-02 (2010), available at http://www.alabar.org/ogc/PDF/201002.pdf (discussing “Retention, Storage, Ownership, Production and Destruction of
Client Files”); State Bar of Arizona, Ethics Op. 09-04 (2009), available at http://
www.myazbar.org/ethics/opinionview.cfm?id=704 (discussing “Confidentiality;
Maintaining Client Files; Electronic Storage; Internet”); Prof’l Ethics of the
Florida Bar, Op. 06-1 (2006), available at http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/tfbetopin
.nsf/43859e278a5ce05185256b51000b736b/9d8c4cf77b6a54278525718f005ab400?
OpenDocument (discussing electronic storage of client records); New York State
Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 680 (1996), available at
http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&ContentID=49409&Te
mplate=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm (discussing electronic storage of client
records).
307. ABCNY Opinion 2008-1, supra note 231, pt. 2.
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defenses that exist in the cloud. As Forrester analyst Chenxi Want
noted, “‘[c]loud computing is optimized for performance,
optimized for resource consumption, and optimized for scalability’.
308
. . . ‘It’s not really optimized for security.’”
One reported way in which cloud security has yet to be
optimized is encryption. Although many cloud service providers
offer encryption in transit (while data is moving up to the cloud or
from the cloud to the customer), the encryption of data at rest
within the cloud service provider’s servers has prompted questions
and serious doubts, such as the following:
• “Data at rest is more complex, and you may have to rely on
309
your own resources to encrypt it.”
• “[A] request for encryption of stored data goes beyond the
[cloud service provider] industry standard and may, because of
310
technological constraints, degrade the service.”
• “Encryption is less reassuring if the [cloud service] provider
controls the keys. It gets back to a question of trust and
verification that the provider is following strict policies
regarding who has access to the keys and under what
311
circumstances.”
• There is a fundamental problem with cloud computing that
uses “virtualization software to partition servers into ‘images’ . .
. . Although packing those virtual machines into cloud
providers’ data centers provides a more flexible and efficient
setup[,] . . . virtual machines suffer from a rarely discussed
flaw: They don’t always have enough access to the random
312
numbers needed to properly encrypt data.”
i.

Ethical Issues

Where a security incident involves intrusion into a law firm’s
networks leading to the loss or damage of a client’s data and
documents, the ethical issues raised by diminished control over a
308. Neil Roiter, How to Secure Cloud Computing, SEARCHSECURITY.COM (Mar.
2009),
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/magazineContent/How-to-SecureCloud-Computing (quoting Forrester analyst Chenxi Want).
309. Id.
310. Barry Reingold & Ryan Mrazik, Cloud Computing: The Intersection of Massive
Scalability, Data Security and Privacy (Part I), 14 No. 5 CYBERSPACE L. 1, 2 (June
2009).
311. See Roiter, supra note 308.
312. Andy Greenberg, Why Cloud Computing Needs More Chaos, FORBES.COM (July
30, 2009, 7:00 PM EDT), http://www.forbes.com/2009/07/30/cloud-computingsecurity-technology-cio-network-cloud-computing.html.
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firm’s network defenses are much the same as those discussed in
the earlier sections of this essay concerning the risks of inadvertent
disclosure of client confidential information through the use of
313
new technologies —troublesome information that could be
embarrassing to the client, and information the client asked to be
kept confidential. Access to client confidential information could
compromise the protection required for each kind of such
information.
The primary ethical issue raised by such security incidents
would be the requirements of NYRPC Rule 1.6(a) that states a
314
A
“lawyer shall not knowingly reveal confidential information.”
law firm is better able to know and assess the sufficiency of the
safeguards for its clients’ data and documents before entrusting
them to a public cloud. If a law firm has knowingly relinquished
such control and arguably diminished its ability to safeguard its
clients’ data and documents, is the firm at greater risk of an ethical
violation in the event of a breach of its network defenses and access
to its client’s confidential information?
Breaches in a law firm’s network defenses raise similar ethical
issues under MRPC Rule 1.6(a), which states that lawyers are not
permitted to reveal client information unless the client either gives
informed consent or the disclosure is “impliedly authorized” to
315
Outsourcing data control is not
carry out the representation.
316
Even
“impliedly authorized” within the meaning of Rule 1.6(a).
sophisticated clients are unlikely to understand the network
defenses that a law firm has in place to protect its information. For
this reason, it is possible that law firms have an obligation to
disclose to a client any proposed use of cloud services and to obtain
the client’s informed consent due to the potential for security
breaches in cloud defenses.
The ABA’s 2008 opinion on
outsourcing services seems to support this assertion. The opinion
notes that particularly where the relationship between the firm and
the service provider is “attenuated,” no information that is
otherwise protected under MRPC Rule 1.6 can be revealed without
317
the client’s informed consent.

313. See supra Part III.B.
314. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.6(a) (2011).
315. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a)(2) (2007).
316. ABA Formal Op. 08-451, supra note 94, at 5 (stating that the implied
authorization of Rule 1.6(a) and Comment 5 do not extend to outside entities
over whom the firm lacks effective supervision and control).
317. Id.
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Ultimately, lawyers are prohibited from actually revealing
information relating to the representation of a client and they must
prevent disclosures that could lead to the discovery of confidential
information. If relinquishing control over network defenses might
heighten the probability of unauthorized access to client
information, the decision to transfer control to a cloud service
provider would seemingly fall within the scope of MRPC Rule 1.6.
As a result, lawyers have an affirmative obligation to attempt to
minimize the risks that the cybersecurity defenses maintained by
outside service providers will not keep pace with rapidly evolving
threats. In that event, counsel might be at risk of failing to take or
ensuring that third parties take reasonable precautions to present
disclosure of client confidential information.
ii. Considerations and Precautions
The answer to the question above probably would depend on
the other precautions taken by counsel, the sensitivity of the
client’s information, whether safeguards would have averted the
breach, and the manner in which such unauthorized access was
achieved. Nevertheless, the question could prove troubling for a
law firm, making it prudent to consider the issue before agreeing to
entrust clients’ confidential information to a public cloud. It also
would be prudent for law firms to make routine assessments of the
vulnerability of their computer networks to the most recently
reported and anticipated threats (from insiders and outsiders), and
to make a focused assessment of the probable change in such
vulnerabilities that might result from outsourcing storage or
processing of client data and documents to a public cloud. Doing
so arguably would improve the chances that the counsel will
become aware of security flaws that they may want to address before
outsourcing storage of client data to a public cloud.
By increasing the probable protection of client confidential
information, counsel will, in most instances, be increasing their
own protection against the risks of an ethical breach. If a breach
occurs despite reasonable precautions, those precautions may
provide important evidence with which to defend counsel from
allegations of a violation of the counsel’s ethical obligations under
the NYRPC.
f.

Diminished and Delayed Knowledge of Data Breaches

When a law firm has exclusive control over the storage of its
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electronic records, it should be in a reasonably good position to
monitor cybersecurity, security incidents, and data breaches.
Unless the cloud service agreement requires it, however, the cloud
service provider may claim it is entitled to withhold information of
security incidents. For example, the authors have yet to find a
cloud service agreement that promises to alert the customer when
the provider learns of a security breach. Regardless of the precise
origins of the breach, counsel need to know and to inform their
clients of the breach and to help them recover from it. If the cloud
service provider is located in one of the few jurisdictions that has
318
the cloud service
not enacted a data breach reporting law,
provider might decide it is entitled to issue no report on the
incident or on the data affected by the breach.
i.

Ethical Issues

A data breach involving the potential release of or access to
client confidential information implicates a lawyer and law firm’s
ethical obligation under NYRPC Rule 1.6(a) to “not knowingly
319
If a cloud provider’s policy is
reveal confidential information.”
not to report data breaches to its customers, those customers
cannot assess on an ongoing basis the security of their data and the
reliability of the cloud provider’s safeguards for their data. A cloud
provider might take the position that commercial customers must
accept the risks and have no compelling need to monitor the
modulations of those risks in the cloud. However, lawyers and law
firms are not ordinary customers in that they have an ethical
obligation under NYRPC Rule 1.6(c) to “exercise reasonable care
to prevent the lawyer’s employees, associates, and others whose
services are utilized by the lawyer from disclosing or using confidential
320
information of a client . . . .”
Public cloud providers, if engaged by a lawyer or law firm,
would appear to come within the category of persons “whose
services are utilized” by such lawyer or law firm. If a lawyer or law
firm has not ensured that the public cloud provider will report data
breaches that may involve the lawyer’s or law firm’s client data, how
318. See supra Part III. As of October 12, 2010, only four states did not have
data security breach notification laws. Those states were Alabama, Kentucky, New
Mexico, and South Dakota. State Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13489 (last updated Oct.
12, 2011). For a listing of the data security breach laws, see id.
319. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.6(a) (2011).
320. Id. § 1200 R. 1.6(c) (emphasis added).
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well can they fulfill the ethical obligation to “exercise reasonable
care” to prevent a cloud provider from “disclosing” client
confidential information? Can “reasonable care” be sufficiently
exercised if the law firm contractually relinquishes its ability to
supervise or even to monitor or receive timely reports on the
performance of a public cloud provider’s protection of client data?
The answers may change substantially if, instead of an isolated
incident (an accident that occurs despite good precautions), the
pubic cloud experiences a succession of data breaches (a systemic
failure of safeguards or uncorrected vulnerabilities).
The prospect of successive service interruptions and data
breaches looms larger after occurrences of both safeguards and
321
322
Amazon,
and
uncorrected vulnerabilities in 2011. Sony,
323
Google all have suffered from these types of events in recent
years. For example, public concerns about Sony’s vulnerabilities
324
rose after Sony reported its second 2011 episode.
The proposed changes to Model Rule 1.6 build upon the New
York provision and support the assertion that public cloud
providers would fall within the category of persons “whose services
are utilized” by the lawyer or law firm. The ABA Commission notes
that there is currently an implicit duty to prevent inadvertent
325
However, the proposed MRPC
disclosure in MRPC Rule 1.6.
Rule 1.6(c) states, “[a] lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to
prevent the inadvertent disclosure of or unauthorized access to,
326
information relating to the representation of a client,” which
includes unauthorized access by third parties whose services the
lawyer utilizes. Although the Commission did not propose any
specific security procedures due to the rate at which technology
changes, it was the Commission’s belief that “lawyers should have
an obligation to act reasonably when using technology” and that
327
the rule should clearly state the obligation to do so.
321. Matt Peckham, PlayStation Network Outage a Disaster for Sony, TIME (Apr. 21,
2011),
http://techland.time.com/2011/04/21/playstation-network-outage-adisaster-for-sony.
322. Blodget, supra note 100.
323. Claudine Beaumont, Google Gmail Crash Which Hit Millions Now ‘Fixed,’ THE
TELEGRAPH (Feb. 24, 2009, 6:47 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology
/google/4799758/Google-Gmail-crash-which-hit-millions-now-fixed.html.
324. See Jared Newman, Playstation Network Breach: It’s Really, Really Bad,
TECHNOLOGIZER (Apr. 26, 2011, 2:17 PM), http://technologizer.com/2011
/04/26/playstation-network-breach-data-stolen.
325. ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, supra note 62, at 9.
326. Id. at 6.
327. Id. at 4.
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It is, therefore, questionable whether a lawyer or law firm who
relinquishes control over the storage of its data would be acting
reasonably when it has little to no control over security breaches.
The Commission provides some guidance on the meaning of
“reasonableness” in Comment 16 to proposed MRPC Rule 1.6(c).
The Commission identifies several factors that lawyers should
consider in determining whether their efforts to protect a client’s
confidential information are reasonable. These factors include
considering the “sensitivity of the information, the likelihood of
disclosure if additional safeguards are not employed, and the cost
328
of employing additional safeguards.” Based on these factors, it is
possible that the “reasonableness” of a lawyer’s action will vary
based on the circumstances. However, where the lawyer or the law
firm are aware that breaches have already occurred, it is arguably
unreasonable, based on these factors, to fail to implement additional
safeguards as the likelihood of disclosure would now be apparent.
ii. Considerations and Precautions
Use of a communications technology implies an ethical
responsibility to evaluate the degree to which its use may put client
confidential information at an increased, and perhaps
unreasonable, risk. As the NYSBA Ethics Committee noted in the
context of an opinion on precautions needed to protect client
confidential information from disclosure via metadata, “a lawyer
who uses technology to communicate with clients must use
reasonable care with respect to such communication, and therefore
must assess the risks attendant to the use of that technology and
determine if the mode of transmission is appropriate under the
329
circumstances.”
The same duty to “assess the risks attendant to the use” of
technology would appear to apply to communication of client data
to and from a public cloud. Such assessments may need to be
made not only before entering into an agreement with a public
cloud provider but continually in order for counsel to stay abreast
of changes in the operation of the cloud, changes in the terms of
use, and changes in the rapidly evolving security threats to webbased services and services that provide wireless access. Modes of
328. Id.
329. New York State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 782, 2 (Dec. 8,
2004), http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders/EthicsOpinions
/Opinions751825/Opn782.pdf.
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storage and of transmission can be affected by such threats and
may therefore deserve continual reassessment. As the NYSBA
Ethics Committee has observed (in the context of transmittals by email), “[r]easonable care may, in some circumstances, call for the
lawyer to stay abreast of technological advances and the potential
risks in transmission in order to make an appropriate decision with
330
respect to the mode of transmission.”
The ABA made a similar assessment in its opinion on the use
of unencrypted e-mail. Its opinion compared various forms of
communication from “direct” e-mail to services provided by third
parties. Although the ABA ultimately concluded that lawyers have
a reasonable expectation of privacy when using e-mail to transmit
information, it noted that “[t]he reasonableness of a lawyer’s use of
any medium to communicate with or about clients depends both
on the objective level of security it affords and the existence of laws
intended to protect the privacy of the information
331
communicated.” The ABA evaluated four different e-mail systems
before reaching its conclusion, thereby reflecting the view that the
“reasonableness” of an expectation of privacy depends, at least in
part, on the particular third-party provider’s security measures for
332
Furthermore, “when
ensuring the confidentiality of user e-mail.
the lawyer reasonably believes that confidential client information
being transmitted is so highly sensitive that extraordinary measures
to protect the transmission are warranted, the lawyer should
consult” with the client as to what method is appropriate for the
333
transmission of that information.
The digital era ultimately puts counsel in the uncomfortable
position of being responsible for protection of client confidential
information during a period when the technologies that facilitate
competent representation also threaten to undermine counsel’s
efforts to protect that same confidential information. The growing
recognition that security breaches are frequent occurrences
approaching near certainty makes this situation even more difficult
to resolve, particularly when the likelihood of such breaches is
expressed in a cloud provider’s terms of service or, as in the case of
Soonr, in its privacy policy and in the August 30, 2011 changes to
its policy as shown in the version below:
No method of transmission over the Internet, or method
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id. at 2–3.
ABA Formal Op. 99-413, supra note 133.
Id.
Id.
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of electronic storage, is 100% secure, however.
Therefore, we cannot guarantee its absolute security.
Sharing access to your files may create additional
risks to privacy and to the confidentiality of the
information within your files.
We provide certain
safeguards from our end, for example, the ability for you
to view who has accessed the files you’ve decided to share.
But some of the responsibility to prevent unauthorized
334
access remains with you.
In addition, cloud providers do not usually provide much
information about their security measures or security standards in
their terms of use or the related privacy policies. For example,
Google Docs’ Terms of Use offers no comment on those issues, and
its privacy policy offers little insight into what Google actually does
or the standards to which it attempts to adhere:
We take appropriate security measures to protect against
unauthorized access to or unauthorized alteration,
disclosure or destruction of data. These include internal
reviews of our data collection, storage and processing
practices and security measures, including appropriate
encryption and physical security measures to guard
against unauthorized access to systems where we store
335
personal data.
We are not suggesting that a cloud provider should publish
details of its security precautions and risk releasing such
information to people intent on defeating such safeguards.
However, a law firm client may need more information than is
provided by the assurances typically found in a standard
nondisclosure agreement. Thus, a law firm may well find it
prudent to conduct due diligence under appropriate conditions of
confidentiality to satisfy itself that client confidential information is
receiving the standard of care that is consistent with the law firm’s
ethical obligations to exercise reasonable care to ensure the cloud
provider is not permitting the disclosure of client confidential
information.

334. Privacy, SOONR, http://www.soonr.com/security/privacy.php (last
updated Aug. 30, 2011).
335. Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/privacypolicy.html (last
modified Oct. 3, 2010).
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g. Diminished Control over and Knowledge of the Location(s)
and Movement of Personal Information and Client Confidential
Information
Under most standard terms of service, such as the license that
had been offered by Soonr until late August, 2011, a cloud service
provider either claims the right to move, store, and process a
customer’s data in any location at the provider’s sole discretion, or
expresses no position on the issue and thereby makes no promise
to limit the data’s storage to locations identified to the customer or
336
The agreement gives the
subject to the customer’s approval.
336. Soonr Terms of Service and End User License Agreement, supra note 294, § 9.2.
On occasion a customer has sufficient leverage to negotiate location limitations, as
can be seen in the City of Los Angeles’ Google Apps contract which contains the
following provision:
1.7 Data Transfer. Google agrees to store and process Customer’s email
and Google Message Discovery (GMD) data only in the continental
United States. As soon as it shall become commercially feasible, Google
shall store and process all other Customer Data, from any other Google
Apps applications, only in the continental United States.
Information Technology Agency, Professional Services Contract, CITY OF L.A., 75 (Nov.
20,
2009),
http://clkrep.lacity.org/onlinecontracts/2009/C-116359_c_11-2009.pdf. Thomas Trappler identifies additional issues relating to the location (and
change in location) of a customer’s data stored in a cloud vendor’s servers:
A variety of legal issues can arise if an institution’s data resides in a cloud
computing provider’s data center in another country.
Different
countries, and in some cases even different states, have different laws
pertaining to data. One of the key questions with cloud computing is,
which law applies to my institution’s data, the law where I’m located, or
the law where my data’s located? Additionally, there are questions about
export control: Does saving controlled data on a cloud computing service
with a data center located outside the United States constitute a violation
of export control laws? For these reasons, it can be important for the
contract to identify the geographic region within which the data center
hosting your institution’s data may be located.
Thomas J. Trappler, If it’s in the Cloud, Get it on Paper: Cloud Computing Contract
Issues, EDUCAUSE Q. (2010), http://www.educause.edu/EDUCAUSE+Quarterly
/EDUCAUSEQuarterlyMagazineVolum/IfItsintheCloudGetItonPaperClo/206532.
In addition, there are environmental risks that may be elevated by entrusting data
to a cloud computing provider that may elect to store the data in a vulnerable
offshore location, as highlighted in a recent U.K. Government study:
The Foresight Programme from the UK’s Government Office for Science
produces in-depth studies looking at major issues 20–80 years in the
future. It recently published a report on the International Dimensions of
Climate Change that identifies a significant vulnerability from cloud
computing. As more data centres are needed, and with the UK a
relatively expensive location, more will be going offshore, but that makes
them potentially more vulnerable to climate change impacts.
The report points out that data storage facilities have already
suffered from flooding and cites the Vodafone data centre in Ikitelli,
Turkey, which was affected by flash flooding in 2009, putting a quarter of
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customer no right to receive reports on the exact locations where
their data are stored or the number of “copies” made of such data
that may exist. Moreover, some cloud service providers require
customer consent to blanket permissions for transfers of data into
and out of the European Union, without any assurance that such
transfers will comply with applicable data protection laws and
337
Such appeared to
regulations of the E.U. or its member states.
be the case for transfers covered by the Soonr Terms of Service and
End User License Agreement, which prior to an August 2011
change to Soonr’s privacy policy made no promise to store U.S.
persons’ data on U.S.-located servers:
SOONR
STORES
AND
PROCESSES
THE
INFORMATION WHICH SOONR COLLECTS FROM
YOU ON COMPUTERS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
OTHER COUNTRIES IN WHICH SOONR OR ITS
AGENTS HAVE FACILITIES. YOUR ACCEPTANCE OF
THESE TERMS AGREEMENT INCLUDES YOUR
CONSENT TO TRANSFERS OF SUCH INFORMATION
338
OUTSIDE YOUR COUNTRY.
Some cloud service providers offer features that promise
advantages to the user with an undisclosed reduction in security.
For example, Gmail and Google Docs provide an automatic draft
saving feature by which the service periodically “saves” and uploads
the contents of e-mail or documents to Google’s servers where they
339
However, researchers report that the same
are saved as “drafts”.
the local network at risk. Similarly, in August 2009 the rainfall from
Typhoon Morakot caused rivers to flood in Taiwan flushing large
volumes of sediment into the ocean. This led to several submarine
landslides which broke at least nine communications cables 4000m down.
It disrupted the Internet and telecommunications between Taiwan,
China, Hong Kong and other parts of Southeast Asia.
The study also makes the point that over 95% of global
communications traffic is handled by just one million kilometres of
undersea fibre-optic cable. Rising sea levels increase the risk of flooding
of coastal cable facilities and may also affect the stability of the seabed,
making cables more vulnerable.
Pete Foster, Cloud Computing—A Green Opportunity or Climate Change Risk?, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/sustainable-business
/cloud-computing-climate-change.
337. See, e.g., Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council,
EUR-LEX, 31 (Oct. 24, 1995), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:NOT.
338. Soonr Terms of Service and End User License Agreement, supra note 294, § 9.2.
339. See Roxana Geambasu, Tadayoshi Kohno, Amit A. Levy & Henry M. Levy,
Vanish: Increasing Data Privacy with Self-Destructing Data, UNIV. OF WASH.,
http://vanish.cs.washington.edu/pubs/usenixsec09-geambasu.pdf (last visited
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feature may cause confidential data to be uploaded “in-clear” to
Google even as the user is composing the document, thus making it
340
Moreover, to the extent that Google
susceptible to interception.
retains these early drafts in its system, the drafts qualify as
electronic records that must be preserved and produced in ediscovery. Thus, the drafts feature seems to impose new challenges
for lawyers and law firms.
i.

Ethical Issues

Data protection laws are complex and change frequently, and
compliance often requires close attention to each jurisdiction in
which data is stored or passes through. Because such laws often
differ in significant but subtle ways, a blanket consent given with
the breadth required by some cloud providers’ terms of service
could result in a violation of applicable data protection laws in
multiple jurisdictions.
Similarly, export control regimes such as the U.S. Export
341
Administration Regulations (EAR) and the International Traffic
342
in Arms Regulations (ITAR) require a license for certain kinds of
data to be exported from the United States and make it
impermissible to export or re-export certain kinds of data to
343
If a client places such data in records
prohibited destinations.
they entrust to a lawyer or law firm, and counsel then entrust such
data to a cloud, such data could be moved in violation of the EAR
or ITAR as part of the service provider’s routine relocation of such
data to servers in other jurisdictions. The risks of such occurrences
raise potential ethical issues for a law firm if it entered into such an
Oct. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Geambasu et al.].
340. Id.
341. As the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security explains
on its website: “Per Part 772 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR),
‘technology’ is specific information necessary for the ‘development,’ ‘production,’
or ‘use’ of a product. . . . The ‘export of technology’ is controlled according to the
provisions of each Category’. . . . Controlled technology is that which is listed on
the Commerce Control List.” U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, “Deemed Exports” FAQs,
U.S. BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., http://www.bis.doc.gov/deemedexports
/deemedexportsfaqs.html#2 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
342. 22 C.F.R. § 125 (2010).
343. Embargoes and Other Special Controls, 15 C.F.R. § 746 (2011) (setting
forth the embargoed destinations identified by EAR in Part 746). For a nonexhaustive list of embargoed destinations identified by the ITAR, see U.S. Dep’t of
State, Country Policies and Embargoes, DIRECTORATE OF DEF. TRADE CONTROL,
http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/embargoed_countries/index.html (last updated
Sept. 23, 2011) (listing the Federal Register publications that contain the
applicable regulations for each such targeted country).
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agreement. Although a review of such issues is beyond the scope of
this article, they are likely to become matters of ethical concern as a
direct result of cloud providers’ use of servers located in and
transferring data between multiple jurisdictions with possibly
conflicting requirements for data protection.
Although a cloud provider may intend to apply its security
measures consistently throughout its enterprise, such consistency
may decline as the locations of servers and staff multiply and as the
number of jurisdictions and cultures increases. A law firm and its
clients might reasonably object to storage of client data in certain
jurisdictions due to concerns for local security standards, reported
incidents, or political instabilities.
Law firms whose clients include governments and government
entities may need to know the exact locations of such clients’ data
within the cloud provider’s storage system, since a failure to know
such information could incur risks of violating the client’s own
security requirements and instructions to the law firm regarding
344
adherence to such requirements. The firm may be under express
instructions from that client to avoid storing data in servers within
the jurisdiction of a known adversary. For such firms there could
be ethical issues under the NYRPC or MRPC Rule 1.4(a)(2) to
“reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the
345
client’s objectives are to be accomplished” and under the NYRPC
or MRPC Rule 1.3 requirements to “act with reasonable diligence
346
and promptness in representing a client.”
ii. Considerations and Precautions
Law firms representing clients who have special security
concerns based on political and geographic considerations and
who insist on heightened measures and restrictions regarding the
storage and transfer of their data may find that a public cloud
provider’s standard terms of service do not accommodate such
concerns. On this subject, counsel may find helpful general
guidance in a 2006 New Jersey Advisory Committee on Professional
Ethics opinion on electronic storage and access of client files:
344. See COMPUTER SEC. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FIPS PUB. 200, MINIMUM
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERAL INFORMATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS, at 3
(Mar. 2006), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips200/FIPS-200final-march.pdf; BURKE T. WARD & JANICE SIPIOR, THE INTERNET JURISDICTION RISK
OF CLOUD COMPUTING, 27 INFO. SYS. MGMT. 334, 334–37 (2010).
345. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(2) (2007).
346. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2007).
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[T]he benefit of digitizing documents in electronic form
is that they “can be retrieved by me at any time from any
location in the world.” This raises the possibility, however,
that they could also be retrieved by other persons as well,
and the problems of unauthorized access to electronic
platforms and media (i.e. the problems posed by
“hackers”) are matters of common knowledge. The
availability of sensitive client documents in an electronic
medium that could be accessed or intercepted by
unauthorized users therefore
raises issues
of
confidentiality under RPC 1.6.
The obligation to preserve client confidences extends
beyond merely prohibiting an attorney from himself
making disclosure of confidential information without
client consent (except under such circumstances
described in RPC 1.6). It also requires that the attorney
take reasonable affirmative steps to guard against the risk
of inadvertent disclosure.
....
The critical requirement under RPC 1.6, therefore, is
that the attorney “exercise reasonable care” against the
possibility of unauthorized access to client information. A
lawyer is required to exercise sound professional
judgment on the steps necessary to secure client
confidences against foreseeable attempts at unauthorized
access. “Reasonable care,” however, does not mean that
the lawyer absolutely and strictly guarantees that the
information will be utterly invulnerable against all
unauthorized access. Such a guarantee is impossible, and
a lawyer can no more guarantee against unauthorized
access to electronic information than he can guarantee
that a burglar will not break into his file room, or that
someone will not illegally intercept his mail or steal a
347
fax.
Such concerns suggest that a law firm give serious
consideration to enhanced due diligence of any public cloud
provider as a condition for entering into a service agreement with
such provider. There may be many client-specific checks that need
to be made of a public cloud provider in order to ensure that the
law firm has exercised “reasonable care” to prevent such service
provider from “disclosing or using confidential information
347. New Jersey Advisory Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Op. 701 (2006), available at
http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/ethics/acpe/acp701_1.html.
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348

relating to the representation of a client . . . .”
In addition to
client-specific checks, it is possible that in ensuring compliance
with NYRPC and Model Rule 1.4(a)(1), “reasonable care” would
include informing the client of the circumstances surrounding the
use of the cloud service provider. Both rules provide that a lawyer
shall “promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance
with respect to which the client’s informed consent . . . is required
349
Only by informing the client of the
by these Rules . . . .”
proposed course of conduct and use of the cloud service can the
client provide any specialized instruction regarding additional
security measures.
Also, it would be prudent for a law firm to develop policies and
procedures to be invoked in case of a data breach involving the
client’s data and documents stored in the public cloud. These
should not be limited to the requirements of the applicable
jurisdiction’s data breach statutes, as there may be an ethical duty
to disclose such breach to the affected or potentially affected
clients under both the NYRPC and the MRPC Rule 1.4(a)(3)
requirement to “keep the client reasonably informed about the
350
Moreover, if there is a reasonable
status of the matter.”
possibility that such a breach could result in damage to the client,
which the client could mitigate if it knew the breach had occurred,
then failure to report the incident to the client could risk a breach
of the NYRPC Rule 1.1(c)(2) requirement that the lawyer shall not
intentionally “prejudice or damage the client during the course of
351
the representation . . . .”
In 2009, the Illinois State Bar Association (ISBA) reviewed the
issues that may arise if a law firm elects to have its computer
network managed by an offsite third-party vendor. The ISBA noted
that in looking at the same scenario, the ABA concluded that if the
third-party vendor breaches the confidentiality of the firm’s client
files, a lawyer may be obligated to disclose this breach to its client if
it is likely to affect the position of the client or the outcome of the
352
Such disclosure may be required under MRPC
client’s case.
348. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007); see also N.Y. COMP.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.6(a) (2011).
349. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(1) (2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.4(a)(1) (2011).
350. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(3) (2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.4(a)(3) (2011).
351. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.1(c)(2) (2011).
352. ISBA Advisory Op. on Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 10-01 (2009), available
at http://www.isba.org/sites/default/files/ethicsopinions/10-01.pdf.
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1.4(b), pursuant to which a “lawyer shall explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
353
decisions regarding the representation.”
An additional concern is the type of warranties or
indemnification that a cloud provider may offer to the lawyers and
law firms with which it contracts. Lawyers and law firms may wish
to consider the availability of indemnification for damages
sustained by outages and data security breaches. In the event that
lawyers or firms find the warranty or indemnification provisions
lacking in any respect, they may wish to procure separate coverage
for actual, incidental, and consequential damages that outages or
breaches may cause them directly, and clients indirectly.
h. Diminished Ability to Protect Data from Government
Surveillance or Seizure
Data transmitted wirelessly can be intercepted more easily than
354
Encryption may reduce the
data sent through telephone wires.
potential number of persons who can intercept transmitted data,
unless they are government agents or government-sponsored
355
Moreover, the amount of data that can be intercepted
entities.
353. Id. at 3 (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal
Op. 95-398 (1995)).
354. A 2010 Government Accountability Office (GOA) Report highlighted the
increased risks of wireless communications, noting: “Wireless technologies use
radio waves instead of direct physical connections to transmit data between
networks and devices. As a result, without proper security precautions, these data
can be more easily intercepted and altered than if being transmitted through
physical connections.” The GAO further observed that:
Wireless networks also face challenges that are unique to their
environment. A significant difference between wireless and wired
networks is the relative ease of intercepting WLAN transmissions. For
WLANs, attackers only need to be in range of wireless transmissions and
do not have to gain physical access to the network or remotely
compromise systems on the network.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-43, INFORMATION SECURITY: FEDERAL
AGENCIES HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO SECURE WIRELESS NETWORKS, BUT FURTHER ACTIONS
CAN MITIGATE RISKS 1, 8 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items
/d1143.pdf.
355. PARLIMENTARY OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH., POSTNOTE 270: DATA ENCRYPTION
(2006) (U.K.), available at http://www.parliament.uk/documents/post
/postpn270.pdf.
If Congress passes certain legislation requested by the
Administration, Government agencies would have access to such encrypted
communications. As reported in The New York Times:
Essentially, officials want Congress to require all services that enable
communications—including encrypted e-mail transmitters like
BlackBerry, social networking Web sites like Facebook and software that
allows direct “peer to peer” messaging like Skype—to be technically
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will usually be less than the data that can be seized if government
356
agents gain access to the cloud provider’s servers.
Although the use of national security letters (NSL) by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) can result in the government
gaining access to data on virtually any computer in the United
357
States, the authors expect that law firms likely will put up far
more resolute and vigorous defenses of client confidential
information than will cloud providers. The latter may find it
advantageous to cooperate with the government, offer token
resistance, and/or be barred by the terms of an NSL from even
informing the law firm customer that its client confidential
information has been requested by, or surrendered to, federal
358
agents.
In addition, there are reported instances in which the FBI has
received overproduction of records sought from an Internet service
provider. For example, the FBI, when conducting a national
security investigation and having obtained a court order to an
Internet service provider to produce e-mails sent to a single e-mail
address, received instead all of the e-mails from the entire domain
because the Internet service provider improperly set filtering
controls and collected data on the domain instead of the single e-

capable of complying if served with a wiretap order. The mandate would
include being able to intercept and unscramble encrypted messages.
Charlie Savage, U.S. Tries to Make It Easier to Wiretap the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/us/27wiretap
.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&hp.
356. THE HARVARD LAW NATIONAL SEC. GRP., CLOUD COMPUTING & NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW 21 (2010), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs
/nsrc/Cloud.pdf.
357. 12 U.S.C. § 3414(a)(3)(A) (2006); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u(d)(1), 1681v(c)(1)
(2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c)(1) (2006); 50 U.S.C. §436(b)(1) (2006). For more
discussion of the nondisclosure requirements of these national security letter
statutes, see DAVID P. FIDLER & SARAH JANE HUGHES, RESPONDING TO NATIONAL
SECURITY LETTERS–A PRACTITIONERS’ GUIDE, ch. 3 (2011) and text accompanying
notes 15–23, supra.
358. See, e.g., J. Nicholas Hoover, LulzSec, Anonymous: Feds Most Wanted,
TECHWEB (June 21, 2011, 1:06 PM), http://www.techweb.com/news/231000131
/lulzsec-anonymous-feds-most-wanted.html (“[F]ederal investigators routinely seek
access to the server logs of ISPs as part of their investigations. ‘Most U.S.-based
ISPs these days don’t even report law enforcement requests to the public[.]’”
(quoting Chester Wisniewiski, senior security advisor at Sophos)); Mike Masnick,
So the FBI Can just Take a Copy of All Instapaper User Data with No Recourse?, TECHDIRT
(June 24, 2011, 6:39 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110624
/15282814850/so-fbi-can-just-take-copy-all-instapaper-user-data-with-norecourse.shtml (describing FBI seizure of backup server for popular service known
as Instapaper, which individuals use to save web pages and other information).
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359

mail address. While it is troubling that these types of errors can
occur, the greater concern for law firms and lawyers intent on
protecting a client’s confidential information should be that these
occurrences are not rare. As the New York Times reported:
[A]n intelligence official, who spoke on condition of
anonymity because surveillance operations are classified,
said: “It’s inevitable that these things will happen. It’s not
weekly, but it’s common.”
A report in 2006 by the Justice Department inspector
general found more than 100 violations of federal wiretap
law in the two prior years by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, many of them considered technical and
360
inadvertent.
Providers of web-based e-mail may represent that they offer
security against any intrusion (including by government agencies),
but then fail to provide it when faced with a court order. For
example, Hush Communications, Inc., a Canadian company and
operator of the web-based e-mail service Hushmail.com, reportedly
represented that “not even a Hushmail employee with access to our
servers can read your encrypted e-mail, since each message is
361
uniquely encoded before it leaves your computer.” However, as
the result of a mutual legal assistance treaty between Canada and
the United States, Hush released to U.S. Drug Enforcement Agents
362
three CDs containing e-mails from three Hushmail accounts.
Although supposedly Hushmail could release only encrypted emails that could not be read by government agents, users
reportedly had found it too burdensome to use Hushmail’s most
secure services, which required installing Java and loading and
running the Java applet, and elected instead to use a more
traditional form of web-mail offered by Hushmail in which the user
363
The court order required
stores a passphrase with Hushmail.
Hushmail to use such stored passphrases to decrypt the e-mails
359. Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Gained Unauthorized Access to E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
17, 2008, at A1, A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/17/
washington/17fisa.html.
360. Id. at A1.
361. Ryan Singel, Encrypted E-Mail Company Hushmail Spills to Feds, WIRED.COM
(Nov. 7, 2007, 3:39 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2007/11/encryptede-mai.
362. Criminal Complaint, Statement of Probable Cause at 4, United States v.
Stumbo, No. 5:07-mj-00034-TAG (E.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007), available at
http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/files/steroids.source.prod_affili
ate.25.pdf.
363. Singel, supra note 361.
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364

Ethical Issues

National security letters (NSLs) present unique and unusually
sensitive ethical issues for counsel in fulfilling the NYRPC Rule
1.6(c) duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent persons “whose
services are utilized by the lawyer” from disclosing client
confidential information. NSLs also implicate the implicit duty
under MRPC Rule 1.6(a) to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of
client information. If a law firm receives an NSL, it is on notice of
the risks and can respond accordingly if it has adopted policies and
procedures for handling NSLs. Such policies likely will place a
priority on protecting client confidential information from
disclosure and may include measures to be taken in an initial
review of the NSL.
There is likely to be a very different set of priorities where the
recipient of an NSL is a public cloud provider, however, especially
if the provider is a major enterprise that has received many NSLs
already and has a pre-established protocol for responding to NSLs.
It is important for a law firm to be aware of the challenges that
NSLs present to a public cloud provider and to the likelihood that
the public cloud provider may find it in its own interests to do little
to limit the intrusion of the government into files that contain a law
firm’s client’s confidential information. A good summary of those
challenges is presented in Responding to National Security Letters: A
Practitioner’s Guide, which observes that such challenges include the
following:
The company [recipient] must be able to review the
national security letter, but the federal agents may not
permit the company to keep the [hard copy] letter or a
copy of it. If the agents indicate that the company may not
keep the letter or make a copy, company representatives
who review the document should take notes in order to
evaluate its legality and content.
....
In all likelihood, federal agents will deliver a national
security letter that certifies that disclosure of the letter or
its contents to persons beyond those to whom disclosure is
permitted (e.g., legal counsel) may result in a danger to
U.S. national security; interference with a criminal,
364.

Id.
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counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation;
interference with diplomatic relations; or danger to the
life or physical safety of any person. Although federal
courts have held that this nondisclosure requirement
violates the First Amendment [footnote omitted],
companies will likely be cautious and comply with the
365
nondisclosure obligations.
Once client data and documents are stored in a public cloud, they
not only reside in a location whose custodian will have little, if any,
incentive to protect them from government intrusion under the
authority of an NSL, but also will be a more likely target for
government requests for information under an NSL. Entrusting
client data and documents to a public cloud would appear to
increase the risks of disclosure to the federal government and of
such disclosure occurring without the law firm’s or its client’s
awareness. Such risks may be significantly greater for some clients
because of their nature of their businesses
ii. Considerations and Precautions
Law firm customers of a public cloud provider should not
expect notice from the provider that it has received an NSL that
would cover data and documents of the law firm or its clients.
Notice would violate the gag order provisions of national security
letter laws. Indeed, the recipient of the NSL may not decide to
notify its own lawyers of receipt unless the lawyers’ involvement is
necessary to the recipient’s response to the NSL or the recipient
has a question about its duties under the NSL. Thus, counsels’
decision of whether to store in a public cloud the documents and
data of clients whose businesses make them more likely to receive
NSLs may require additional careful consideration in order to
comply with both the NYRPC and MRPC requirements to avoid
damaging a client and to exercise reasonable care to prevent the
cloud provider from disclosing client confidential information.
Such considerations also may deserve to be discussed with the
client to ensure compliance with the NYRPC and MRPC
requirement to reasonably consult with the client about the means
366
by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished.

365. FIDLER & HUGHES, supra note 357, at 42, 44.
366. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.2 (2011).
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i. Diminished Ability to Monitor and Ensure Secure Purging of
Archived Records
Sometimes the concern regarding client confidential
information centers not on preservation, access, or production of
data but on the need to ensure its destruction, as when a protective
order or settlement agreement requires the destruction of
confidential materials after litigation. In such cases, it is not
enough to shred hard copy pages or delete a digital file from a
hard disk. Even after a matter ends, the confidentiality of
information concerning that matter remains an imperative until
such information can no longer be accessed in whole or in
multitudinous parts.
Hard copy information can be eradicated by fairly standard
practices, including careful shredding and incineration.
Unfortunately, data stored on digital media cannot be eradicated as
straight-forwardly and reliably as data in hard copy. For example,
as noted by NIST in the “Guidelines for Media Sanitization,”
published in 2006, digital media “may require special disposition in
order to mitigate the risk of unauthorized disclosure of
367
The chief
information and to ensure its confidentiality.”
challenge is that deletion of digital files may not delete the data
contained in the files, which can remain intact and recoverable on
the digital media. The reasons for the data’s persistence despite
purportedly being “deleted” are inherent in the design of digital
storage. As one report observed:
A cardinal rule for product design of computers, disks,
and tapes is to protect user data from accidental deletion.
Computer operating systems erase disk files into recycle or
trash folders to prevent accidental deletion of user data,
and have file recovery commands. File deletion erases
only file block pointers, links that let a file system
368
reassemble a file.
In 1985, the Department of Defense (DoD) established its
standard for eradicating digital data. Document DoD 5220
367. RICHARD KISSEL, ET AL., DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L INST. OF SCI. AND TECH.,
SPECIAL PUB. 800-88, GUIDELINES FOR MEDIA SANITIZATION 7 (2006) [hereinafter
NIST 800-88], available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/80088/NISTSP800-88_rev1.pdf.
368. Gordon F. Hughes, Daniel M. Cummins & Tom Coughlin, Disposal of Disk
and Tape Data by Secure Sanitization, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, Jul.-Aug. 2009, at 29,
available at http://66.14.166.45/whitepapers/compforensics/datarecovery
/scrubbing-sanitization/Disposal%20of%20Disk%20and%20Tape%20Data
%20by%20Secure%20Sanitization.pdf.
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required “two fixed-character overwrites and one random-character
369
overwrite, followed by a verify read.” This standard eventually
ceased to be capable of eradicating data from disk drives, because
design of the disk drives made the first two overwrites ineffective:
All drives today use partial response-recording channels, a
technology that randomizes user data before recording, so
the first two writes of DoD 5220 no longer function as
intended. The US Defense Security Service today requires
that federal agencies using overwrite utilities have an
authorized DoD laboratory evaluate them for proper
functionality. NIST 800-88 replaces DoD 5220 for disk
370
sanitization.
NIST 800-88 recommends that organizations store confidential
information on media labeled in accordance with internal
operating classifications and associate such media with the kind of
data sanitization that will eradicate it to the extent necessary to
371
prevent its recovery.
The federal government has cited NIST 800-88 as the
applicable standard in regulations concerning data security. For
example, in the HITECH Act: “Organizations should label these
media with their internal operating classifications and associate a
372
type of sanitization described in this publication.”
If the files stored include personally identifiable information
about consumers, whether direct customers of the firm or
customers of the firm’s client, additional “safe disposal” regulations
implementing the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of
373
2003 may be required. Even if not required, the Act and federal
374
regulations implementing it, may suggest suitable means for the
firm to implement.
The Ethics Essays concluded that many law firms or lawyers
375
They also
were not familiar with NIST 800-88 and its standards.
questioned whether law firms and lawyers or their clients had their
confidential information so well organized that it is stored on
media labeled by the level of confidentiality as recommended by
369. Id. at 30.
370. Id. (footnotes omitted).
371. NIST 800-88, supra note 367, at 7.
372. Id.
373. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, §
216, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (2006)).
374. E.g., Disposal of Consumer Report Information and Records, 69 Fed. Reg.
68690 (Nov. 24, 2004) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 682).
375. See sources cited supra note 53.

2011]

RED SKIES IN THE MORNING

237

376

NIST 800-88.
NIST 800-88 encourages that plans for data sanitization be
made based on the media and the level of risk to confidentiality. It
explains that the planning process should “categorize the
information, assess the nature of the medium on which it is
recorded, assess the risk to confidentiality, and determine the
future plans for the media. Then decide on the appropriate type
377
of sanitization.” Ideally such plans would be made before or at
the same time that the data is stored, but in most cases such plans
will likely be made much later. But in any event, plans need to be
made carefully before entrusting data to storage media that are not
controlled by the law firm or its lawyers, because there is little or no
evidence at present that cloud service providers have made secure
sanitization of data a high priority or included it in their plans for
customers.
For example, in Google Docs’ Terms of Service there is no
mention of “data sanitization” or any provision that addresses
Google’s responsibilities for eradicating confidential data entrusted
to its cloud or even a covenant to verify eradication of data if
378
If plans for secure data sanitization
requested by a customer.
were a priority for a cloud service provider, one would think that
the service provider would add that to the list of excluded or
disclaimed warranties and/or limits of liability, but there is no
provision on the subject in, for example, Google Docs’ Terms of
379
Similarly, in the Amazon Web Services Customer
Service.
Agreement, the provisions on “Data Preservation in the Event of
Suspension or Termination” and on “Post-Termination Assistance”
mention possible preservation or retrieval, but say nothing about
secure data sanitization or customer-authorized eradication of data
380
from the hard drives of Amazon’s cloud servers.
NIST 800-88 identifies three methods of data sanitization
suitable for eradicating confidential information from digital
media—clearing, purging, and destroying—and the level and kinds
381
There is no
of risk that each is best at protecting against.
376. Id.
377. NIST 800-88, supra note 367, at 7.
378. Compare 2011 Google Terms of Service, supra note 268, with 2009 Google Terms
of Service, supra note 270.
379. See, e.g., 2011 Google Terms of Service, supra note 268.
380. October 2010 AWS Customer Agreement, supra note 282, §§ 3.7–.8.
381. NIST 800-88, supra note 367, at 7–9. Note that NIST identifies a fourth
method of sanitization, “disposal,” but that does not involve eradication of the
data, and would incur risks of unauthorized access in an era where “dumpster
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established standard for what level of data eradication needs to be
achieved by lawyers or law firms to fulfill the objective of protecting
client confidential information stored in digital media.
Nonetheless, there are federal and state standards that can be used
as guidance that would help a lawyer or law firm document and
demonstrate that reasonable measures had been taken to protect
382
For example, the
the confidentiality of such information.
HITECH Act defines “unsecured PHR identifiable health
information” to mean such information that is not secured by a
technology or methodology identified by the Secretary of the
383
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).
The DHHS, in April 2009, issued guidance for security of such
information, and explained that “protected personal health
information” would be deemed “unusable, unreadable, or
indecipherable to unauthorized individuals” only if certain
measures had been taken, and explained that such information
when stored or recorded on electronic media would eventually
need to be “cleared, purged or destroyed consistent with” NIST
384
800-80.
diving” is not an uncommon practice. Id. at 5.
382. Examples of federal data sanitization standards include the HITECH Act
and the Safeguards Rule of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Note that the FTC
recommends that financial institutions, to achieve compliance with the Safeguard
Rule, should consider disposing of “customer information in a secure way and,
where applicable, consistent with the FTC’s Disposal Rule.” BUREAU OF CONSUMER
PROT. BUS. CTR., FED. TRADE COMMISSION, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND CUSTOMER
INFORMATION: COMPLYING WITH THE SAFEGUARDS RULE (Apr. 2006), available at
http://business.ftc.gov/documents/bus54-financial-institutions-and-customerinformation-complying-safeguards-rule; see 16 C.F.R. § 682.3 (2005); Disposal of
Consumer Report Information Records, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/os
/2004/11/041118disposalfrn.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). According to one
report, “at least 10 states have enacted laws that require destruction of ‘personal
information’ that is no longer needed for business.” Guidelines for Data Sanitization
and Disposal, CARNEGIE MELLON, 3 (Jan. 21, 2010), http://www.cmu.edu
/iso/governance/guidelines/docs/DataSanitizationDisposalGuidelines_
FINALv1.2.pdf.
383. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
(HITECH) Act, 42 U.S.C. § 17937(f)(3) (2010). HITECH further specifies that
the Secretary is required to issue guidance in a timely manner. Id. § 17932(h)(2).
384. Guidance Specifying the Technologies and Methodologies that Render Protected
Health Information Unusuable, Unreadable or Indecipherable to Unauthorized Individuals
for Purposes of the Breach Notification Requirements Under Section 13402 of Title XIII
(Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act) of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (Apr. 27,
2009), http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/ coveredentities
/federalregisterbreachrfi.pdf; see also Health Information Technology: Initial Set
of Standards, Implementation Specifications, and Certification Criteria for
Electronic Health Records, 75 FED. REG. 2014 (Jan. 13, 2010).
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Lawyers and law firms should give serious consideration to
adopting a standard similar to, or using, NIST 800-80, i.e., when
eradicating client confidential information, any such information
in digital media should be rendered “unusable, unreadable, or
indecipherable to unauthorized individuals.”
i.

Ethical Issues

Entrusting client confidential data to a cloud service provider
means moving a copy of such records outside of counsel’s
immediate control and placing it on digital media under the
control of at least one third party—the service provider—and
potentially multiple third parties, depending on the extent to
which the service provider itself outsources or subcontracts the
management of its cloud servers. Moreover, information that can
be reconstructed into an incomplete and partially identifiable
record is doubly dangerous. To the extent that fragments of
confidential information can be extracted, pieced together in a
semblance of their original structure, and rendered coherent and
interpretable, confidentiality and the client’s interests may become
compromised, risking a breach of counsel’s ethical duty to protect
a client’s confidential information from disclosure. To the extent
that extracts of confidential information can be read but remain
incomplete, there is the added risk that the information may be
taken out of context and seriously misinterpreted, distorting the
content and its purpose. In some situations, the lawyer or firm
could only defend against the publication of such mangled
fragments by a further disclosure of client confidential information.
With such data located offsite on a third party’s digital media,
we suggest that some of the following types of data sanitization
issues may arise:
• Re-location of Data. Will the cloud service provider relocate the
data to other servers in the same site or to servers in other
sites? If so, there is the risk that the cloud service provider will
not eradicate the data from the original server(s). Any party
gaining unauthorized access to such servers, either from onsite
or wirelessly via the Internet, might thereby gain access to
residual confidential data of the client.
• Retirement of Servers. Will the cloud service provider replace the
server during the storage period? If so, there is the risk that
the cloud service provider will not eradicate the data when
disposing of (or selling) the server. Any party gaining
possession of the discarded server might gain access to the
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residual confidential data of the client.
Backup Media. Will the cloud service provider be making
backup copies of the data? If so, there is the risk that upon
replacement of such media, the client’s confidential data will
remain on the discarded media, and thus be potentially
accessible by unauthorized persons.
Custody of E-Discovery Records. When a firm produces client
electronic records in fulfillment of e-discovery obligations, is
the recipient firm entitled to store such records in the cloud
without an express commitment to take “reasonable
precautions” to ensure that such records are not thereby put at
heightened risk of disclosure to unauthorized parties? When
the litigation concludes, will the firm be obligated to ensure
that any such records entrusted to a cloud service provider
have been securely sanitized (in accordance with NIST 80088)? If not, the client’s confidential information could be at
continuous risk for years thereafter. If clients believe that their
data will be put at such heightened risks, counsel may find it
increasingly difficult to persuade clients to fulfill their ediscovery obligations.
Expiration of Preservation Order. If a court issues a protective
order that requires destruction of confidential information at
the conclusion of a trial, will the court include (and should
counsel propose) a detailed statement of the measures to be
taken to ensure that such data, if entrusted to a cloud, will be
securely sanitized in all media used to store it by the cloud
service provider? Would failure to propose such measures risk
an ethical violation?
Failure of a Cloud Server’s Storage Media. If hard drives or other
storage media of the cloud service provider fail while still
under warranty by the original equipment manufacturer
(OEM), will the cloud service provider send the drive back to
the OEM for a warranty repair or replacement? If so, it is
unlikely that an effort will be made to eradicate the
confidential data contained on such media before releasing
them to the OEM. In that event, either the OEM and its
repair personnel will have access to the confidential data (and
may not be under any confidentiality agreement concerning
accessing such data), or if the OEM elects to replace the media
and discards the failed media there is the risk that the OEM
will invest no effort to eradicate the confidential data
contained on the media and will thereby place such data at
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risk by failing to sanitize it. It is important to note that in such
instances, the cloud service provider will probably have
relinquished all control over the failed media when it sends it
back to the OEM for warranty repair or replacement.
• Termination of a Cloud Relationship. Will the cloud service
provider eradicate all copies of client confidential data if
requested by counsel upon termination of the relationship
with the service provider? If not, the risks of residual client
data may be multiplied.
• Termination of a Client Relationship. Will the cloud service
provider eradicate all copies of client confidential data if requested
by counsel in the event of termination of the attorney-client
relationship? What if the client asks that the data be
transferred from its former counsel’s cloud service provider to
the cloud service provider of its new counsel? Will the cloud
service provider comply and, if so, will it then securely sanitize
the client’s data from the media on which it had been stored?
If not, the client may be at continuing risks of unauthorized
access to its confidential data.
In each of those instances, failure to ensure secure sanitization of
every copy of client confidential information from each of the
media on which the copies exist, have been recorded, or have been
stored in the cloud vendor’s servers and back-up servers raises the
possibility that counsel will fall short of the standard set by NYRPC
Rule 1.6(c): "A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent the
lawyer’s employees, associates, and others whose services are utilized by
the lawyer from disclosing . . . confidential information of a
385
client . . . .”
As discussed previously, the requirement that counsel monitor
“other persons” involved in the representation is currently
386
embodied in Comment 16 to MRPC Rule 1.6. Although straying
from the MRPC comments would not itself indicate a violation of
the MRPC per se, Comment 16 nevertheless provides guidance on a
lawyer’s responsibility to prevent unauthorized disclosure of
387
Furthermore, the ABA Commission’s
confidential information.
proposed amendments to MRPC Rule 1.6 indicate the ABA
Commission’s attempt to heighten a lawyer’s confidentiality
obligations under the Rule; thus, a failure to protect client
385. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.6(c) (2011) (emphasis
added).
386. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 16 (2007).
387. Id.
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information after the termination of representation could
388
ultimately still put the lawyer at odds with MRPC Rule 1.6.
If the client has terminated the relationship with counsel,
there is also the risk of failing to meet the standard set by NYRPC
Rule 1.9(c)(2):
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter
or whose present or former firm has formerly represented
a client in a matter shall not thereafter: . . .
....
(2) reveal confidential information of the former client
protected by Rule 1.6 except as these Rules would permit
389
or require with respect to a current client.
MRPC Rule 1.9(c)(2) imposes a similar requirement, but it
omits the use of the word “confidential” with reference to revealing
the former client’s information. The MRPC rule, therefore,
appears to have a broader reach than does the NYRPC, although
the comments to the MRPC rule indicate that a lawyer may
nevertheless use “generally known information” about a client
390
when necessary for representing another client.
NYRPC Rule 1.6 requires that a lawyer exercise “reasonable
care” to prevent service providers, including a cloud service
provider, from disclosing a current client’s confidential
information. There is no similarly express requirement in either
391
392
NYRPC Rule 1.9(c)(2) or MRPC Rule 1.9(c)(2) regarding a
former client’s confidential information. Perhaps the MRPC’s
drafters did not have an opportunity to consider the ramifications
of cloud computing, or perhaps they considered the ethical
challenges of cloud computing but did not take into account the
risks inherent in a former client’s confidential data continuing to
reside on cloud servers. Absent an ethical provision directly
addressing the issue of a former client’s confidential data
remaining on a third party’s servers, counsel will have to make their
own evaluation of the risk under either the NYRPC or the MRPC.
In this connection, the scope of client confidential
information of concern includes all such information that a lawyer
or law firm is not otherwise required to retain for seven years under
NYRPC Rule 1.15(d), such as “copies of all retainer and
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.

See ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, supra note 62, at 5–10.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.9(c) (2011).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. 8 (2007).
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.9(c)(2) (2011).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (C)(2) (2007).
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393

compensation agreements with clients,”
“copies of all bills
394
rendered to clients,” and “copies of all records showing payments
to lawyers, investigators or other persons, not in the lawyer’s regular
395
employ, for services rendered or performed.”
Client confidential information not covered by the seven-year
retention rule is put at risk when a lawyer or firm entrusts
compliance with the retention rule to a cloud service provider and,
thereafter, the attorney-client relationship terminates. Counsel
does not have an obligation to retain such records, but clearly
counsel has not ceased to be responsible for the protection of
client confidential information of a former client. There is no
analogous seven-year retention provision in the MRPC. But under
either the MRPC or the NYRPC, what precisely is counsel’s
obligation for such information when it remains on a cloud service
provider’s servers, even after its former counsel, at the client’s
request, has arranged for digital copies of all such information to
be transferred to the client’s new counsel? Surprisingly, this issue is
not addressed in either the NYRPC or the MRPC, although the
396
former came into effect in April 2009.
Lawyers and law firms should not rely on cloud service
providers to eradicate residual confidential data entrusted to them.
As a result, they must deal with the significantly high risk that
confidential data of a lawyer or law firm’s clients, if entrusted to a
cloud, will remain on one or more cloud servers after termination
of the client’s relationship with the lawyer or law firm. Once that
happens, the risks to the client’s confidential data, and the ethical
risks to its counsel, start to multiply as the data increasingly become
removed from the control of parties who have an interest in
protecting its confidentiality.
The first loss of control may occur when the relationship
between the client and counsel terminates. The client may instruct
counsel to transfer the electronic records to a new counsel.
However, copies of the client’s confidential data may remain on the
cloud provider’s servers after a copy has been forwarded to the new
counsel (or its cloud service provider), as requested. The client’s
original counsel may have lost effective control of the client’s
393. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 1.15(d)(1)(iii) (2011).
394. Id. R. 1.15(d)(1)(v).
395. Id. R. 1.15(d)(1)(vi) (emphasis added). Here, the seven-year record
retention rule would appear to apply to the “payments” to the cloud service
provider as well as to the lawyer or law firm. See id.
396. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200 (2011).
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confidential data, particularly if counsel is unaware that the data
continues to reside on the cloud service provider’s servers.
Counsel will not be aware of the continuing need to exercise
reasonable care to prevent the cloud service provider from
disclosing such data or keeping such data from being accessed by
unauthorized third parties. Quite simply, counsel may not realize
the need to insist on secure sanitization of the residual confidential
data.
Loss of control also may occur if the original cloud service
provider’s storage media fails and the service provider sends the
media back to the OEM for warranty repair or replacement. At
that point, as noted by NIST 800-88, the party sending the media
back to the OEM may be at risk of relinquishing control over that
media (including confidential data contained on it), if the cloud
service provider has not required in an agreement with the OEM
that the cloud service provider retain effective control over the
media and that the OEM preserve the data’s confidentiality
397
Unfortunately, there
throughout the warranty repair period.
appears to be little incentive for a cloud service provider to
negotiate (and pay) for such control and confidentiality safeguards,
particularly if its own customers are not pressing it to demonstrate
such precautions. Thus, NIST 800-88 draws a clear distinction
between circumstances in which control over the media and its
data is retained and those in which control is relinquished:
Media being turned over for maintenance are still
considered under organization control if contractual
agreements are in place with the organization and the
maintenance provider specifically provides for the
confidentiality of the information . . . . Media that are
being exchanged for warranty, cost rebate, or other
purposes and where the specific media will not be
returned to the organization are considered to be out of
398
organizational control.
When an organization plans to take an action that will cause it
to relinquish or lose control over media containing confidential
information, NIST 800-88 recommends that the organization
“purge” all confidential information on such media and verify that
399
NIST 800the “purge” eradicated the confidential information.
88 explains, “[a] representative sampling of media should be tested
397.
398.
399.

NIST 800-88, supra note 367, at 7.
See id. at 14.
Id. at 8.
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for proper sanitization to assure the organization that proper
protection is maintained. Verification of the process should be
conducted by personnel without a stake in any part of the
400
process.”
If the cloud service provider relinquishes control over the
storage media and a client’s confidential data stored on such
media, the client’s former counsel will no longer have any way of
exercising control over the media and security of the confidential
data. Counsel has no contractual relationship with the OEM, and
its contractual relationship with the cloud service provider may
have terminated or does not expressly apply to data of a former
client, a copy of which has been forwarded to a new counsel or its
cloud service provider. The risk remains, however, that the client’s
confidential data could be disclosed to, or accessed by,
unauthorized third parties once the client-attorney relationship has
terminated or once the storage media has been sent to the OEM
for repair. To the extent that one views such a risk as significant,
there would appear to be a serious gap in the NYRPC.
Until that gap is corrected by amendment of the NYRPC, we
recommend that counsel interpret MRPC Rule 1.9(c)(2) and
NYRPC Rule 1.9(c)(2) as implying a duty to do more than avoid
revealing confidential information of a former client protected by
Rule 1.6. Counsel also should take steps before losing control of
such data to ensure that a former client’s confidential information
will receive the same level of protection as it received when counsel
represented the client.
Put differently, in the explicit requirement of NYRPC Rule
1.6(c) and in the implicit requirement of MRPC Rule 1.6, a lawyer
or law firm must exercise reasonable care to ensure that others whose
services are utilized by the lawyer will not disclose the client’s
401
Therefore, one could construe
confidential information.
entrusting such information to a cloud service provider’s digital
media as nullifying an underlying assumption of Rule 1.6, namely
that the client’s confidential information will only be at risk from
402
counsel’s service providers during the representation. In the predigital era, that assumption was fundamentally sound: when the
attorney-client relationship terminated, the attorney would usually
400. Id. at 15.
401. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
22, § 1200, R. 1.6(c) (2011).
402. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 22, § 1200, R 1.6(c) (2011).
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return or arrange for secure destruction of the hard copies
containing client confidential information. If counsel retained
such information in a warehouse, counsel remained under an
obligation to ensure that the warehouse did not reveal or grant
access to the former client’s confidential information. However, if
counsel ordered the secure destruction of such records, there was
little or no risk of confidential data persisting in the way it does on
a cloud service provider’s digital storage media.
It appears to be consistent with the spirit of NYRPC Rule 1.6(c)
and MRPC Rule 1.6 that if counsel entrusts client confidential
information to a cloud service provider and its digital media,
counsel appears to have an ethical obligation to exercise
reasonable care to ensure that the service provider does not reveal
(or allow access to) that information from the time it receives it
until such time as it securely sanitizes such data in accordance with
the standards set forth in NIST 800-88. Reading the NYRPC more
narrowly and accepting the gap that appears to exist with respect to
protection of a former client’s confidential information would
appear to be inconsistent with the intent of the NYRPC, and would
risk damage to counsel’s relationship with clients and its
reputation.
ii. Considerations and Precautions
If counsel discusses with a client the cybersecurity issues that
may arise from entrusting the client’s confidential information to a
cloud service provider and its digital media, it also would seem
prudent for counsel to discuss carefully with the client the
cybersecurity issues that may need to be addressed in order to
ensure that data sanitization measures will be sufficient to protect
such information in the circumstances we have reviewed. It would
be prudent for counsel also to review with the client the risks that
data stored on the cloud, and not frequently accessed by the client,
403
might eventually cease to be readable by a client’s equipment.
Before discussing such issues with a client, counsel will need to
consider carefully whether its agreement with the cloud service
provider covers the full range of risks of confidential data
remaining on digital storage media and requires the
403. See Robert Plant, To Cloud, or Not to Cloud, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2011, at R9
(“[C]ompanies can’t just hand over data [to a cloud service provider] and forget
about it. They need to check it regularly to make sure the formats are still
compatible with their current systems—think of all those eight-tracks in the attic—
and the tapes haven’t started to degrade.”).
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implementation of safeguards commensurate with such risks.
Counsel should anticipate that cloud service providers may resist
being required to provide such safeguards. The omission from the
cloud service providers’ terms of service of any discussion of the
secure eradication of confidential data suggests that providers are
not attending to this issue. Counsel cannot safely ignore or
postpone addressing such issues. Once the lawyer or law firm
entrusts a client’s confidential data to a cloud service provider, the
problem of such data’s eventual eradication is inevitable. Delaying
addressing it will likely reduce counsel’s leverage in negotiating
such issues with the cloud service provider, and risks having a data
breach occur, with all of the attendant risks.
In order to address such issues adequately, lawyers and law
firms should confer with prospective cloud service providers and, at
a minimum, map out in detail each digital storage or digital
recording of client information that may occur once a copy of the
data is transferred from counsel’s computer to the cloud’s servers.
From that map, counsel can identify the probable circumstances
under which the media will leave the cloud service provider’s
404
control and require “purging” at the standard set by NIST 800-88.
Counsel’s ethical obligations cannot be fulfilled by accepting a
vendor’s position that the required precautions are too
burdensome, are too expensive, and would impose operational
inefficiencies. Cost and efficiency are not unimportant, but the
ethical obligations to protect a client’s confidential information
remain an imperative. Protecting client confidences and client
confidential information is essential for a client to trust its counsel.
The promised benefits of cloud computing appear to be
significant, but so far they also appear to have obscured the need to
address how and when the cloud service provider must securely
sanitize client confidential data in order to prevent its disclosure to
unauthorized persons. With so much attention focused on getting
data onto the cloud and on the possible loss of data while in the
cloud, the promoters of cloud computing and their customers risk
overlooking the problem of data remaining on a cloud service
provider’s servers long after data were supposedly “deleted,”
transferred, or backed up. The proliferation of storage sites
multiplies the risks that such data may be disclosed to or accessed
by unauthorized persons. Because counsel appear to remain
obligated to protect such data, even when the data relate to matters
404.

NIST 800-88, supra note 367, at 7–8.
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of a former client, the increase in the risks to the data would
appear to also increase the ethical risks for counsel.
j. Increased Risk of Inadvertent Grant of Licenses to Client’s
Intellectual Property
It probably would appear farfetched to many clients and their
counsel that the storage of data on a cloud vendor’s servers, or the
use of the cloud vendor’s services and software, could result in the
grant of any license to the client’s intellectual property rights in its
data. However, certain cloud computing vendors require such
grants in their standard customer service agreements. If a law firm,
for example, is considering authorizing its lawyers to use Google
Docs, as a cloud-based substitute for perhaps Microsoft Word, or
fails to prohibit its lawyers from using such an application, the law
firm would probably find it objectionable that Google’s Terms of
Use for Google Docs include a grant to Google, by the data
customer, of a so-called “content license” that states, in pertinent
part:
11. Content license from you. 11.1 [B]y submitting,
posting or displaying the content you give Google a
perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide, royalty-free, and nonexclusive license to reproduce, adapt, modify, translate,
publish, publicly perform, publicly display and distribute
any Content which you submit, post or display on or
through, the [Google Docs] Services . . . . 11.3 You
understand that Google, in performing the required
technical steps to provide the Services to our users, may
(a) transmit or distribute your Content over various public
networks . . . and (b) make such changes to your Content
as are necessary to conform and adapt that Content to the
technical requirements of connecting networks, devices,
services or media. You agree that this license shall permit
405
Google to take these actions.”
Google’s response, however, addresses issues only that arise
under its Terms of Service, Section 11.1, and thus ignores those
that arise under Section 11.2 and 11.3. Moreover, the “content
license” is far broader than what Google’s response describes it to
be. If it were not, it would contain only the language set forth in
the response, and not the far more extensive reach attained by the
operative words “license to reproduce, adapt, modify, translate,
405. Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE (Apr. 16, 2007), http://www.google
.com/accounts/TOS?hl=en.
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publish, publicly perform, publicly display and distribute any
Content which you submit, post or display.” If all Google needs to
do is have a license to ensure it has “permission to display,” it would
not need to include in the “content license” an express grant of
rights to “publicly perform,” “modify,” “translate,” and “adapt,”
which arguably also grants Google by implication a right to create
derivative works.
To say the license is one thing, when it clearly says the opposite
and reaches far beyond the explained scope is fundamentally
misleading, as is the suggestion that ownership is the only issue and
that only those “not familiar with legal agreements” would find the
scope of the “content license” deeply troubling. When one looks
again at Sections 11.2 and 11.3, it becomes evident that those
sections contradict the position taken in Google’s response. A
need to ensure “permission to display” is not required by, and is
inconsistent with, a statement that the grant of a “content license”
includes “a right for Google to make such Content available to
other companies, organizations or individuals with whom Google
has relationships for the provision of syndicated services.” In short,
Google’s response is lamentable and could mislead unwary readers
into overlooking what they are really granting Google the rights to
do with their content. For that reason, Google’s requirement that
users grant it a “content license” raises serious ethical risks for a law
firm or lawyers that use, or allow their staff to use, Google Docs
when generating or revising documents that contain client
confidential data and content in which the client has intellectual
property rights.
i.

Ethical Issues

There are probably few, if any, clients that would be willing to
agree to grant a cloud vendor a right to any content that the client
may generate or that its attorneys may generate through the use of
a cloud-based, word-processing program such as Google Docs. A
lawyer or law firm would certainly also be unwilling to agree to
grant such a license. There is, however, an ethical risk that could
be inadvertently overlooked by a law firm’s failure to ensure that its
lawyers, and the personnel that they are responsible for
supervising, decide on their own to use a cloud-based service whose
terms of use included a “content license” similar to that required
for use of Google Docs. The detrimental effects that the grant of
such a license could have to a client’s copyrights and trade secrets
would severely damage a law firm’s relationship with its client and
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could put the firm at risk of having acted in violation of the NYRPC
and MRPC, including Rules 1.1 (to provide “competent
representation”) and 1.6(a) (to protect “confidentiality” of client
information).
ii. Considerations and Precautions
The primary precaution to avert the risk of inadvertent grants
of licenses to cloud vendors is for law firms to ensure that, as part
of their ongoing efforts to keep abreast of new technologies, they
extend such efforts to include a review of a representative sample
of vendors’ standard terms and conditions. To the extent that such
review identifies risks, such as the express grant of “content
licenses” or other unacceptable terms, the firm will probably find it
prudent to modify their policies for employees and third-party
contractors to highlight such risks and to consider prohibiting such
personnel from letting any client confidential information become
subject to any third-party vendors’ services agreement without
express authorization by the firm. The attraction that new
communications technologies tend to exert, however, over
personnel makes such prohibitions unpopular and difficult to
enforce consistently throughout an enterprise. Partners, associates,
and other personnel are each, for different reasons, probably going
to find circumstances where they believe that an exception to such
prohibitions is warranted in order to achieve a desired
convenience, or to meet an urgent deadline, or to obtain access to
data when other means have become inefficient or unavailable. As
with any data security policy, it is such discretionary actions that can
create vulnerabilities in a system, or in this context, result in an
inadvertent and potentially costly grant of a “content license.”
k. Increased Risk of Noncompliance with New or Amended
Laws and Regulations
When lawyers and law firms remain in control of the client
confidential information entrusted to them, they also remain in a
position to be able to adjust promptly and with agility to any new or
amended laws and regulations that might apply to the storage, use,
movement, retention, or security of such data. When control over
client confidential information is relinquished to a cloud
computing vendor, changes in the law can create obligations for
compliance that may be difficult, costly, and potentially impossible
to fulfill while the data remains in the control of the cloud
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computing vendor. Such changes in the law or regulations tend to
emerge and apply in specific regulated industries or activities such
as health care, finance, securities, and defense and aerospace. As
an illustration, we will review here the emergence of a rule
proposed by the DoD: an amendment to the Defense Federal
406
The proposed
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS).
DFARS rule, if adopted, would add a new subpart and associated
407
contract clauses that would establish, for the first time,
requirements applicable to DoD contractors and subcontractors for
the safeguarding of unclassified DoD information and the
reporting to the Government cyber intrusions that affect
unclassified DoD information resident on or transiting a
contractor’s unclassified information systems (the “Cybersecurity
Rule”). The Cybersecurity Rule was initially described in March
2010 in the DoD’s advanced notice of proposed rulemaking,
408
seeking public comment on the rule and setting forth in greater
detail in the proposed rule published in the Federal Register on
June 29, 2011, seeking public comment to be considered in the
409
formation of the final rule. Neither the March 2010 nor the June
2011 drafts of the Cybersecurity Rule refers to cloud computing
systems or appear to have any provisions that specifically address
contractors that outsource their information systems to a cloud
410
However, the June 2011 draft
computer service provider.
provides a definition of “Contractor information system” in a
proposed contract clause entitled “Enhanced Safeguarding of

406. DFARS is a set of rules designed to assist members of the DoD when
procuring goods and services (e.g., ammunition for military personnel). About
Defense Acquisition Regulations System, DPAP, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars
/about.html (last updated Sept. 29, 2011).
407. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Safeguarding
Unclassified DoD Information (DFARS Case 2011–D039), 76 Fed. Reg. 38,089,
38,089 (June 29, 2011) [hereinafter DFARS], available at http://www.gpo.gov
/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-06-29/pdf/2011-16399.pdf (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts.
204, 252). The proposed DFARS are identified alpha-numerically, e.g., with the
letters such as XX or YY at the end of the numeric sequence to signal their
relationship to provisions in the existing regulation. The DFARS does not
presently address the safeguarding of unclassified DoD information within
industry, nor does it address cyber intrusion reporting for that information. Id.
408. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Safeguarding
Unclassified Information (DFARS Case 2008–D028), 75 Fed. Reg. 9563, 9565
(Mar. 3, 2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-03-03/pdf
/2010-4173.pdf (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 204, 252).
409. DFARS, supra note 407, at 38089.
410. See DFARS, supra note 407; Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement; Safeguarding Unclassified Information, supra note 408, at 9563.
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Unclassified DoD Information” which would appear to apply to an
information system that relies at least in part on a cloud computing
411
system.
A cloud computing system serving a DoD Contractor would
412
probably qualify as an information system “operated . . . for” the
Contractor or a subcontractor, and there is no provision in the
Cybersecurity Rule that appears to exclude it from the Rule’s
413
scope.
The Cybersecurity Rule exemplifies a recent trend in
amendments to the DFARS and Federal Acquisition Regulations:
the setting of enhanced standards for contractor conduct
combined with new requirements for self-reporting of violations by
414
The Cybersecurity Rule
the contractor to the Government.
establishes standards for contractor and subcontractor provision of
cybersecurity for unclassified DoD information, requires
contractors to report cyber intrusions that affect such information,
and sets forth criteria by which the DoD’s Contracting Officers will
then evaluate whether such intrusions demonstrated whether the
reporting contractor, if it complied with the reporting obligations,
nonetheless failed to fulfill its contractor obligations under the
Rule to protect the compromised information. As explained in the
Cybersecurity Rule’s policy statement:
A cyber incident that is properly reported by the
contractor shall not, by itself, be interpreted as evidence
that the contractor has failed to provide adequate
information safeguards for DoD unclassified information,
or has otherwise failed to meet the requirements of the
clause at 252.204–70YY . . . . A cyber incident will be
evaluated in context, and such events may occur even in
cases when it is determined that adequate safeguards are
being used in view of the nature and sensitivity of the DoD
unclassified information and the anticipated threats.
However, the Government may consider any such cyber
incident in the context of an overall assessment of the
contractor’s compliance with the requirements of the

411. DFARS, supra note 407, at 38093 (“As used in this clause . . . Contractor
information system means an information system belonging to, or operated by or for,
the Contractor or a subcontractor.”) (emphasis added).
412. Id.
413. See id.
414. See, e.g., Federal Acquisition Regulations; FAR Case 2007-006, Contractor
Business Ethics Compliance Program and Disclosure Requirements, 73 Fed. Reg.
67,064, 67,075 (Nov. 12, 2008) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 2, 3, 9, 42, 52).
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clause at 252.204–70YY.
The Cybersecurity Rule, if adopted in or near to its current
form, will set two levels of data security or information protection
that DoD contractors must implement and maintain: “basic
416
against cyber
safeguarding” and “enhanced safeguarding”
intrusions that might result in “exfiltration” of information (i.e.,
“any unauthorized release of [DoD information] from within an
information system” includes “copying the data through covert
network channels or the copying of data to unauthorized
417
media”). Separate contract clauses set forth the requirements for
“basic safeguarding” and “enhanced safeguarding” (respectively,
418
DFARS 252.204-70XX and 252.204-70YY).
“Basic safeguarding” requires the contractor to provide
“adequate security to safeguard unclassified Government
419
These
information” from unauthorized access and disclosure.
requirements apply to a contractor’s unclassified information
system, but do not appear to apply to any such system operated for
the contractor, except that the Rule appears to prohibit the
contractor from handling such information in certain ways and
thus would appear to require the contractor to flow down such
requirements to any third-party operator handling such
information on its behalf. There are seven basic safeguards that a
contractor must implement, each of which amounts to a common
sense precaution, or put differently, the avoidance of actions that
would put Government information at an unnecessarily high risk of
420
“exfiltration.” Examples include the following:
(1) Protecting unclassified Government information on public
computers or websites: Do not process unclassified
Government information on public computers (e.g., those
available for use by the general public in kiosks, hotel
business centers) or computers that do not have access
control . . . .
(2) Transmitting electronic information. Transmit email, text
messages . . . using technology and processes that provide
the best level of security and privacy available, given
facilities, conditions, and environment.

415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.

DFARS, supra note 407, at 38091–92.
Id. at 38090.
Id. at 38092.
Id.
Id. at 38093.
Id.
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....
421
(5) Sanitization. At a minimum, clear information on
media that has been used to process unclassified
Government information before external release or
422
disposal.
Each of the above-quoted “basic safeguarding” requirements
would appear, to varying extents, to be difficult, if not impossible,
to fulfill if the contractor or its outside legal counsel received
unclassified Government information, in connection with a DoD
contract that contained the “basic safeguarding” clause (DFARS
252.204-70XX), and processed and stored such information in a
cloud computing vendor’s servers subject to a typical standard
service level agreement. This would be particularly the case if such
agreement contained clauses similar to those discussed above in
Amazon’s Web Service Agreement (i.e., one that made the
customer responsible for information security that omitted any
requirement for the vendor to sanitize media that contained
customer data, or that did not commit to using any specified or
high standard of data security). If the cloud service level
agreement did not require the vendor to ensure that its servers had
“access controls,” the contractor and its outside legal counsel would
be barred by DFARS 252.204-70XX from having Government
information processed on the cloud service provider’s servers. If
the service level agreement did not require the vendor to
implement the “best level of security . . . available, given facilities,
conditions, and environment” (a rather ambiguous standard), then
the contractor and its outside legal counsel could not transmit
electronic information to each other through their service vendor’s
cloud.
And if the service level agreement contained no
requirement that matched or incorporated by reference the
DFARS 252.204-70XX requirement for clearing media that has
been used to process unclassified Government information before
disposal of such media, then the contractor and its outside legal
counsel would be prohibited from allowing any such information
421. The Cybersecurity Rule’s proposed text for DFARS 252.204-70XX defines
“clearing information” as:
[A] level of media sanitization that would protect the confidentiality of
information against a robust keyboard attack. Simple deletion of items would
not suffice for clearing. For example, overwriting is an acceptable method
for clearing media. The security goal of the overwriting process is to
replace written data with random data.
Id. at 38092 (emphasis added).
422. Id.
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to be uploaded to their service vendor’s cloud. Simple deletion of
the data would violate the “clearing” requirement—overwriting of
the data, or a similarly rigorous method, would need to be required
423
Thus, the current standard service level
of the vendor.
agreement for cloud computing is inconsistent with, and an
impediment to, a contractor’s obligations to implement and
maintain “basic safeguarding” for unclassified DoD information.
Neither the contractor nor its outside legal counsel could permit
any such information to be uploaded to a cloud if the governing
agreement were the current standard service level agreement,
without putting the contractor at risk of breaching its contractual
obligations to the Government under DFARS 252.204-70XX. It
also would put its outside legal counsel at risk of violating
professional ethical obligations, including to provide “competent
representation” and to maintain “confidentiality” of the client’s
information.
The “enhanced safeguarding” requirements set significantly
higher standards for security than the basic safeguarding
requirements impose. As a consequence, “enhanced safeguarding”
creates commensurately greater obstacles for a contractor seeking
to comply with the contractual requirements of the proposed
DFARS clause 252.204-70YY and for its outside legal counsel
seeking to fulfill applicable ethical obligations under NYRPC or the
Model Code. Proposed DFARS 252.204-70YY directly applies to a
contractor’s information system “operated . . . for, the Contractor”
and thus to any cloud computing system used by the contractor for
processing or storage of unclassified DoD information. Note that
DoD contractors would be barred from processing or storing
classified DoD information in the cloud, because doing so would
almost certainly bring the contractor into noncompliance with the
applicable requirements of National Industrial Security Program
(NISP) Operating Manual (NISPOM), which establishes the
requirements for all government contractors for the handling of
424
The “enhanced safeguarding”
classified information.
requirements apply to seven categories of unclassified DoD
information, including:
• Information designated as “Critical Program Information,”
423. See id. (defining “clearing information”).
424. The currently applicable NISPOM is the February 2006 version. U.S.
DEP’T OF DEF., NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM (NISP), DEF. SECURITY
SERVICE, available at http://www.dss.mil/isp/fac_clear/download_nispom.html
(last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
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defined as elements of a “research, development, or
acquisition program, that, if compromised, could cause
significant degradation in mission effectiveness; shorten the
expected combat-effective life of the system; reduce
technological advantage; significantly alter program direction;
or enable an adversary to defeat, counter, copy, or reverse
425
or as “critical
engineer the technology or capability”;
426
information”;
• Information subject to export controls under the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and Export
427
Administration Regulations (EAR);
• Information designated for controlled access and
dissemination (e.g., “For Official Use Only,” “Sensitive But
Unclassified,” “Proprietary”);
• Technical data, computer software, and certain other technical
428
information designated by DoD directives; and
• Personally identifiable information, including information
protected pursuant to the Privacy Act and the Health
429
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).
Because those categories include information covered by the
ITAR, EAR, HIPAA, as well as information that qualifies as
“Proprietary” or as technical data and computer software, virtually
all DoD contractors and subcontractors would have such
information on their systems. If awarded a contract containing the
Cybersecurity Rule’s proposed clause 252.204-70YY, such
contractors would need to implement policies and procedures to
ensure fulfillment of the “enhanced safeguarding” requirements.
There are, however, several of the “enhanced safeguarding”
requirements that would be difficult, if not impossible, for a
contractor to fulfill if it allowed such information to be processed
or stored on the cloud under cloud vendors’ current, standard
service-level or customer agreements. The contractor must
• Implement, at a minimum, the security controls identified in
425. DFARS, supra note 407, at 38093. Such information is designated in
accordance with DoD Instruction 5200.39. Id.
426. Id. Such information is designated in accordance with DoD Directive
5205.02. Id.
427. Id. at 38093.
428. The applicable directives are DoD Directive 5230.24, Distribution
Statements on Technical Documents (D.O.D 1987), and DoD Directive 5230.25
(D.O.D. 1984), Withholding of Unclassified Technical Data from Public
Disclosure. DFARS, supra note 407, at 38092–94.
429. Id. at 38094.
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NIST Special Publication (“SP”) 800-53, set forth in a table in
430
the Enhanced Safeguarding clause of DFARS 252.204-70YY;
• Procure and use only DoD-approved identity authentication
431
credentials for authentication to DoD information systems;
• Report to the DoD “within 72 hours of discovery of any cyber
incident . . . that affects DoD information resident on or
transiting through the Contractor’s unclassified information
432
systems”; and
• Take specific actions in response to a reported cyber incident.
The contractor must
 “Conduct an immediate review of its unclassified network
for evidence of intrusion . . .”;
 Identify specific DoD information accessed by the
intrusion;
 Preserve and protect “images of known affected
information systems and all relevant monitoring/packet
capture data until DoD has received the image and
completes its analysis, or declines interest”; and
 Cooperate with the DoD Damage Assessment
433
Management Office to identify systems compromised.
Cloud vendors’ current standard-service-level or customer
agreements would not enable a contractor and the contractor’s
outside legal counsel to fulfill such requirements. Since such
agreements omit any obligation for the cloud vendor to report to
the customer any data breach or intrusion or to allow for postintrusion investigations by the customer, the contractor and its
outside legal counsel could not fulfill the cyber intrusion reporting
obligations of the Cybersecurity Rule’s “enhanced safeguarding”
clause. Furthermore, the cloud vendor service-level agreements
would, in their current form, not enable a contractor and its
outside legal counsel to implement the required security controls
and identity authentication credentials.
It may be that the Cybersecurity Rule will be further revised in
response to comments to address the possibility of contractors
allowing the covered information to be processed and stored in the

430. Id. at 38094 tbl.1.
431. Id. at 38094.
432. Id. The clause specifies that reportable cyber incidents include those
“involving possible data exfiltration or manipulation or other loss or compromise
of DoD information resident on or transiting through its, or its subcontractors’,
unclassified information systems.” Id.
433. Id. at 30895.
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cloud, but unless such permissions are explicitly expressed in the
rule, it would not appear possible for a contractor to fulfill its
obligations under either the “basic safeguarding” or the “enhanced
safeguarding” contract clauses. For the same reasons, a DoD
contractor’s outside counsel could not allow information from the
contractor, subject to the Cybersecurity Rule, to be processed or
stored in the cloud without putting its client at risk of breaching
the Cybersecurity Rule’s contract clauses, and, by doing so, putting
counsel at risk of failing to fulfill its professional ethical obligations.
As a result, a lawyer or law firm whose clients include, or might
come to include, a DoD contractor or subcontractor would need to
take extraordinary precautions to avoid allowing such client
information from being included, processed, or stored in the
cloud, if counsel had decided to use cloud computing services.
Although we have drawn this illustration from the DoD, because of
its apparent commitment to implementing a final version of the
Cybersecurity Rule in the near future, similar regulatory obligations
could be imposed by other federal or state agencies. Such
obligations could make it difficult and costly for a lawyer or law
firm if they belatedly reconsider whether it was prudent to use
cloud computing for processing and storing client confidential
information.
l. Potential Ethical Risks from Emerging Technology that
Causes Digital Data to Self-Destruct
Computer scientists at the University of Washington developed
a research prototype version of a technology, referred to as
“Vanish,” which encrypts digital records (including documents and
e-mails), but also enables the author to set a time after which the
434
Some web services reportedly already
digital data self-destructs.
offer to perform a similar function, and “electronic devices like
FLASH memory chips have added this capability for protecting
stored data by automatically erasing it after a specified period of
435
time.” With the Vanish technology, the digital data would have a
fairly precise time frame within which the data would cease to exist.
The subject digital data, such as a file, an e-mail, or an instant
message, is “encapsulated” in what the researchers termed a
434. Geambasu et al., supra note 339, at 1.
435. See John Markoff, New Technology to Make Digital Data Disappear on Purpose,
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 21, 2009, at D3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07
/21/science/21crypto.html.
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“vanishing data object” or “VDO.” This VDO prevents the data
contents from persisting beyond a specified time, causing it to selfdestruct, thus averting it from becoming “a source of retroactive
436
The researchers claim that the selfinformation leakage.”
destruction prevents an “attacker” from accessing the data once it
has been “encapsulated” in a VDO. Regardless of whether the
VDO is copied, transmitted, or stored in the Internet, it becomes
unreadable after a predefined period of time even if an attacker
retroactively obtains both a pristine copy of the VDO from before its
expiration and all of the user’s past persistent cryptographic keys
437
and passwords.
The specified period of the digital data’s persistence, once
encapsulated in a VDO, is quite limited—between eight and nine
hours:
By default, the data will be available with high probability
for 8 hours after its encapsulation and will become
unavailable with high probability after 9 hours. During the
one hour between 8 and 9 hours, the data’s state is
undetermined: it could be available or unavailable,
although it typically remains available for close to 9
438
hours.
Once that time expires, the digital data become irretrievable from
“all Web sites, inboxes, outboxes, backup sites and home
439
The
computers. Not even the sender could retrieve them.”
process by which the digital data is encrypted and timed to selfdestruct is as follows:
The Vanish prototype washes away data using the natural
turnover, called “churn,” on large file-sharing systems
known as peer-to-peer networks. For each message that it
sends, Vanish creates a secret key, which it never reveals to
the user, and then encrypts the message with that key. It
then divides the key into dozens of pieces and sprinkles
those pieces on random computers that belong to
worldwide file-sharing networks, the same ones often used
to share music or movie files. The file-sharing system
constantly changes as computers join or leave the
436. Geambasu et al., supra note 339, at 4.
437. Id.
438. Jared Moya, “Vanish” Uses BitTorrent to Make Data Disappear, ZEROPAID
(Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.zeropaid.com/news/86800/vanish-uses-bittorrent-tomake-data-disappear.
439. See Press Release, Hannah Hickey, Univ. of Wash., This Article Will SelfDestruct: A Tool to Make Online Personal Data Vanish (July 21, 2009), available at
http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2009-07/uow-taw072109.php.
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network, meaning that over time parts of the key become
permanently inaccessible. Once enough key parts are lost,
440
the original message can no longer be deciphered.
Because the researchers developed Vanish to avoid the risks
arising from the fact that “users’ sensitive data can persist ‘in the
cloud’ indefinitely . . . sometimes even after the user’s account
441
termination,” the main requirement for use of the technology is
442
and
connectivity to the Internet during the “encapsulating”
443
“decapsulating” of a VDO.
The Vanish prototype deployed exists in three applications,
each posing different ethical challenges to lawyers and law firms
who are asked by clients to advise on the adoption and use of the
technology. In one application, “FireVanish,” the technology is
implemented in a Firefox browser plugin for Gmail and enables
the sender to encapsulate Gmail-based e-mails that could be
“decapsulated” by the recipient, provided the recipient does so
before the VDO times out and causes the e-mail to self-destruct.
In a second application, “FireVanish Extension for the Web,”
the technology is implemented through a Firefox browser plugin
that enables the user to “select text in any Web page input box,
right click on that selected text, and cause FireVanish to replace
444
By that process, a
that text in-line with an encapsulated VDO.”
user can cause “messages on Facebook, documents on Google docs,
or instant messages on Google Talk” to self-destruct when the VDO
445
time limit expires.
In the third, and probably the most ethically problematic
application, “Vanishing Files,” the technology could create a “selfdestructing trash bin” or self-destructing Microsoft Word
446
Files moved to a computer’s “trash bin” or that have
autosave.
been backed up using Word’s autosave would be collectively or
individually wrapped in a VDO, and when the VDO expires, the
cleartext of each file would be deleted from the storage disk and
447
the VDO would be stored in place of the files. Apparently, a very
important arena for concern, a subsequent mirror image made of
440.
441.
442.
443.
VDO).
444.
445.
446.
447.

Id.
Moya, supra note 438.
Geambasu et al., supra note 339, at 10.
Id. at 7 (explaining decapsulation as recovering cleartext back from a
Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the disk as part of a court-supervised e-discovery or a government
investigation would be unable to recover the cleartext of the files,
for as the researchers explain (referring to the party seeking the
data as an “attacker”):
This ensures that, even if an attacker copies the raw bits
from the laptop’s disks after the timeout, the data within
the VDO will be unavailable. Like traditional file
encryption, Vanishing Files relies upon existing
techniques for securely shredding data stored on disks or
448
memory.
Although the researchers claim that, with their technology,
“users can regain control over the lifetimes of their Web objects,
such as private messages on Facebook, documents on Google Docs,
or private photos on Flickr,” their paper on the subject shows
seemingly subversive interest in helping litigants evade the reach of
449
For example, their paper
lawyers and e-discovery processes.
provides the following text to a figure depicting the operation of
the technology:
Ann wants to discuss her marital relationship with her
friend, Carla, but does not want copies stored by
intermediate services to be used in a potential child
dispute trial in the future . . . . The screenshot shows how
Carla reads a vanishing email that Ann has already sent to
450
her using our Vanish Email Firefox plugin for Gmail.
The accompanying figure shows Ann and Carla linked by Hotmail
and Gmail servers that are surrounded by a “cloud” outside of
which is a frowning emoticon labeled “Husband’s lawyer” and
above which are the words “Future subpoena,” suggesting that the
technology could enable the sender to evade or circumvent court
451
Moreover, in a section entitled
ordered discovery processes.
“Avoiding Retroactive Privacy Attacks,” the researchers reveal that
undermining the legal discovery process is actually one of their
452
They do not
primary motivations for development of Vanish.
appear to have a high opinion of lawyers and judges’ efforts to
develop ways to manage e-discovery, or of the salient importance to
fair trials or the access to, and admissibility of, contemporaneously
generated written records. As they explain:
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.

Id.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id.
See id. at 11.
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Attackers. Our motivation is to protect against retroactive
data disclosures, e.g., in response to a subpoena, court
order, malicious compromise of archived data, or
accidental leakage. For some of these cases, such as the
subpoena, the party initiating the subpoena is the obvious
“attacker.” The final attacker could be a user’s exhusband’s lawyer, an insurance company, or a prosecutor.
But executing a subpoena is a complex process involving
many other actors . . . . For our purposes, we define all the
involved actors as the “adversary.”
....
Deployment Decisions . . . . Vanish is oriented
towards personal users concerned that old emails,
Facebook messages, text messages, or files might come
453
back to “bite” them . . . .
The researchers acknowledge that lawyers have advised them that,
as they express it,
‘Vanish is ahead of the law.’ Specifically, Vanish in some
commercial or government settings may raise interesting
issues related to eDiscovery and public record laws.
....
. . . [I]t is not absolutely clear what the legal implications
of using Vanish might be.
....
To the best of our knowledge, however, it is OK to
use Vanish for personal purposes in the U.S. assuming
that the user is not involved in a legal proceeding nor is
expecting to be involved in a legal proceeding . . . . Some
legal scholars have, however, observed that – because of
their ephemeral nature – VDOs by design are more like
‘conversations’ than ‘documents.’ Data retention laws may
therefore not apply to Vanish. However, we stress again
454
that we are not lawyers.

453. Id. at 11–12.
454. Frequently Asked Questions, VANISH [hereinafter Old_vanish_faq.html]
(previously published copies of the Vanish FAQ on file with the authors). The
authors would like to thank Professor Geambasu for providing us with a copy of
the “old_vanish_faq.html” file and for re-posting the paper she and her University
of Washington colleagues wrote in 2009 after our inquiry to her about its
whereabouts. For some additional analysis of Vanish, see Self Destructing Digital
Data, P2PNET, http://www.p2pnet.net/story/26730 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
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Analysis of Ethical Issues

The developers of the new self-destructing digital data
technology are clearly aware that use of such technology might
cause the destruction of electronic records during a legal
proceeding, or in anticipation of a lawsuit, or during investigation,
and would raise serious ethical issues for any lawyer advising a
client, because such actions would likely result in a judicial finding
of spoliation and possibly severe sanctions. It is troubling that the
researchers do not appear to recognize the value of
contemporaneously generated records, and the greater accuracy
and credibility that such records have when compared to a witness
testifying on the basis of limited (and potentially biased) memory
months or years after an event as to what may or may not have been
communicated between parties on matters at issue in the litigation
or investigation. Given the widespread reportage of parties
suffering adversely from introduction into evidence of their
455
electronic communications, it should be anticipated that selfdestructing digital data technology could come into popular use
rather rapidly. Since the technology is already available, it is
prudent to consider the potential ethical issues before clients
become tempted to use it without consulting legal counsel.
If a lawyer is representing a client in a lawsuit or government
investigation, or a client who reasonably anticipates the start of a
lawsuit or government investigation, the lawyer should not advise
the client to use any technology that would cause a communication
of potential relevance to the lawsuit or investigation to self-destruct.
Doing so would have the effect of suppressing evidence that the
client is required to preserve and may be required to produce in
the lawsuit or investigation. To assist in such conduct would likely
violate NYRPC Rule 3.4(a)(1), which mandates that a lawyer shall
not “suppress any evidence that the lawyer or the client has a legal
456
obligation to reveal or produce.”
MRPC Rule 3.4(a) contains a slightly different mandate. The
455. See Tracey Tyler, Email Evidence is Changing the Law, TORONTO STAR (June
9, 2007), http://www.thestar.com/news/article/223386, for a non-comprehensive
account of cases in which e-mail evidence has been determinative. As John M.
Barkett observes, “[o]ne example that occurs frequently is the production of
privileged records. As one commentator explains, ‘E-discovery increases the
potential for inadvertent production of privileged information. Producing parties
typically do not have mechanisms in place to retrieve, restore, and cost-effectively
identify electronically stored information that is privileged.’” JOHN M. BARKETT,
THE ETHICS OF E-DISCOVERY 19 (A.B.A. 2009).
456. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 3.4(a)(1) (2011).
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MRPC states that a lawyer shall not “unlawfully obstruct another
party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a
457
document or other material having potential evidentiary value.”
MRPC Rule 3.4(a) clearly encompasses the preservation of
evidence based on the anticipation of litigation. The stated
458
purpose of the rule is to maintain fair competition in litigation.
VDOs, clearly undermine the purpose of MRPC Rule 3.4(a).
There would appear to be little or no genuine support for the
researchers’ claim that written communications that have been
“encapsulated” as VDOs are “more like ‘conversations’ than
459
‘documents.’” A lawyer who relied on that argument as the basis
for his or her advice that such records were not subject to data
retention duties under the applicable federal rules would be in
violation of the prohibitions against suppressing evidence that the
client has a legal obligation to produce contained in NYRPC Rule
3.4(a)(1) and MRPC Rule 3.4(a).
If the lawyer was aware that such an argument was without
merit, then in advising a client to use a digital record self-destruct
technology during a “litigation hold,” for example, the lawyer also
would be at risk of violating either NYRPC Rule 3.2 or MRPC Rule
3.2 on delay of litigation. NYRPC Rule 3.2 states: “In representing a
client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial
purpose other than delay or prolong the proceeding or to cause
460
MRPC Rule 3.2 contains a broader
needless expense.”
requirement that a “lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to
461
expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.”
MRPC Rule 3.2 was intended to encompass tactics used for the sole
purpose of frustrating an opposing party’s attempt to seek redress,
even where the conduct would otherwise not bring the lawyer into
462
conflict with the rules of the court. In defending a client’s use of
vanishing data objects, a lawyer must therefore be aware of the
boundaries of the lawyer’s own ethical requirement in court.
More problematic are the potential ethical issues that might
arise in the context of a corporate client asking whether it should
adopt a digital data self-destruct technology for use in sending
confidential communications, whether those are internal or with
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (2007) (emphasis added).
See id. cmt. 1.
Old_vanish_faq.html, supra note 454.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200, R. 3.2.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.2 (2007).
See id. at cmt. 1.
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strategic allies in ongoing transactions. In the era before clients
generated electronic records when they sent written
communications, counsel would sometimes advise that clients not
make any notes on such documents and that they place their notes
instead on Post-Its that the client could remove a few days or weeks
later. However, the new digital data self-destruct technology would
affect the durability of the basic communication itself, not merely
notes concerning it. And since the durability is limited to a mere
eight or nine hours, the technology may make a poor choice for
the kind of corporate communications needed for transactions and
463
negotiations. There would be many situations in which a client is
far better served by creating a durable communication, because it
may need such a record as evidence to support its position in the
event of litigation.
However, what if the client has started to become
apprehensive about a transaction that could turn into a legal
dispute, but has not developed so clearly in that direction as to
require the issuance of a “litigation hold”? The client wants to
communicate internally about what it describes as “litigation
avoidance” strategies, but which also contain elements of strategies
to position the client in the event that litigation breaks out.
Clients, of course, can be advised to communicate orally, but not in
writing, in order to avoid creating a written record that could be
misinterpreted or adverse to the client and that might have to be
produced during an ensuing discovery. In such circumstances
could counsel advise the client to make selective use of a digital
data’s self-destruct technology to ensure that any written
communications that might otherwise be discoverable would
destruct within eight or nine hours and, thus, not even exist by the
time a litigation hold would be issued?
Advising a client to avoid making a written record does not
promote a course of action that results in spoliation of evidence.
Similarly, advising a client to implement and adhere to a
“document retention” policy with routine destruction of
documents in accordance with an established timetable (such as
purging all records that are older than a set number of years) does
not constitute spoliation of evidence, unless the lawyer fails to
ensure that when a litigation hold is issued the document retention
463. See Geambasu et al., supra note 339, at ¶ 5.1 (“Nodes further remove from
their caches all values whose store timestamp is more than 8 hours old. This
process has a 1 hour grade period. The originator node must re-push its 8 hours
old (index, value) pairs if it wishes to ensure their persistence past 8 hours.”).
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policy is suspended promptly and throughout the client’s
enterprise. Those are quite different from a hypothetical in which
the client asks for its lawyer’s approval of the use of a digital data
self-destruct technology for written communications that may
become relevant to a law suit whose potential is the subject of such
communications. Here the conduct, while perhaps not illegal,
appears to cross the line into the unethical. To recommend the
use of such technology (which is precisely the situation in which
the researchers appear to recommend that customers use their
technology) would pose a serious risk of violating both MRPC Rule
8.4(c) and (d) as well as NYRPC Rule 8.4 (c) and (d), both of
which mandate that a lawyer or law firm shall not “engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”
or “engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
464
justice.”
The ethical issues become potentially more perilous if the
digital data self-destruct technology is used to eradicate and remove
all traces of files moved to a computer’s “trash bin.” Clients facing a
government investigation or a lawsuit and harboring doubts about
the use that might be made by the government or adversaries of
certain files might give serious consideration to making a “last
minute” sweep of such files into a computer’s “trash bin” that has
been equipped with a “Vanishing Files” feature. The most likely
ethical risk here for the client’s lawyer(s) and law firm is not that
the lawyers or law firm would have advised the client to take such
action, but that the lawyers or law firm, aware of the technology
and of the client’s adoption of it, failed to oversee the “litigation
hold” with sufficient vigilance to prevent any personnel of the
client from causing such files to be encapsulated in a VDO and
letting them to self-destruct when that VDO expires a few hours
later. Because a client’s litigation or trial counsel have a duty to
oversee, and not merely to help issue, a “litigation hold” notice
through the client’s enterprise, and since counsel are also
responsible for familiarizing themselves with the client’s
information technologies, such as those that perform back-ups and
overwrites of electronic records (and to avert inadvertent
destruction of potentially relevant records), such duties would
appear to extend also to knowing of the existence, operation, and
use of a digital data self-destruction technology.
Failing to develop that knowledge and to avert the misuse of it
464.

N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c), 8.4(d) (2009).
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to circumvent electronic discovery obligations would create
grounds for a finding of spoliation, but could constitute a violation
of NYRPC Rules 3.4(a)(1) (suppressing evidence), 8.4(c) (conduct
involving deceit), and 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice). Such conduct also would implicate the
corresponding MRPC rules.
ii. Considerations and Precautions
In light of the potentially disruptive effect that digital data selfdestruction technology could have on a client’s fulfillment of its
electronic discovery duties and the adverse consequences that
could result, it would be prudent for lawyers and law firms to
familiarize themselves with the technology and to monitor closely
its development and use. Clients that may be considering adopting
the technology should be encouraged to develop clear policies for
the use and cessation of use of the technology in order to avoid the
risk of spoliation. Similarly, it would be prudent for law firms to
develop internal policies that would educate associates who might
fail to appreciate the risks of advising that a client use such
technology when doing so might potentially be a disservice to the
client, but might create ethical risks for the associate, the partner
supervising the associate, and the law firm. Moreover, although the
researchers use highly persuasive metaphors to tout the technology
(e.g., using Vanish is like “writing a message in the sand at low tide,
where it can be read for only a few hours before the tide comes in
465
and permanently washes it away”), it is important to notice that
such metaphors can mislead as well as persuade, and that to the
extent that they suggest that use of the technology is simply a
“conversation” and not the creation of a “document” it is seriously
misleading and ethically hazardous for lawyers and law firms who
might not closely scrutinize the technology in the context of
electronic discovery obligations.
Most importantly, the emergence of digital data selfdestruction technology brings with it an implicit duty for lawyers
and law firms (especially litigation counsel but also others who may
advise during a pre-litigation phase) to familiarize themselves with
the technology, the ways in which its touted capabilities may
encourage a client to use the technology to the client’s serious
disadvantage (since spoliation often turns out to be a form of selfsabotage), and the extent to which the client may have made such
465.

Hickey, supra note 439.
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technology available to its personnel. The risks of misuse of such
technology arise directly from the kinds of claims that the
researchers make for their technology: that it can spare the user
from getting “bitten” by correspondence and documents authored
by the user. That view is not only short-sighted, but it also seriously
misperceives and distorts the legal obligations that many corporate
clients have to preserve records of transactions and to preserve
potentially relevant evidence in anticipation of litigation or
government investigation.
Part of understanding a new
communications technology is becoming aware of its potential
appeal. Counsel also needs to understand that clients may be
tempted to adopt the new technology in the mistaken belief that
they are thereby going to escape the consequences of
communications that may harm them in litigation.
V. WAVES OF RECENT CYBER-ATTACKS HAVE CHANGED THE
INFORMATION SECURITY LANDSCAPE
Prior to submitting this article, several high-profile security
466
The rapidity and intensity of such incidents
incidents occurred.
suggests that cyber service vendors and subscribers of their services
may be underestimating the vulnerabilities of, threats to, and risks
for a company’s digital assets (1) stored on its premises (but that
remain accessible by attackers through the Internet because the
storage media of such assets are not “air gapped” from it) and (2)
stored in the cloud. These reported incidents and the trends that
they suggest make it increasingly difficult for an organization to
make a definitive risk assessment for its digital assets, because such
incidents may provide evidence of assumptions and analyses that
have obsolesced much earlier than anticipated and may need to be
updated before making a major decision that relies upon them. As
some commentators noted in mid-June 2011:
The roster of hack victims over the last two weeks has
been spectacular: the International Monetary Fund, the
Central Intelligence Agency, Sony, the Turkish
government, Citibank and the US Senate inter alia. If it
wasn’t obvious before, events in cyberspace have made it
abundantly clear there are only two types of company in
the world—those that know they’ve been hacked and those that
466. See, e.g., Ian Sherr, Hackers Breach Second Sony Service, WALL ST. J., May 3,
2011, at B1; Jonathan Soble, Sony Battles Further Hacker Attacks, FIN. TIMES, May 25,
2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/d4b34df2-86a1-11e0-9d41-00144feabdc0
.html#axzz1e5e4QEHR.
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don’t . . . . It is axiomatic that companies should have the
security of their electronic networks at the top of their
agenda . . . . [Notwithstanding the latest governmental
and military safeguards] networked computer systems
467
have never been more vulnerable.
These attacks should dispel remaining doubts that enterprises are
vulnerable to cyberattacks. The attacks also reveal that public
clouds add to the vulnerability of enterprises that migrate data to
the cloud. As another commentator observed:
Recent high-profile hacking attacks, such as the theft of
more than 100m customers’ details from Sony and a fourday outage at Amazon that took down thousands of
websites, have done nothing to reassure companies about
the security of cloud computing . . . . Ryan Rubin, U.K.
head of security and privacy at Protiviti, an IT security
company says: ‘There aren’t many people putting missioncritical data in the cloud. The crown jewels—customer
records, for example—are still very much embedded in
the organization.’ A director at one London investment
bank says: ‘We use the cloud for things such as e-mail. We
468
would never put our client services on it.’
As a result, decisions involving transactions based on due
diligence assessments of the short- and long-term security of digital
assets now appear increasingly to resemble decisions in corporate
transactions where the findings of due diligence investigations
completed before the signing of definitive contractual agreements
are updated and reviewed to verify compliance with conditions for
closing the deal. Similarly, because the addition of an information
technology capability (whether it be in the form of a new web page,
mobile app, or cloud-based feature) creates the potential for
numerous new routes for attackers, it may be increasingly
important for negotiators of corporate transactions to include
consideration of a freeze on such additions or a closely monitored
and evaluated reporting of such additions between the signing and
the closing of major transactions. A recent observation by the chief
executive of Korea's Hyundai Capital further acknowledges the
growing risks of cyber attacks and the importance of technology
469
risk assessment in corporate planning.
467. Misha Glenny, We Must Learn How the Hackers Think, FIN. TIMES, June 17,
2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bf28f5a8-990d-11e0-acd2-00144feab49a
.html#axzz1XaLHYSKt (emphasis added).
468. Maija Palmer, supra note 7.
469. See supra text accompanying note 195.
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VI. MOST RECENT RECOMMENDATIONS FROM NIST
When boards of directors and their legal counsel try to
understand and assess the significance of security incidents at other
organizations and the ethical challenges such incidents may add to
an enterprise’s decisions concerning the use of web-based and
cloud-based communications, data processing, and storage, it
would be prudent for them to include in such a review the
comments and recommendations contained in NIST’s “Cloud
Computing Synopsis and Recommendations”, Special Publication
800-146 (the “Cloud Synopsis”). The Cloud Synopsis was published
in May 2011 as we were revising this article. Since time and space
constraints preclude a full discussion of the Cloud Synopsis, in this
part of the article, we summarize some of its most significant
observations and recommendations.
NIST’s Cloud Synopsis endeavors to describe the current types
of cloud computing and to discuss their strengths and weaknesses.
In doing so, the draft’s most significant contribution may be its
highlighting of certain problematic views of the cloud, starting with
NIST’s own earlier proposed definition of cloud computing.
“Attempts to describe cloud computing in general terms . . . have
been problematic because cloud computing is not a single kind of
system, but instead spans a spectrum of underlying technologies,
configuration possibilities, service models, and deployment
470
models.”
NIST’s Cloud Synopsis identifies the following security
considerations that businesses would be prudent to consider
carefully when deciding whether to move part or all of their digital
assets and digital processing into the hands of a cloud computing
service provider.
• Aggregated data: “Clouds . . . have potential to aggregate an
unprecedented quantity and variety of customer data in cloud
data centers. This potential vulnerability requires a high
degree of confidence and transparency that cloud providers
470. NIST CLOUD SYNOPSIS, supra note 13, at ES-1. The NIST Cloud Synopsis
now identifies five essential characteristics of cloud computing: on demand
service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity, and measured
service. Id. at 2-1. The NIST Cloud Synopsis elaborates on NIST’s definition of
cloud computing by describing three service models (cloud software as a service
(SaaS), cloud platform as a service (Paas), and cloud infrastructure as a service
(IaaS), together with four deployment models: private cloud, community cloud,
public cloud, and hybrid cloud. For more information about these characteristics,
see text accompanying notes 161 to 164, supra.
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471

•

•

•

can keep customer data isolated and protected.”
Reliance on web browsers: “Cloud users and administrators rely
heavily on Web browsers, so browser security failures can lead
472
The security risks may begin at
to cloud security breaches.”
the handshake. The subscriber’s browser and cloud provider’s
server start by negotiating a shared key and then use that key
to encrypt communications between the subscriber and the
cloud. However, this reliance on encryption offers only
limited protection, “because past implementation errors or
protocol flaws have enabled man-in-the-middle attacks that
could allow an attacker to hijack a subscriber’s cloud
473
Moreover, strong encryption is susceptible to
resources.
weakening by implementation errors, making “brute force
474
guessing attacks” more likely to succeed.
Importance of access boundaries: The NIST Cloud Synopsis adopts
the concept of “access boundaries to organize and characterize
475
NIST uses the
the different cloud deployment models.”
term to refer to both an external boundary (such as enforced,
in part, by firewalls) and more generically to boundaries
“between different privilege levels of running software, e.g.,
between applications and operating systems.”
NIST
emphasizes the need to avoid uncontrolled access paths—
those without sufficient access boundaries:
When uncontrolled paths to computing resources
exist, a security perimeter is weakened or may not
even exist. Pervasive wireless communications, e.g.,
are a threat to security perimeters since there may be
no reliable way to interpose a boundary controller
between external and internal entities. Similarly,
many organizations use mobile devices that are
sometimes connected within an organization’s
security perimeter, and sometimes exposed directly,
476
e.g., when on travel.
Superior security of physical separation over logistical separation: In
U.S.-based nuclear power plants, sensitive data such as that
related to the “design basis threat” and a plant’s countermeasures and safeguards are secured by ensuring that they are

471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.

Id. at ES-2.
Id.
Id. at 5-1.
Id. at 5-5.
Id. at 4-3.
Id. at 4-3, n.5.
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“air gapped” from the Internet and not allowed to be on
systems that communicate wirelessly.
Such practices
demonstrate the reliability of physical separation. Cloud
computing services, however, rely instead on logistical
separation for security, which is inherently less reliable. As
NIST’s Cloud Synopsis explains, “One aspect that is pervasive
in cloud systems, however, is reliance on ‘logistical separation’,
as opposed to ‘physical separation’ of user workloads, and the
use of logical mechanisms to protect subscriber resources . . .
[A]nd logical separation has not been shown to be as reliable
477
as physical separation . . . .”
• Software and missions that are unsuitable for SaaS: Decisions
concerning use of cloud computing should consider the
potential for a mismatch between the limits of cloud
computing and the needs of the user. As the NIST Cloud
Synopsis explains, “Different types of applications require
differing levels of system performance. For example, email is
generally tolerant of short service interruptions, but industrial
automation and real-time processing generally requires both
478
high performance and a high degree of predictability.” The
authors observe, however, that even e-mail is not always
tolerant of seemingly short delays. Certain company managers
in high tech enterprises are known to expect immediate
replies to their internal e-mail, which may become an
impossible to meet expectation for subordinates whose receipt
of replies are held up in a cloud computing message traffic
bottleneck. Moreover, a manager will have no reliable way of
verifying whether the delay was due to the subordinate or to
the cloud.
As the NIST Cloud Synopsis also noted,
“Subscribers may lack visibility into how clouds operate. If so,
they will likely be unable to tell if their services are being
479
undertaken and delivered in a secure manner.”
NIST’s Cloud Synopsis points out three key examples of
mismatches involving potential migration to public SaaS. First, are
operations required in real-time, such as flight control systems or
factory robot controls. Because such operations require precise
timing and coordination to complete tasks on reliable, recurrent
times, they are unsuitable for SaaS, which can offer only variable
response times. Moreover, additional delays and mis-timings can
occur as a result of “unavoidable round trip delays for messages to
480
be exchanged between SaaS subscribers and cloud providers.”
477.
478.
479.
480.

Id. at 8-7.
Id. at 8-1.
Id. at 8-5.
Id. at 5-8.
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Imagine a combat pilot or submarine executive officer looking at a
data display screen and suddenly realizing that the updates or
refresh rates have ceased to be predictable, rapid, and that they are
no longer making decisions based on real-time updates to the
tactical picture. Increasingly businesses operate in a similar
environment and such businesses should be cautious in placing
themselves and their decision makers in a position where they
believe they are acting upon real-time information when it is, in
fact, being significantly delayed in updates, is being refreshed at
irregular intervals, and may be obsolete at the time a critical
decision needs to be made based on such data.
Second, are bulk-subscriber operations, such as monitoring of
medical devices. These can generate suddenly high volumes of
data that become infeasible for transfers in real-time over wide area
networks to a SaaS provider. Businesses that need to be responsive
to developments in economic or political crises, such as the trading
of shares on a public exchange, might similarly find that the delays
in response time would prove so costly as to outweigh the
481
anticipated cost savings of migration to cloud computing.
Third, are mission critical operations where a failure would
impose intolerable consequences.
Because avoidance of
complexity is a key engineering strategy for reducing software
failures, such a strategy is ill-suited for SaaS applications, which
“depend on proper operation of a large and complex software
stack that includes a network” and there are “no guarantees” that
can be given that the “network will continue to provide acceptable
482
levels of service.”
• Cloud complexities increase vulnerabilities: Cloud computing
systems, by structure and operation, tend to be complex, and,
483
The
as a result “prone to failure and security compromise.”
marketing promises of cloud service providers can be tested by
comparing them to the disclaimers for reliability and security
that the same providers insist upon in their standard Service
Level Agreement, suggesting that the tendency of such systems
to fail and to be breached by attackers is too high for the
vendors themselves to accept and be financially responsible
for. Potential subscribers need to be aware of the inherent
weaknesses of cloud computing, which include the fact that:
[S]oftware that must accommodate complex
requirements such as concurrency, dynamic
configuration, and large scale computations, may
481.
482.
483.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
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exhibit higher defect densities than typical
commercial grade software. With this in mind, it is
important to understand that cloud systems, like all
complex computing systems, will contain flaws,
experience failures, and experience security
compromises. . . . [Therefore] techniques for
detecting failures, understanding their consequences,
isolating their effects, and remediating them, are
central to the wide-scale adoption of clouds . . . . The
technical means of providing the quality of service
promised are usually not disclosed to the subscriber,
thus raising questions about how subscribers can
verify that the promised quality of service level has
484
been provided.
Difficulty of measuring a cloud’s reliability: Any decision
concerning the migration to a cloud computing service should
be based, in part, on an evaluation of the reliability needed
and the reliability that the cloud computing service can be
depended on to provide.
Negotiating a Service Level
Agreement on that issue for a customer can be compromised
by the difficulties of measuring a cloud’s reliability, both
historically prior to the negotiations and during contract
performance. The sources of the difficulties, as the NIST
Cloud Synopsis explains, are as follows:
Reliability refers to the probability that a system will
offer failure-free service for a specified period of time
within the bounds of a specified environment. . . .
Note that measuring the reliability of a specific
cloud by the provider or subscriber will be difficult
for two reasons. First, a cloud may be a composition
of various components, each inheriting a particular
degree of reliability when it was measured as a
standalone entity. When these components are
combined the resulting reliability is difficult to
predict and may wind up being too course-grained
[sic]. Secondly, reliability measurement is a function
of an environment in which a cloud operates. . . . For
clouds, and most systems of significant scale, each
component has a specific reliability given a specific
context, and therefore understanding the union of
485
the contexts is complex and possibly intractable.
The authors recommend that Boards ask their counsel to test

484.
485.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 8-2.
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the marketing promises of cloud service providers by comparing
them to the disclaimers of reliability and security that the same
providers insist upon in their standard Service Level Agreements.
Where disclaimers of cloud performance undercut a promised level
of performance, it is reasonable to infer that the vendor anticipates
that the tendency of such systems to fail and be breached by
attackers is too high for the vendors themselves to afford and they,
therefore, shift this risk to customers. The customer's negotiation
of a Service Level Agreement should include a careful comparison
of the cloud vendor's performance promises and the cloud
vendor's disclaimers in order to ensure that the customer is not
tempted to believe it will be receiving performance promised by
one section that another section gives the vendor a basis for
denying. Where such inconsistencies exist they create the kind of
ambiguity that can deprive a customer of the benefits of its bargain
and increase the likelihood of serious disagreements with the
vendor that could lead to costly litigation. A customer should insist
on such inconsistencies being removed, and should be careful that
the price of the vendor's services are re-evaluated in light of the
results of the negotiation of such inconsistencies, since the benefits
may have been diminished to the point where the price needs
to be adjusted downward accordingly.
If those terms are
intractable, the assumptions on which the negotiations are based
are not verifiable. If a cloud’s performance levels cannot be
measured and verified, the customer may be paying for rights to
performance it will not be able to enforce.
VII. CONCLUSION
Web 2.0 communications technologies, cloud-based
applications, and cloud computing deserve careful review by
lawyers and law firms. Their rapid adoption may occur without a
full awareness of the potential ethical risks or without adequate
safeguards having been put in place to mitigate the likelihood that
the vulnerabilities may give rise to security risks and ethical
problems. The potential problems include:
• A lawyer’s use of Twitter to advertise the lawyer’s firm or
practice without including, as required under the NYRPC,
“attorney advertising.”
• A lawyer’s use of Twitter to make extrajudicial comments
concerning an ongoing trial in which the lawyer is
participating and that may have a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the
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matter.
A law firm associate receives a “tweet” announcing a political
rally and believes that she will be participating in a political
demonstration, but it turns into a “flash mob” (like those that
recently occurred in the U.K.) and she is arrested for having
re-tweeted the invitation and contributing to the ensuing riot,
injuries, and property damage.
• A lawyer’s posting on a LinkedIn page a description of the
lawyer as a “specialist” in a particular field or as “specializing”
in such field without meeting the stringent conditions for such
terms under the NYRPC.
• A lawyer’s private Facebook page used in a manner that
486
reflects adversely on the lawyer’s character.
• A lawyer’s use of Facebook to communicate with a party
represented by counsel without that counsel’s consent.
• A lawyer’s posting of an entry in a blog noting that a particular
defendant has been charged with a crime, but failing to add a
statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation
and that the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless
proven guilty.
These situations and numerous others have the potential to cause
easily overlooked ethical issues under applicable rules of
professional conduct.
Counsel will need to monitor the ever-changing security
environment of social networking sites. One method for such
monitoring is to observe how the security environment is perceived
by security experts engaged in efforts to test the cloud platforms for
vulnerabilities. Other organizations treat the security of the data
they possess as among the highest of priorities. Reports by such
experts can provide the basis for due diligence examinations of
prospective vendors of cloud services under consideration by a law
487
firm. A second method for monitoring the security environment
•

486. Material that may reflect adversely on a lawyer’s character or involve
disclosure of confidential information can be posted even without a lawyer’s direct
involvement, such as by a member of the lawyer’s family who has access and
authorization to place information on a Facebook page. See, e.g., MI6 Boss in
Facebook Entry Row, BBC NEWS (July 5, 2009, 10:34 GMT), http://news.bbc.co
.uk/2/hi/8134807.stm (noting that a British diplomat’s personal life details,
including information about his children and the location of the family’s flat, were
posted on Facebook by spouse).
487. Such reports could include those from security conferences where
findings of security deficiencies are announced and explained. See, e.g., Joseph
Menn, Data Security Services Under a Cloud, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2009,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5aa4f33e-7fc4-11de-85dc-00144feabdc0.html
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is to observe the extent that such organizations have assessed the
risks of social networking sites as unacceptably high. Despite the
security precautions, such assessments should alert law firms and
lawyers of the need to audit the security of the use of such sites by
their personnel to ensure that the safeguards in place are
reasonable in light of the risks recognized by organizations that
have concerns for the safety of their data. There is, unfortunately,
no existing single standard or one organization that sets a “gold
standard” for risk assessments of social networking sites, cloudbased applications, or cloud computing. Moreover, organizations
that have a high regard for the safety of their data and personnel
are currently drawing conflicting conclusions with respect to
whether such risks are tolerable or intolerable. For example, on
August 9, 2009, the Marine Corps issued a one-year ban on use by
its personnel of social networking sites (SNS) (even if access was
through a virtual private network), citing the unacceptably high
risks that such sites introduce:
THESE INTERNET SITES IN GENERAL ARE A PROVEN
HAVEN FOR MALICIOUS ACTORS AND CONTENT
AND ARE PARTICULARLY HIGH RISK DUE TO
INFORMATION EXPOSURE, USER GENERATED
CONTENT AND TARGETING BY ADVERSARIES. THE
VERY NATURE OF SNS CREATES A LARGER ATTACK
AND
EXPLOITATION
WINDOW,
EXPOSES
UNNECESSARY INFORMATION TO ADVERSARIES
AND
PROVIDES
AN
EASY
CONDUIT
FOR
INFORMATION LEAKAGE THAT PUTS OPSEC,
COMSEC, PERSONNEL AND THE MCEN AT AN
ELEVATED RISK OF COMPROMISE. EXAMPLES OF
INTERNET SNS SITES INCLUDE FACEBOOK,
488
MYSPACE, AND TWITTER.
Four days earlier, on August 5, 2009, the U.K. Ministry of
Defence (MoD) announced a policy that, contrary to that which
was issued by the Pentagon, encouraged its personnel to “make full
(discussing security problems presented at the Black Hat USA security
conference).
488. Immediate Ban of Internet Social Networking Sites (SNS) on Marine Corps
Enterprise Network (MCEN) NIPRNET, MARINES (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www
.marines.mil/news/messages/pages/maradmin0458-09.aspx. See generally David
Gelles, Marines Ban Social Networking Sites, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009, http://www
.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/6bc60434-812f-11de-92e700144feabdc0.html
#axzz1XaLHYSKt (reporting on the Pentagon’s concerns with the use of social
networking sites, including incautious use by members of Congress when making
confidential visits to U.S. military installations).
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use of online presences” available through SNS, “but within certain
489
In order to
limits to protect security, reputation and privacy.”
promote that policy, the MoD published “Online Engagement
490
Guidelines” for such activities.
As Web 2.0 technology becomes more deeply entrenched in
commercial and corporate enterprises, lawyers and law firms need
to keep abreast of the changes in the legal rules and their
interpretation as applied to such technology. For example, the
E.U.’s Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (“Working Party”)
in June 2009 issued an opinion on “online social networking” that
noted, among other points, that the Data Protection Directive
(“Directive”) applies to social network sites, even if its headquarters
491
are located outside the European Economic Administration.
Moreover, a law firm’s associates who use an online social
networking site can become responsible for fulfilling data
controller responsibilities under the Directive if such an associate,
as a user of the social network, “takes an informed decision to
extend access beyond self-selected ‘friends’ [then] data controller
492
responsibilities come into force.” U.S. law firms with offices in
Europe, and European law firms with offices in the United States,
may find that the Working Party’s opinion on that issue may
necessitate a review of the policies such firms have adopted for use
of social networks by their associates. Additionally, it is prudent to
counsel clients to make similar reviews of their policies for
employees’ use of online social networks.
In addition, the increased use of Web 2.0 communications
raises the risks that clients, their counsel, or both, will find that
their activities have unexpectedly come within the jurisdictional
reach of foreign jurisdictions, subjecting them to potentially
adverse consequences. If a law firm or lawyer fails to apprise a
client of such risks in circumstances where counsel knew of the
facts that made those risks apparent, ethical issues might arise
489. Online Engagement Guidelines, UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, 1–2 (Aug. 5, 2009),
http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/D2AC8314-3B15-4DEB-A7696C85AF4BDA80/0/20090805UMODOnlineEngagementGuidelinesVersion10.pdf.
490. Id.
491. Press Release, Article 29 Working Party, Article 29 Data Prot. Working
Party (June 25, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies
/privacy/news/docs/pr_25_06_09_en.pdf (rendering an opinion on online social
networking).
492. Opinion 5/2009 on Online Social Networking, Article 29 Data Prot.
Working Party, at 6 (June 12, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice
/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp163_en.pdf (discussing access to profile
information).
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concerning the competency of the representation. Although there
may be instances in which the electronic communications at issue
may not have originated with the person alleged to have sent them,
instant messages and text messages have been deemed admissible
by appellate courts when the appropriate foundation has been laid
493
Examples of parties
(e.g., through circumstantial evidence).
surprised by the jurisdictional consequences of their use of
electronic communications technologies include the following:
• A senior investment officer of the Montana Board of
Investments (MBOI) negotiated through a series of instant
messaging exchanges an agreement for a $15 million sale of its
client’s holdings of Pennzoil bonds to Deutsche Bank
494
When MBOI
Securities, Inc. (“DB”) in New York.
subsequently cancelled the sale, DB sued for breach of
495
MBOI moved for
contract in New York Supreme Court.
dismissal, contending that New York’s “long-arm statute” did
496
The
not reach MBOI in Montana for these activities.
supreme court granted the motion and dismissed for lack of
497
498
On
personal jurisdiction. The appellate division reversed.
MBOI’s appeal, the court of appeals noted that New York’s
“‘long-arm statute” was a “single act statute” and emphasized
that “proof of one transaction in New York is sufficient to
invoke jurisdiction, even though the defendant never enters
New York, so long as the defendant’s activities here were
purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the
499
transaction and the claim asserted.’”
• A California client who communicated with her New York
lawyer via telephone, faxes, and e-mails created a continuing
relationship with that lawyer and thereby projected herself
into New York’s legal services market; this was sufficient to
493. See, e.g., United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 151 (2d Cir. 2007)
(rejecting challenges to admission of instant messages); People v. Pierre, 838
N.Y.S.2d 546, 548 (App. Div. 2007) (holding that trial court properly admitted text
message authenticated by circumstantial evidence); In the Interest of F.P., 878
A.2d 91, 93 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (holding that instant messages were admissible
and properly authenticated through the use of circumstantial evidence).
494. Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v. Montana Bd. of Invs., 850 N.E.2d 1140, 1141–
42 (N.Y. 2006).
495. Id. at 1142.
496. Id.
497. Id.
498. Id.
499. Id. (quoting Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 522 N.E.2d 40, 43 (N.Y.
1988)).
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support long-arm jurisdiction over the client when she was
sued by her New York lawyer for unjust enrichment and
breach of contract arising from her nonpayment of legal
500
fees.
A law firm with more than 600 lawyers that maintained a
practice on a “coast-to-coast” platform and one of its partners
who worked in the firm’s Columbus, Ohio office were sued in
a Delaware chancery court for allegedly aiding and abetting a
breach of fiduciary duty by top managers of a publicly-held
company incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in
501
The law firm and its partner challenged the
Ohio.
complaint on the ground that they were not subject to
personal jurisdiction in Delaware because the partner had
never entered Delaware in connection with the representation
and did not file any documents with any court or agency in
502
However,
Delaware in connection with the representation.
the plaintiff presented evidence that the client’s Certificate
Amendment was drafted by a paralegal under the partner’s
supervision and sent to the Corporation Service Company in
503
Delaware for filling. The defendants argued that they could
not be sued simply for performing services for a client since
504
The
they only received fees in exchange for those services.
Vice Chancellor rejected their arguments, emphasizing that
the law firm represented on its website that it had a “unique
[ten office] coast-to-coast platform,” and advertised itself as
“being able to handle the full range of any corporation’s legal
505
The
needs, regardless of its location in the United States.”
Vice Chancellor observed that:
For sophisticated counsel to argue that they did not
realize that acting as the de facto outside general counsel
to a Delaware corporation and regularly providing advice
about Delaware law about matters important to that

500. Fischbarg v. Doucet, 880 N.E.2d 22 (N.Y. 2007); see also Stone v. Patchett,
No. 08 CV 5171(RPP), 2009 WL 1108596, at *4, *10 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2009)
(finding that New York had jurisdiction over defendant in case involving
communications by fax, e-mail, and telephone); Centrifugal Force, Inc. v. Softnet
Commc’n, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 5463(CM)(GWG), 2009 WL 1059647, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 17, 2009) (finding defendant created a relationship with a New York
corporation, and, thus, New York had jurisdiction).
501. Sample v. Morgan, 935 A.2d 1046, 1048, 1052–53 (Del. Ch. 2007).
502. Id. at 1054–55.
503. Id. at 1054.
504. Id. at 1060–61.
505. Id. at 1053, 1063.
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corporation and its stockholders might expose it to this
court’s jurisdiction fails the straight-face test. The moving
defendants knew that the propriety of the corporate
action taken in reliance upon its advice and through its
services would be determined under Delaware corporate
506
law, and likely in a Delaware court.
The Vice Chancellor held that the arranging for the filing of a
corporate instrument in Delaware that facilitated transactions
under challenge in litigation and the advising on Delaware law to a
Delaware corporation that resulted in injury in Delaware were
sufficient to constitute the transaction of business and to provide a
507
basis for jurisdiction. New communications technologies and the
practices that coalesce around their use tend to raise novel issues
under ethical rules. By routinely reviewing such rules counsel can
mitigate, if not eliminate, the risk of misremembering the
mandates or departing inadvertently from their spirit.
Routinely keeping abreast of new communications
technologies is an increasingly important part of the practice of
law. Doing so reduces the probability of being surprised by the
misuse of such new technologies or failing to provide the requisite
degree of supervision for associates, staff, and service providers.
Fulfilling the implicit ethical obligation to keep abreast of new
communications technologies involves several tasks, including the
basic ones of identifying new technologies that seem to be gaining
widespread acceptance and learning of risks that may arise from
their use and misuse, particularly by clients, lawyers, and law firms.
Sometimes the risks will come from new technologies that are not
widespread, not the subject of multiple reports in the media, and
yet are important for counsel to be aware of. For example, there
has been little reporting of the risks from “side-channel attacks,”
but they pose a severe risk to enterprises. These attacks exploit
vulnerabilities in the reflective surfaces (such as eyeglasses and
506. Id. at 1065.
507. Id. at 1057, 1063. The Vice Chancellor also noted public policy reasons in
support of the decision, stating that:
Delaware has no public policy interest in shielding corporate advisors
from responsibility for consciously assisting the managers of Delaware
corporations in breaching their fiduciary duties. If well-pled facts can be
pled that support the inference that a corporate advisor knowingly
assisted corporate directors in breaching their fiduciary duties, Delaware
has a public policy interest in ensuring that its courts are available to
derivative plaintiffs who wish to hold that advisor accountable to the
corporation.
Id. at 1065.
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computer screens) throughout offices and capture them on the
latest photographic and video recording devices. As explained in
an article in the May 2009 issue of Scientific American:
[A]n alarmingly wide range of objects can bounce secrets
right off our screens and into an eavesdropper’s camera.
Spectacles work just fine, as do coffee cups, plastic bottles,
metal jewelry —even . . . the eyeballs of the computer
user. The mere act of viewing information can give it
away.
The reflection of screen images is only one of the
many ways in which our computers leak information
through so-called side channels, security holes that bypass
the normal encryption and operating-system restrictions
we rely on to protect sensitive data.
....
“Side-channel” attacks exploit the unprotected area
where the computer meets the real world . . . at a stage
before the information is encrypted or after it has been
translated into human-readable form. Such attacks also
leave no anomalous log entries or corrupted files to signal
that a theft has occurred, no traces that would allow
security researchers to piece together how frequently they
happen. The experts are sure of only one thing: whenever
information is vulnerable and has significant monetary or
intelligence value, it is only a matter of time until
508
someone tries to steal it.
In closing, we believe it is important to identify one other step
that counsel may find prudent and valuable in fulfilling ethical
obligations related to the emergence and use of new
communications technologies. Integral to the ethical duty to keep
abreast of technology, but easily overlooked in efforts to fulfill it, is
the need to be alert to the use of words that create the appearance
of an objective assessment of a new communications technology
when, in fact, the words work to coax the reader to trust an
assertion, when the reader should be examining, testing, and
challenging it. In his 1946 essay, Politics and the English Language,
George Orwell cautioned against uses of language that can cause
readers to concede points that they should be examining; instead,
words that “are used to dress up a simple statement and give an air
of scientific impartiality to biased judgments” and that are used for
508.
58.

W. Wayt Gibbs, How to Steal Secrets Without a Network, SCI. AM., May 2009, at
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509

“the defense of the indefensible.”
As lawyers, we continuously train ourselves to be vigilant and
critical of the use of words in contracts, board resolutions, replies
to interrogatories, and other documents where what is written will
be taken seriously, where it will be understood to be the expression
of what was meant, and where inaccuracy or any effort to mislead
may harm others and ultimately may harm the author and the
author’s legal counsel.
In order to keep abreast of new
communications technology, it is valuable to train ourselves to be
equally critical of the uses of words that developers, vendors, and
promoters use to describe such technologies and their capabilities
and benefits. When the description of capabilities seems to omit a
serious assessment of shortcomings or of ways in which
performance may fall short of specifications or representations, or
disclaims in one provision promises made in others, it should be
seen as a red flag that important information is missing. When the
description of benefits purports to address potential weaknesses,
deficiencies, or risks, but does so in a manner that, on close
examination, proves to have been written to persuade the reader
that the risks do not exist or have been dealt with in ways not really
disclosed, this too should be seen as a red flag. For example, when
a web page document, entitled 10 Reasons to use Azure for Your Cloud
Apps, discusses the important topic of “Security,” there should be a
discussion of the vulnerabilities before there is an assertion that
they have been minimized, mitigated, averted, or rendered
510
Instead, such document offers the following
nonexistent.
assurance designed to make the reader complacent, less vigilant,
more trusting, and ultimately unquestioning of the assurances and
the risks it obscures: “Knowing that security is one of the biggest
concerns for companies considering a move to the cloud, Microsoft
designed Azure with security in mind. . . . Microsoft has designed
511
its compliance framework to meet regulatory requirements.”
A contract for the design and development of a computerbased system would provide the customer little protection of its
interests if the specifications stated merely that the vendor must
“design[] . . . [the system] with security in mind” and that it must
509. GEORGE ORWELL, POLITICS AND THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1946), available at
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/orwell46.htm.
510. Debra Littlejohn Shinder, 10 Reasons to Use Azure for Your Cloud Apps,
TECHREPUBLIC § 9 (Jan. 6, 2010, 9:41 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com
/blog/10things/10-reasons-to-use-azure-for-your-cloud-apps/1282.
511. Id.
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be “designed . . . to meet regulatory requirements.”
Competent
counsel would challenge such vacuous specifications.
It is
important for counsel to alert themselves, their law firms, and their
firm’s clients when a new communications technology contains
risks that are being obscured, trivialized, or otherwise deemphasized by the language the vendors have used not only in
marketing literature, but in the service level agreements, white
papers, and other documents that a client and its counsel should
consider adding to their due diligence list. As in any due diligence
exercise, where documents authored by a party to the transaction
contain statements or omissions that should be clear red flags, it is
prudent to ask questions in order to understand whether the red
flag is evidence of a risk, and, if so, whether the risk can be
mitigated—and whether the client can accept the risk to the extent
mitigated.
Just as counsel often asks a client to explain its business, its
manufacturing methods, and its technologies, and will compare
those descriptions to the client’s published statements to see where
they match and where they might diverge, counsel in fulfillment of
professional ethical obligations will often benefit from comparing
what can be learned of a new communications technology to what
the technologies’ developers, vendors, and supporters say, write,
and publish. As we have noted in this essay, there are many places
where the cloud vendors’ statements to promote their technology
seem to diverge from what the vendors put in their standard service
level agreements and seem also to diverge from the risks disclaimed
or that one discovers in the reports of problems that the vendors’
published statements did not hint at or seem uninterested in
pointing out to potential customers.
Because the client’s confidential information and interests are
at stake, as is counsel’s reputation and the ability to fulfill
professional ethical obligations, it is worth learning and keeping
abreast of the changes in technology and of the changes in the
mismatches between the language vendors use to describe and
emphasize and the language they use to de-emphasize. That is an
important part of keeping abreast of new technologies. Failure to
do so can lead counsel to underestimate the promises in a service
level agreement to a client’s detriment. For example, promises
such as those that typically appear in the agreement’s specification
of “uptime” service level can be complex. When probed, the
512.

Id.
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specifications prove to be difficult for the customer to verify
because key facts required for the computation of “uptime” are not
513
accessible to the customer.
Such failure can also cause counsel to be distracted by the
drum beat of promotional discourse. As a result, counsel may
become so accustomed to reading the praises of a new
communications technology and the exhortations to “adopt it or be
left in its wake” that counsel may come to believe that the new
technology really performs as well its promoters promise it will and
that the risks, whatever they might have been, have ceased to exist
or never did or must have been exaggerated. Add to that the
tendency for experienced lawyers to want to avoid appearing either
ill at ease with new technology or not as technologically adept as
younger colleagues, and it can be difficult for such counsel to
remain vigilant and keenly observant for undisclosed defects and
risks in a new, widely popular communications technology. To
counteract the dulling of a lawyer’s skeptical questioning of new
technologies and the loss of a healthy wariness that should
accompany the use of new communication devices there are some
antidotes, one of which is for counsel to be presented with
contemporaneous and sharply contrasting reports of the same
technology with one praising it and one revealing an unsuspected
513. For example, Microsoft’s Service Level Agreement for its Azure Storage
Service Level Agreement, promises an “uptime” of “99.9%,” but that is expressed
as a “monthly uptime percentage.” Windows Azure Storage SLA-English.doc,
MICROSOFT § 4, http://www.microsoft.com/download/en/details.aspx?id=6656
(last visited Oct. 20, 2011). Such percentage is to be “calculated by subtracting
from 100% the average Error Rate for the billing month for the customer’s
storage transactions . . . .” Id. The “Error Rate,” in turn, is defined as the “total
number of Failed Storage Transactions divided by the Total Storage Transactions”
that occur during an hour. Id. § 3. To know if the “uptime” has not been
achieved, a customer would have to be able to compute a value for the “Error
Rate” denominator; and, to do that, the customer has to first know its own “Total
Storage Transactions” for a month. Id. Few, if any, customers are likely to be
keeping, or to be able to keep, an accurate count of such transactions, making the
“Error Rate” incomputable. Furthermore, the customer would also need to be
able to compute a value for the “Error Rate” numerator; and, to do that, the
customer has to have access to the records of incidents of “Failed Storage
Transactions.” Id. The Service Level Agreement defines that as any of certain
occasions when a request exceeds the specified “Maximum Processing Time,” but
it qualifies that by stating that “the amount of time spent processing a request . . .
does not include the time it takes to transfer the request to/from the Windows
Azure Storage service” and “only includes the time spent processing the request,”
neither of which a customer will be able to access. Id. § 2. Thus, both the
numerator and the denominator of the “Error Rate” prove to be incomputable by
a customer, making the “uptime” of “99.9%” an undeterminable and thus
unenforceable term for a cloud customer.
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risk and its damaging consequences.
An example of two such contrasting reports appeared in the
morning newspapers on August 31, 2011, on the eve of the
submission of this article for publication. The bright side of cloud
computing received expression in an op-ed piece published in The
New York Times, and in reading it one would be tempted to believe
that any security risks inherent in the cloud had either been
disarmed or never had existed. For the author cheerfully writes:
The State Department, for instance, has raised concerns
about whether the cloud approach introduces security
risks, since data is stored off site by private contractors.
But cloud computing is often far more secure than
traditional computing, because companies like Google
and Amazon can attract and retain cyber-security
personnel of a higher quality than many governmental
agencies. And government employees are so accustomed
to using cloud services like Dropbox and Gmail in their
personal lives that, even if their agencies don’t formally
permit cloud computing, they use it for work purposes
anyway, creating a “shadow I.T.” that leads to a more
vulnerable organization than would a properly overseen
cloud computing system.
The United States cannot afford to be left behind in
514
the cloud computing revolution.
The dark side of cloud computing came to light in the
Financial Times, which reported an incident that the author
apparently found both alarming and discomforting:
The worst breach to date in the dominant system for
securing websites has raised fears that thousands of
Iranians have had their Google e-mail read by government
authorities.
A Dutch company called DigiNotar . . .
[which sells] certificates to authenticate sensitive sites,
said on Tuesday that it discovered that it had been hacked
on July 19, allowing unknown attackers to fake certificates
and impersonate websites beginning with the letters
“https” and displaying a padlock to visitors. Known
formally as Secure Sockets Layer, the system is used
worldwide by banks and communications providers,
including Google mail or Gmail . . . . [Some makers of
web browsers] decided to ban all DigiNotar certificates
. . . . [DigiNotar] said it did not expect material harm to
514. Vivek Kundra, Op-Ed., Tight Budget? Look to the ‘Cloud,’ N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
31, 2011, at A27.
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its business, but shares in the company fell 6 per cent.
Whether counsel believes in the bright or the dark side of
cloud computing, seeing two such reports juxtaposed should
sharpen and reinvigorate the questions that counsel might find
prudent to ask of the technology and its vendors before venturing
to store client confidential information in the cloud with the
attendant risks to reputation, client trust, and professional ethical
obligations. Among those questions, counsel will probably find
several that lawyers, law firms, and state bar ethics committees
asked of earlier communications technologies that appeared
attractive and nonetheless created brave new worlds of digital
capabilities and digital risks.
Boards of directors also may need to reckon with cybersecurity
threats and reported attacks. As they do so, priorities and the
weights assigned to cybersecurity risks will change. Risks thought to
be remote may be recalibrated as imminent threats. Having
measured technologies for their probable benefits, boards may
require that technologies be measured also for their vulnerabilities
and the potential for damage to the enterprise. As the CEO of
Hyundai Capital suggested, boards may ask if the enterprise can
afford the total of adoption and management of the new
cybersecurity technology.
New technologies in the last ten years have increased a lay
person’s ability to report—to publish and broadcast written
utterance as well as photographs and videos that express each
individual’s account of events that they have witnessed or to which
516
And yet, ironically, the rush to adopt and
they are reacting.
adapt these technologies to benefit a corporate enterprise, eager to
extract value from the use of social media externally and internally
to the enterprise, has not led to greater care in the use of words to
describe such technologies, but instead has led to a prolific use of
vague terms that obscure from counsel and their clients the precise
515. Joseph Mann, E-mail Breach in Iran Raises Surveillance Fears, FIN. TIMES Aug.
30, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6bb480b4-d327-11e0-9ba8
-00144feab49a.html#axzz1Y3gVT1p7.
516. As David Friend recently observed, “[o]n Sept. 11, 2001, there was no
such thing as a YouTube video. Or a Facebook page. Or a Twitter feed. Cell
phone cameras did not exist.” David Friend, Seeing 9/11 Through a Digital Prism,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424053111903461304576524781716173962.html. However, since then,
as he also notes, “the documentation of conflict—in the form of still photographs
and moving pictures, often by civilians carrying camera—equipped mobile
phones, whose footage can be viewed almost instantaneously across the globe—
actually takes precedent [sic] in the public mind over context and analysis.” Id.
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nature and risks of such technologies.
It has become far easier today than a decade ago to release
incautiously considered expressions that once posted remain
sempiternally attached to and accessible on the Web, and thus on
view for all the world to see. Before a letter was posted, it was often
reread. There was time to reconsider its phrasing and content.
And many times reconsideration of a handwritten or typewritten
letter led to a decision to rewrite it or not to send it. Before an email was transmitted, there tended to be much less time to
reconsider the text, because e-mails were (and continue to be)
often quick responses to other e-mails sent with the expectation of,
if not the insistence on, a quick reply. As a result, lawyers often
learned that pressing the SEND key prematurely could lead to
unfortunate results: text that sorely needed revision, or a message
that went to REPLY ALL when it was written for only one of the
addressees, sometimes raising the risk of waiving the privilege
concerning certain communications. The move towards brevity
that has accompanied the adoption of communicating by texting,
social network postings, and tweets should alert lawyers that
learning each new communications technology brings with it a
professional responsibility for using the technology in a manner
consistent with counsel’s ethical obligations, however inconvenient
and contrary to our culture’s social customs such caution may
appear to be when observed by digital natives, laymen, and
corporate executives.
Two of the most unsuspected risks from each new
communications technology appear to be the increasingly
incautious use of the media, which counsel must avoid while
nonetheless learning and using such media, and the increasingly
obscure use of words to describe the workings, benefits, and risks of
such media, which counsel must diligently discern and highlight
for clients. The measure of success or failure in averting such risks
is not, and probably should not be, found in the precepts of a state
bar association’s code of professional responsibility. The practice
of law is difficult to do well, and will not be improved by adding
ethical liability as an incentive for using good judgment and
common sense, especially when the rules in their current form
supply adequate reminders of the need to use good judgment and
common sense when communicating with old, as well as with new,
technologies. Having new equipment to communicate sadly may
make it harder to capture what we really need to say, and to avoid
saying it in client-sensitive communications. And our efforts to
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express our thoughts are already dependent on words and
expressions that tend to deteriorate in ways that often escape our
notice, as the poet T.S. Eliot recognized when he wrote:
And so each venture
Is a new beginning, a raid on the inarticulate
With shabby equipment always deteriorating
In the general mess of imprecision of feeling,
Undisciplined squads of emotion . . . .
517
For us, there is only the trying. The rest is not our business.

517. T.S. ELIOT, East Coker, in THE COMPLETE POEMS
123, 128 (1962).
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